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Abstract 
 
By using case-studies as method of analysis, the dissertation analyzes the impact external 
variables can have at the onset of genocide and politicides. While a majority of studies focus on 
internal conditions when analyzing these events, the basic premise of this dissertation states that 
to understand why genocide and politicide occur it is important to assess the role of external 
variables as well as the interaction between them and the internal variables. The dissertation builds 
upon Harff’s (2003) statistical model of genocide/politicide, which tested internal variables as 
predictors of genocide or politicide events. The model, however, misclassified 26% of the cases. 
The cases included in the dissertation, Iraq, Indonesia and East Timor, were selected because they 
have at least two events with one accurately predicted and another not predicted by Harff’s model. 
The dissertation used a modified version of Stoett’s (2004) classification of state involvement to 
assess the role of external variables at the onset of these crimes: effects of colonialism at state 
creation, direct assistance, and indirect support.  
By using case-studies it was possible to observe the interaction between the external and 
internal variables and how those dynamics worked at the onset of genocide and politicide, allowing 
to observe how external variables influenced, constituted and created the events and which ones 
had a larger impact. It was found that external variables can affect whether regimes develop the 
reasons and obtain the means and opportunities to carry out the crimes. Furthermore, the case 
studies revealed that external variables can have both direct and indirect effects which can increase 
or decrease the probability of genocide/politicide. While the effects of colonization are the main 
root cause of conflict, these effects had mostly already been embedded in the domestic conditions 
before the events. Overall, direct assistance and indirect support had the most impact at the onset, 
providing both means and opportunities, and in some cases, even the reasons for engaging in 
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genocide or politicide. In some instances, indirect assistance in the form of strategic indifference 
or diplomatic support proved to have a stronger effect.  
One important finding is direct assistance and indirect support can change in directionality, 
explaining why some cases progressed further into genocide/politicide or why they did not. 
External states had very specific reasons for providing/removing the assistance to either the 
government to the militant groups, or both. Thus, when interests of external powers changed, the 
assistance could be removed completely or given to the opposite group. These changes in 
directionality of support reflect broader dynamics of international security and political issues. 
These changes in directionality of support should be taken into account in policies for prevention 
of genocide and politicide. New policies should include the effect of the international environment, 
as well as changes in directionality of assistance, both in providing the conditions for the crimes 
to occur and in allowing or preventing any intervention to stop them. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide in 1948 (UNGC) was created with the objective of preventing genocides from 
happening “ever again”, genocides have occurred ever since “and the phenomenon in question 
remains endemic” (Jones 2008, p. ix). Since World War II there have been almost fifty genocides 
and politicides1, killing at least 12 million people (Harff 2003, p. 57). Genocides and politicides 
such as those in Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, and Biafra in Nigeria to name 
a few, occurred without much external attempt to stop the violence. Indeed to some extent, “never 
again” has proven an empty slogan. However, the genocides in Rwanda (in 1994) and in Srebrenica 
(in 1995) generated a new debate on genocide prevention and military intervention. It had been 
argued that the lack of prompt action was due to the contradiction between the international 
principle of state sovereignty2 on the one hand and military intervention to protect human rights 
on the other. In the context of this conceptual tension, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan asked the world: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica –to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (We the Peoples 
2001, p. 48). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) created 
the report on Responsibility to Protect in 2001 as a response to Annan’s question. The ICISS was 
                                                          
1 Definitions and analysis are provided below. 
2 “Sovereignty refers to the capacity or characteristic (of nation-states) to be independent of external influence in the 
management of their internal affairs, where the distinction between internal and external is in turn delimited by the 
territorial boundaries of a state’s claim to (sovereign) authority” (Hay & Lister 2007, p. 270). 
2 
 
led by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. The UN General Assembly adopted this principle in 
2005, as declared by the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/6O/L. 1)3 (Evans & Sahnoun 2001; 
Responsibilitytoprotect.org 2014).  
R2P attempts to protect not only from the crime of genocide, but also from crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes4. R2P states that (1) the world needs to pay attention 
to probable cases and take action to prevent a crisis from emerging; (2) if prevention fails and 
violence begins, military intervention must be undertaken to protect targeted civilians; (3) once 
the conflict has lessened, assistance must be provided to help people rebuild (Evans & Sahnoun 
2001).  
R2P thus challenges state sovereignty; while the debate on the right to intervene studied 
the conditions under which military intervention would be considered legal or illegal under 
international law, R2P attempts to change the terms of the debate by equating sovereignty with 
responsibility, as opposed to right. Furthermore, this responsibility is both internal and external: 
internally, a sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its population from the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. But more importantly, 
responsibility is also external; thus if a state is not fulfilling this responsibility, it then becomes the 
responsibility of the international community to protect the affected population: 
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, 
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
                                                          
3 The World Summit Outcome in 2005 was unanimously adopted by all UN member states, including paragraphs 
138 and 139, which refer to Responsibility to Protect. Since then, different discussions within the UN General 
Assembly as well as reports by the Secretary General on R2P have been put forward. More importantly, the UN 
Security Council has enacted 21 resolutions on R2P since 2006, 16 of which were enacted after 2009; For instance: 
“On 21 August 2014, the UN Security Council adopted another resolution (S/RES/2171(2014)) on conflict 
prevention, which also included operative paragraphs on RtoP reaffirming that states have a responsibility to protect 
civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and recalling the important role 
of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and RtoP” (Responsibilitytoprotect.org 2014, p. 4).   
4 Definitions and analysis are provided below. 
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unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect (Evans & Sahnoun 2001, p. xi)  
 
The expectation of R2P is to avoid late intervention or nonintervention at all due to political 
and legal discussions over these principles. To carry out the tasks of R2P, the UN created a new 
office for R2P. In addition, although R2P covers the crime of genocide, the UN also created two 
Special Adviser offices: the Special Adviser on the prevention of genocide (created in 2004) and 
the Special Adviser for R2P (created in 2007). These two are described as complementary, sharing 
“a common methodology for early warning, assessment, convening, learning, and advocacy, as 
well as a common office and staff” (UN Prevent genocide). In addition, to the ICISS report, 
scholars and expert international aid workers have created guidelines to solidify R2P into actual 
state practices5. One was developed in the United States in 2008: Preventing Genocide: A 
Blueprint for US Policymakers.  The second one emerged in Canada in 2009: Mobilizing the Will 
to Intervene (W2I) Initiative (both of these are referred below as R2P documents). 
Following the premises of the principle of R2P as developed by ICISS, these documents 
begin with tasks of prevention, focusing on early warning signs of impending genocide and acting 
before it occurs. While the premise is accurate, there are two main issues with these documents 
that would make this difficult to accomplish. The first issue is that they do not coincide on their 
conceptualization of the crimes6. The problem is that if there is no agreement on what a genocide 
is, for instance, it is harder to coincide in the cases that need attention and intervention, making 
                                                          
5 Some NGOs were created with the purpose of supporting R2P, for instance the International Coalition for the 
Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). 
6 ICISS report on R2P includes the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. 
While Mobilizing the Will to intervene uses “mass atrocities” throughout the document to refer to all the four crimes, 
Preventing Genocide uses “genocide and mass atrocities”, thus separating genocide and collapsing the three other 
crimes within the “mass atrocities” category.  
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more difficult to reach agreement on how to prevent them. Second, the R2P documents focus 
mostly on domestic, structural issues as the key causes of the crimes with little attention to the 
external context. The external factors -- for instance, the role of other states in transferring 
weapons, blocking UN decision-making, supporting a regime for economic interests, among others 
-- and their interaction with domestic variables have, in general, been under-studied and are the 
main focus of analysis in this dissertation. The dissertation highlights the importance of providing 
sufficient weight to the external context in R2P.  
Since its inception, scholars have analyzed the strengths and limitations of R2P (see for 
example: (Badescu & Weiss 2011; Hehir 2010; Schabas 2009, 2010; Boghossian 2010). Among 
the biggest challenges of R2P is applying it to an international situation. For instance, Russia 
justified its intervention in Georgia under R2P. Similarly, the government of Kyrgyzstan solicited 
help invoking R2P. Another important challenge is that as the main task of R2P is prevention, it is 
challenging to take measures to prevent without creating further conflict.  
Given that the priority of R2P is to prevent crises from emerging, the basic task is to 
identify the causes of these crimes to prioritize probable cases of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes and from there, derive policies of prevention and 
intervention. The main assumption is that genocide arises due to internal political, economic and 
social conditions --as stressed by most scholarly work on genocide (see literature review below). 
In the ICISS conception of R2P, to prevent the four crimes (genocide, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes), it is important to address the causes that make these 
crimes possible: Institutionally-- lack of democratic institutions, power sharing and the rule of law; 
economically-- inequality, terms of trade; as well as enhancing military training, education, among 
others (Evans & Sahnoun 2001, p. 23). For Mobilizing the Will to Intervene, mass atrocities occur 
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when structural factors converge with proximate causes: poverty and inequality, population growth 
and the youth bulge, ethnic nationalism, and climate change. For Preventing Genocide, the causes 
of genocide and mass atrocities include “armed conflict or a change in regime character… history 
of genocide, autocracy, state-led discrimination, and high infant mortality” (p. 26). 
While it is certainly evident that these internal conditions could very well be the precipitant 
factors of genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes, it is also important 
to analyze if external conditions could have an effect at the onset of these crimes.  
Scholarly research has not argued that external conditions do not matter, but several authors 
agree that the role of external conditions in genocide research remains under-analyzed and that 
comprehensive, comparative studies of the role of external conditions are not abundant (Jones 
2004, 2011; Kroslak 2002; Stoett 2004; Rumney 2003; Levene 2004). For example, Rumney 
(2003) argues, “it is clear from a review of legal scholarship that little serious or sustained attention 
is given to the role of Western states in the crime of genocide” (p. 595).  
The gap in the study of the onset of genocide has been explained as a way to avoid 
“accusations of engaging in conspiracy theorizing” (Stoett 2004, p. 32) or because genocide is seen 
as something that is “out there”, happening in a faraway place and it is not our concern (Levene 
2004, p. 155). Perhaps the reason why external conditions have not been systematically analyzed 
is that this could be seen as removing responsibility from the government committing the crimes, 
and placing it at the international level (Karl Holsti in Jones 2011, p. 47). Yet another reason is 
that states do not want to be accused of the same crimes they are accusing others (Jones 2006). 
Whatever the reason, the analysis of external variables will augment our understanding of these 
events, providing that key variables be taken into account by policies directed toward prevention. 
In this dissertation, examining external conditions is complementary rather than in opposition to 
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the literature analyzing internal causes.  
The starting premise for the dissertation is that external factors do have an effect on the 
onset of genocide. The main research questions that guided the dissertation are: (1) What external 
(international) factors have the most impact on the onset and progression of genocide-politicide? 
And, (2) how do these factors interact with internal factors to generate the conditions that give rise 
to such events? 
This study builds upon Barbara Harff’s statistical model of genocide/politicide (2003): out 
of 127 world-wide cases of internal war, 37 experienced events of genocide and/or politicide. To 
explain why there were genocide/politicide in these 37 situations and not in the rest, Harff analyzed 
domestic variables and tested them in a statistical model. The final model included these variables: 
(1) political upheaval, (2) prior genocide, (3) exclusionary ideology, (4) regime type, (5) ethnic 
character of ruling elite, and (6) trade openness. The model accurately predicted 74% of the cases 
but misclassified 26% of the cases.  
The main argument for this dissertation is that external variables can explain these 
misclassified cases. In the case of false negatives, external factors could have contributed to the 
progression of the genocide or politicide in a way that internal factors alone could not. In the case 
of false positives, external factors could have been alleviating factors, lessening the probability of 
the crimes. The attempt is not to uncover the primordial cause; it is not a question about what was 
first the egg or the chicken, the internal or the external. It is about analyzing how they interact and 
how the external can exacerbate or diminish the internal. 
The cases selected to analyze the interaction between the internal and the external variables 
at the onset of genocide/politicide cover all the range of possible predictions by the model: 
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 Iraq had two instances of genocide, one beginning in 1963 (not predicted by the model) 
and the other one beginning in 1988 (predicted by the model). 
 Indonesia had three: 1956 (predicted); 1975 (predicted); and events during the last 
years of the 1990s (not genocide, but predicted by the model as genocide). 
 Sri Lanka: one non-genocide accurately predicted and 1 genocide not predicted. 
 
Relevance of the study 
 
This research is relevant in several ways: it expands the research of genocide by including 
external factors in the analysis of its onset and not just as a response to the conflict. It also analyzes 
the interaction between the internal and the external; thus, aligning with research that assesses the 
possibility and mechanism of intervention (including when and how to intervene and what could 
be possible unintended consequences of intervention). Because the cases selected included events 
accurately and inaccurately predicted by the model, this allowed to understand the interaction 
between the internal and external in a variety of contexts.  
 
  Predicted Not Predicted 
  Gen Non-Gen Gen Non-Gen 
Iraq 1   1   
Indonesia 2     1 
Sri Lanka   1 1   
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Structure of the dissertation  
 
The Literature Review first analyzes the debates around the conceptualization of the concept of 
genocide and later focuses on the debates around the onset of the crimes, including the internal and external 
variables that have been considered in the literature for analyzing why and when genocides occur. Chapter 
2, Methodology, explains the case-study research in the dissertation. A description of Harff’s model is 
included as well as the modifications made to Stoett’s classification of external involvement. The case study 
chapters (Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Iraq) are structured in the following manner: First, the chapter offers a 
brief overview of Harff’s model for each case as well as the research questions. Second, a brief historical 
review is provided, followed by an analysis of external issues. The conclusion of the dissertation provides 
a comparative analysis of the three case-studies.  
 
Literature Review 
 
The underlying assumption in genocide research is that the more we understand genocide, 
the more we will be able to prevent it. Adam Jones (2011) described the tasks of genocide scholars: 
first “to define genocide and bound it conceptually. Second … to prevent genocide” (p. 15-16). 
Thus, the literature review first will follow the debate around the concept of genocide and then 
discuss how it occurs. 
 
The conceptualization of the crimes and the debate around them 
 
As with many other studies and discussions regarding genocide, crimes against humanity 
and similar events, there is no consensus on the definition of the crimes covered by R2P, especially 
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genocide and crimes against humanity. There are discrepancies between the use of these concepts 
in international legal settings and in academia. Definitions adopted by the UN and the ICC7 have 
been challenged by scholars; also, the concepts of genocide and crimes against humanity are 
treated differently in the R2P documents.  
During World War I, the Ottoman Empire began an extermination campaign against 
Armenians and other Christian minorities. Despite the cover of the Great War, the mass killings 
and forced migration were known abroad. These crimes became known as crimes against humanity 
and civilization. The concept of genocide was developed later, between the 1920s and the 1930s 
by Raphael Lemkin, a jurist from Poland, after an Armenian was arrested in Berlin for the murder 
of Talat Pasha, one of the planners of the genocide, while the British government freed other people 
that had been involved in the planning for the Armenian genocide. Lemkin began an energetic 
campaign for the new concept of genocide: “the intentional destruction of national groups on the 
basis of their collective identity” (Jones 2011, p. 10).  
After the experience of the Jews and other minorities under the Nazi concentration camps, 
and the creation of the United Nations, the UN Genocide Convention adopted a modified version 
of Lemkin’s concept of genocide8: 
Article II of the UNGC defines genocide as:   
…any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members 
of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
                                                          
7 The ICC adopted the same definition of genocide as the UN. The ICC has jurisdiction over three of the crimes 
covered by R2P: War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
8 The UNGC left out political groups and cultural genocide, which were included in Lemkin’s original proposal for 
genocide (Schabas 2000, Chalk & Jonassohn 1999; Jones 2011). The UNGC definition, however, include the forced 
transfer of children which was not included in Lemkin’s definition. 
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group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group (UNGC, 1948). 
 
This definition, however, has been rejected by many scholars9, who have challenged key 
sections and made modifications accordingly. Debates on the conceptualization of genocide center 
around (1) the victim groups that are included and excluded and how to describe these groups; (2) 
the agents of genocide (whether non-state actors could also be perpetrators); (3) whether killing is 
the defining characteristic of genocide or if indirect means of destruction should also be 
considered; (4) and the implication of the phrase “in whole or in part” (how many people have to 
die or be affected for an event to be considered genocide). Given all these areas of debate, it is not 
surprising that there are almost as many definitions of genocide as there are people studying it.10 
The debate has not only produced a critique to the definition, but it has also sprouted a myriad of 
definitions of genocide. And, as by Huttenback (2004), we do not really have a “conceptually all-
embracing definition of genocide” (p. 149-150). 
 
Victims: “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” 
 
There is an overall consensus that it is problematic that the UNGC conceptualization of 
                                                          
9 Some authors do not reject the definition, for instance Eric Weitz (2010) and Berel Lang (2010). William I. Schabas 
(2010) argues that the problem is not necessarily the definition itself, but that people want it to fit cases that it does 
not fit. 
10 Jones (2011) lists 22 different definitions of genocide by different scholars. For useful surveys of genocide 
definitions as well as analysis of these see Straus, 2001, p. 350-358 and Adam Jones, 2011, p. 16-20. Also see 
Moshman 2001. 
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genocide includes only national, ethnical, racial and religious groups; there is less agreement on 
which groups should be also included and how to define these groups. Jones (2011) lists different 
conceptualizations that scholars have created to reflect the political, economic or social groups 
they think should be included, for instance: Politicide (Barbara Harff); Classicide (Michael Mann); 
Democide (R.J. Rummel); Eliticide (Samuel Totten, Paul R. Bartrop, and Steven L. Jacobs); 
Gendercide (Mary Anne Warren); Urbicide (Marshall Berman); among others (in Jones 2011: 26-
29)11. 
In addition to the issue of inclusion and exclusion in the UNGC definition, another 
contentious issue is the segment “as such”: Although perpetrators may target a specific religious 
or ethnic group, the reasons for doing so are complex since issues of politics, identity and 
economics are interconnected. Ethnicity and ethnic affiliations can be as artificially constructed as 
are political affiliations. Evidence shows “that contemporary ethnic identity may have rather 
shallow historical roots draws our attention to the fact that ethnicity can be shaped by political and 
economic factors as much as by ancestry and inherited culture” (Cribb 2001, p. 222). Furthermore, 
identities “never exist in isolation” (Jones 2011, p. 34). Group identity is fluid and evolves over 
time. As Schabas critically argues, people always belong to different groups, and the argument 
that an event is genocide because the victims belonged to a national group12 “leads to the 
conclusion that all mass killing is equivalent to genocide, because obviously any large group of 
people will belong to one or more national groups. The reasoning becomes circular and in effect 
deprives the distinct concept of genocide of any real meaning"(Schabas 2000, p. 290). For Chalk 
and Jonassohn (1990), the solution to the problem of defining the victims “lies in using the 
perpetrator’s definition of the victim group” (p. 10).   
                                                          
11 However, for scholars like Irving Horowitz (2010), these categorizations debilitate the concept of genocide (p. 10).   
12 Schabas was criticizing Hurst Hannum’s argument that the killings in Cambodia were genocidal.  
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Although not explicit in many definitions there is some agreement that the victims are non-
combatant civilians. In most cases of extreme violence the distinction between victims and 
perpetrators is blurred, however. At the same time, because genocide always occurs in the context 
of war or in its aftermath (for example, Mann 2005; Jones 2011; Levene 2004; Fein 1993; Harff 
2003), it is very difficult to differentiate victims of genocide from victims of war –or other crimes 
for that matter. There may be a time when it would be easier to distinguish between victims and 
perpetrators but once victims begin to defend themselves, it is more complicated. Harff and Gurr 
(1988) allow for this in their definition: “if unarmed civilians are deliberately and systematically 
killed, even if they support an opposition group (rebels), then the event is a genocide or politicide” 
(p. 360).  
 
Agents: the perpetrators of genocide 
 
The UNGC definition of genocide does not specify who can be the perpetrator of the crime. 
Most authors consider it a crime of the state (Lemkin 1944 in Straus 2006, Horowitz 1997; Melson 
1992; Chalk & Jonassohn 1990; Scherrer 1999; Valentino 2000). Some authors allow non-state 
actors in their definitions (for instance Harff & Gurr 1988; Horowitz 2004; Chalk & Jonassohn 
1999; Fein 1993). For this dissertation, most cases involve government perpetrators, although 
militias are also sometimes involved and may have some government support. 
 
Means, intent and scale 
 
 It is clear that the UNGC allows for indirect means of destruction and not just directly 
killing as specified in the following sections of Article II: “(b) Causing serious bodily or mental 
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harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” 
(UNGC, 1948). Nonetheless, there is a debate on the means of genocide. On the one hand there 
are those who consider direct killings the definitional aspect of genocide, like Horowitz (2002) 
who claim that “actual genocides involve real deaths” (Horowitz 2002, p. 43 – my emphasis)13. 
On the other hand there are those that allow for indirect means of destruction in their UNGC-
improved definitions. For instance, Fein (1993) explicitly states that “Genocide is sustained 
purposeful action by a perpetrator (usually the state) to physically destroy a collectivity directly 
(through mass or selective murders and calculable physical destruction…) or through interdiction 
of the biological and social reproduction of group members” (Fein 1993, p. 81-my emphasis). 
Indirect means of destruction could have more deadly consequences throughout the years than 
direct killings. As Valentino (2000) notes:  
Deaths resulting from the intentional creation of inhospitable conditions should not 
be underestimated. The majority of mass killing deaths in this century have resulted 
from starvation, malnutrition, exposure, exhaustion and disease. Deaths resulting 
from these factors outnumber more direct methods of killing, even in cases known 
for their violence and brutality (p. 5). 
 
                                                          
13 There is a debate regarding the topic of cultural genocide. The difficulty in assessing it is that in many cases it is 
impossible to know whether the culture changed naturally because they were exposed to outside sources or because 
the perpetrators explicitly attempted to deny the victims their culture. The extreme cases are easier to assess: it is clear 
that Japan’s prohibition to Koreans to speak their own language “was an attempt at cultural genocide”, but it would 
not be as simple to argue the same for “teaching tribal peoples of Borneo a language which will enable them to take 
part in the modern world is also cultural genocide or rather an act of liberation.” (Cribb 2001, p. 221). For Cribb then, 
the defining issue would be cultural suppression when there is change in the death rate (p. 221). 
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There is a blurred distinction between when indirect means evolve into killing and whether 
indirect means could end in death even if there is no direct killing, as Valentino suggests. However, 
indirect means can be considered both a warning sign of genocide and genocide. This is when the 
issue of intent becomes significant. For an event to be considered genocide, according to the 
UNGC, there should be intent on the part of perpetrators to specifically and systematic target the 
victims group. The motives of the leaders to engage in genocide are irrelevant, what matters is if 
there was intent to destroy: “Prosecutors need only to prove that the criminal act was intentional, 
not accidental" (Gellately & Kiernan 2005 in Jones 2011, p. 37).  
Proving intent to destroy a group is no easy task, especially in a context of war, when 
motives will be obscured by other war strategies. In the case of Darfur, for instance, the UN 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in February 2005 “was unable to find sufficient evidence that 
the killing and village-burning and raping that had occurred was actually genocidal in its intent" 
(Evans 2006, p. 330); it was considered crimes against humanity, instead (Schabas 2009). 
Scholars contend that intention can also be indirect. For Chalk & Jonassohn (1990) “an 
action is ‘intended’ even when it is carried out for different purposes but the perpetrator is likely 
to know that genocide is the inevitable or probable by-product of a planned action" (p. 43). This 
was the case against Milosevic for the crimes committed against the Muslim population of 
Srebrenica. The Court argued as follows in relation to the prevention article in the UN Convention 
on Genocide for the case of Yugoslavia: “the organs of the Respondent did nothing to prevent the 
Srebrenica massacres, claiming that they were powerless to do so … for a State to be held 
responsible for breaching its obligation of prevention, it does not need to be proven that the State 
concerned definitely had the power to prevent the genocide; it is sufficient that it had the means to 
do so and that it manifestly refrained from using them" (Case Concerning the Application of the 
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, para 438., in Schabas 
2007, p. 184).  
A final issue highlighted by the literature is the segment “in whole or in part”. This is an 
issue of scale, of how many people have to die or be affected for an event to be considered 
genocide, or as Paul Boghosian (2010) critically asked: can “the intended number of victims … be 
as small as one, for the act to count as genocide”? (p. 107). While some argue that genocide implies 
absolute mass murder (Horowitz cited by Jones 2011, p. 22), most use the word “substantial” (for 
instance: Harff & Gurr 1988, Charny 1994, Chirot & McCauley 2006 in Jones 2011, p. 16-20). 
This allows evaluating each case as a proportion of population. Killing 1,000 in one place could 
be relatively the same as killing 100,000 in a different population.  
A big problem of arguing both for absolute mass murder as well as for intended murder 
(intention of killing without actually carrying out) is that it makes it difficult to prevent it from 
happening. Absolute implies that we would have to wait until everybody dies in order to know it 
is happening, so intervention would come too late. On the other hand, intent is even harder to 
assess than number of deaths. And if this is the issue, prevention would fail to distinguish critical 
cases from others.  
The ICISS depiction of R2P also stipulates that killing should be large scale, without 
quantifying what “large scale” is to avoid waiting until many people are dead before doing 
something about it: 
In both the broad conditions we identified – loss of life and ethnic cleansing – 
we have described the action in question as needing to be “large scale” in order 
to justify military intervention. We make no attempt to quantify “large scale”: 
… What we do make clear, however, is that military action can be legitimate as 
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an anticipatory measure in response to clear evidence of likely large scale 
killing. Without this possibility of anticipatory action, the international 
community would be placed in the morally untenable position of being required 
to wait until genocide begins, before being able to take action to stop it (Evans 
& Sahnoun 2001, p. 33).  
 
This is in accord with Eboe-Osuji who advocates caution against using the word substantial:  
Not only will it be more difficult to show that the accused intended to destroy a 
substantial part of the group, but it arguably needs to be shown that the accused 
was in a position to destroy the substantial part of a protected group … it will, 
in most cases, be difficult to ascertain the state of mind of the perpetrators and 
planners in order to establish whether or not they harbour joint or several intent 
to destroy a "substantial" part of the group. The longer the delay in establishing 
whether or not the perpetrators and planners harboured that intent, the longer it 
will take for the international community to react and intervene with the level of 
urgency and action required (Chili, Eboe-Osuji 2007 in Jones 2011, p. 24-25). 
 
Valentino (2000) claims that it is better to establish a “significant number” instead of 
ambiguous terminology, such as substantial. For this author, this significant number is "at least 
50,000 intentional deaths over the course of five years" (p. 5). Although he acknowledges that this 
number is arbitrary, he claims that is better than the alternatives. He argues that limiting mass 
killing to total annihilation is problematic because it has never happened (according to him, not 
even the holocaust of the Jews would count), and defining percentages could mean that only very 
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few people died. Perhaps the defining issue is not how many people were killed but if the intention 
was “to eliminate so many people that the group ceases to function as a social or political entity” 
(Harff 2003, p. 59)14. 
 
Crimes against humanity 
 
The problem with the UNGC, as remarked by Georg Schwarzenberger, is that “the 
Genocide Convention was unnecessary when applicable and inapplicable when necessary” (in 
Schabas 2010, p. 98-99). Given all these areas of contention, some scholars are advocating for the 
concept of genocide to be dismissed altogether (Boghosian 2010; Scheffer 2006). Instead of 
genocide (or any other of the concepts derived from it, such as politicide, gendercide, classicide, 
etc.) Scheffer (2006) proposes “atrocity crimes” while Valentino (2000) suggests “mass murder”. 
Others argue that instead we should use the concept of crimes against humanity. According to 
William A. Schabas (2010), the problem is not really the concept of genocide, but that people want 
it to fit cases it does not fit; that is, cases that would fall under the umbrella of crimes against 
humanity (p. 99). 
Crimes against humanity as a legal concept was first used in the Nuremberg Charter, and 
later adopted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the 1998 Rome Statute: 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) 
                                                          
14 Jones compares the controversy regarding scale for applying the term genocide to the lack of it regarding the term 
war: “We readily use “war” to designate conflicts that kill “only” a few hundred or a few thousand people (e.g., the 
Soccer War of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras; the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982), as well as epochal 
descents into barbarity that kill millions or tens of millions. The gulf between minimum and maximum toll here is 
comparable to that between Kosovo and the Jewish Holocaust, but the use of “war” is uncontroversial. There seems 
to be no reason why we should not distinguish between larger and smaller, more or less exterminatory genocides in 
the same way” (Jones 2011, p. 23). 
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Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of 
population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual 
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) 
Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to 
body or to mental or physical health (Article 6, Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court). 
 
Crimes against humanity are “easier” to identify and prosecute than genocide15. As 
described by Leila Sadat (2011), “of the nearly 200,000 deaths, 50,000 rapes estimated to have 
occurred, and the 2.2 million forcibly displaced as a result of the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, 
genocide was held to have been proven only in the massacre of some 8,000 Muslim men and boys 
in Srebrenica in July 1995” (p xxiii.). Because there are some areas of overlap between these two 
terms some scholars consider genocide to be a type of crimes against humanity. Legal and genocide 
scholars like Joseph Dautricourt (1949, cited in Jones 2011), Martin Shaw (2007), Adam Jones 
(2004, 2011), Evans (2006), and Michael Stohl (2004) recognize genocide as a type of crime 
                                                          
15 The UN has only recognized the events in Rwanda and in Srebrenica in the 1990s as genocides.  
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against humanity. Both genocide and crimes against humanity are recognized to be state violence 
and both are considered to be systematic attacks toward civilian population (this is explicit in the 
definition of crimes against humanity, but not in the definition of genocide). Furthermore, there 
are advantages of classifying genocide as a type of crime against humanity: the type of crimes 
covered by crimes against humanity includes those defined by the UNGC, for instance, murder or 
forced transfer of population. Crimes against humanity also allows for any group of people to be 
victims without restricting it to national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. In short, the concept 
of crimes against humanity “covers everything that genocide covers, and more” (Schabas 2010, p. 
99).  
Nonetheless, “In a strictly legal sense, genocide is not a ‘crime against humanity’ at all. It 
is the subject of its own international convention, the International Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (Jones 2004, p. 19). Different court and tribunals such 
as the Rwanda tribunal’s Akayesu judgment of 1998 have kept the distinction between the two 
(Jones 2004; Schabas 2010). 
Genocide is a very powerful word, charged with political and social power, and became 
the point of reference for assessing mass killings. Its attachment to the Jewish Holocaust during 
WWII and its frequent use in the media instill images of suffering and invoke action. Thus referring 
to a violent crisis as genocide is very controversial since it has different political, economic and 
social consequences. It seems that the word genocide mobilizes more than crimes against humanity 
and, thus, “…at the level of international law, genocide is perhaps being displaced by the framing 
of “crimes against humanity,” which is easier to prosecute and imposes much the same 
punishments as for genocide convictions. The result may be that “genocide, in the coming years 
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and decades, will prove more significant as an intellectual and scholarly framework (a heuristic 
device, for the jargon-inclined), and as a tool of advocacy and mobilization” (Jones 2011, p. 25)  
What this brief review of the literature on the concept of genocide reveals is that there is 
no clear consensus in the definitional boundaries between the crimes and so, there is no consensus 
on which cases are genocide and which cases to include into the analyses of genocide. 
Furthermore, different crimes can be occurring at the same time or one type of crime could evolve 
into another; these are not static. For instance, a policy of forced transfer of people from one place 
to another can change into killing these people as they move. In a way, by including the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes under R2P, the issue of 
defining something as genocide would not matter as much.  
Because these crimes have issues that overlap, it may not be necessary to have separate 
theoretical explanations for each of them. This dissertation uses Harff’s (2003) definition of 
genocide and politicide. She combines the study of genocide and politicide by assuming that these 
crimes have the same causes and can therefore be analytically studied as a single phenomenon. 
She distinguishes between genocide and politicide depending upon the targeted groups: 
Genocides and politicides are the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent 
of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents— or, in the case of civil 
war, either of the contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole 
or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group. In genocides the 
victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their 
communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined 
primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant 
groups (Harff 2003, p. 58). 
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The advantages of using Harff’s definition is that victim groups are not limited to the 
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, but extends to political groups16 which allows the 
analysis to be extended to more cases in which governments systematically attack a segment of 
their own population.  Another advantage is that by including political groups in the definition, 
cases that would be considered crimes against humanity can also be included, therefore, facilitating 
the theoretical explanations for the cases.  A third advantage for the purposes of the dissertation is 
that her definitions allows for a large number of instances of mass killings to be included in her 
study, and cases can be chosen that can be used to analyze where Harff’s model was successful 
and when it was not (see chapter 2).  
 
The onset of genocide-politicide: domestic factors 
 
Research in Political Science and Sociology has emphasized domestic structural 
explanations in the analysis of causation17. Leo Kuper (1981) analyzed the social and political 
structures of a state and developed what is known as the plural society theory. According to this, 
genocide is more likely to occur in plural societies with marked ethnic divisions in which one 
ethnic group rules over another, usually in the context of an exclusionary ideology. Further 
research has also confirmed plural societies with marked ethnic divisions as a key variable; 
although, as Kuper acknowledges as well, not a sufficient one to explain genocide (Kuper 1981; 
Harff 2003; Fein1993; Scherrer 1999): For Chalk and Jonassohn (1999), the plural structure of 
society “is at best an intervening variable” (p. 18). Harff found that “indicators of ethnic and 
                                                          
16 Of course this is true of any definition that is inclusive. 
17 Leo Kuper (1981) was amongst the very first to study genocide comparatively. Before that, genocide studies was 
centered to the study of the Jewish Holocaust during World War II. 
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religious cleavages had ambiguous effects in the final model [and although] … active 
discrimination against ethnic minorities is a significant causal factor leading to ethnic war … once 
ethnic and other civil wars have begun, discrimination does not help explain which of them are 
likely to lead to genocide/politicide”  (Harff 2003, p. 70).  
A second structural observation on genocide focuses on regime type. Most scholars agree 
that non-democratic regimes are more likely to engage in genocide than democratic regimes 
(Rummel 1994; Fein 1993; Horowitz 2002; Harff 2003; Harff & Gurr 1988). This claim has been 
challenged by looking at the United States, Canada, and Australia’s treatment of their indigenous 
population during the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries (Mann 2005), by claiming that 
democratic regimes have engaged in genocide in other countries (Jones 2004), and by arguing that 
they have supported genocidal regimes elsewhere (Fein 1993).  
Fein (1993) contended that democratic states have not committed genocide against their 
own population in this era, but “have been patrons and accomplices of genocidal regimes 
elsewhere” (p.79). This is opposite to Harff and Gurr (1988) who “imply that the superpowers are 
likely to restrain client states from using genocide” (in Fein 1993, p.99). It is not clear under which 
situations democratic and non-democratic regimes would constrain or support a regime 
committing such atrocities. Similarly, much depth of analysis is needed to assess the role of 
external state’s actions not only in state-to-state situation but also between states and non-state 
actors. 
The argument that undemocratic regimes do not have the safeguards that democracies have 
to avoid a small group of people from getting power is summarized in Rummel’s (1994) power 
principle, “power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely” (p. xvi). However, this absolute power 
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can sometimes be backed by external states, which provides the right conditions, means and 
opportunities for the government to carry out their plans.   
 Both plural society and regime type theories focus on structural characteristics of the 
societies under study. There is general agreement that these structural factors are key variables, 
but not sufficient explanation of why genocides occur; social cleavages and undemocratic regimes 
are found in many places, but genocide does not happen in all of them. Instead, others find the 
explanation in leaders’ decision making. According to Chalk & Jonassohn (1990), leaders engage 
in genocide when they want to “(1) to eliminate a real or potential threat; (2) to spread terror among 
real or potential enemies; (3) to acquire economic wealth; or (4) to implement a belief, a theory, 
or an ideology" (Chalk & Jonassohn 1990, p. 29). Similarly, Valentino (2000) claims that the 
causes of mass killings18 lie in the leaders’ goals and he finds two types of motives. The first is 
‘dispossessive mass killing’ which occurs “when leaders' plans result in the near complete material 
or political disenfranchisement of large groups of people, [with the result that] leaders are likely 
to believe that mass killing is necessary to overcome resistance by these groups” (Valentino 2000 
p. 30). There is a similar argument made by Chalk & Jonassohn; to eliminate a threat.  The second 
type of motives Valentino finds is what he calls ‘coercive mass killings’, when leaders find 
themselves in a situation in which “conventional military options are ineffective or inefficient" (p. 
30) and thus turn to mass killing as a tactic to achieve their goals19. 
 
                                                          
18 Valentino actually uses the concept of mass killings and considers genocide to be a type of mass killing.  
19 Scholars have also created typologies of genocide according to the objective of the genocide. For instance: Helen 
Fein (1984) divides it into developmental, despotic, retributive and ideological; Leo Kuper (1981) divides into 
genocide against indigenous people, following decolonization or a two- tier structure of dominion, genocide during 
struggle for power or autonomy, and genocide against hostage groups; Harff and Gurr (1988) categorize them into: 
hegemonical, xenophobic and retributive genocides and repressive, revolutionary, and repressive/hegemonical 
politicides. 
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The onset of genocide-politicide: external factors 
 
Certainly, the leader’s motives and decision-making matter and without the leaders, 
genocides would not occur when they do, but as Kuper says, “whatever the responsibility of elites, 
they are working with social forces present within the society, and not creating a genocidal 
situation out of a vacuum or transforming a harmonious equilibrium into a genocidal conflict” 
(Kuper 1981, p. 50). This argument can be extended outside of domestic conditions: Leaders also 
operate within an external political, economic and social context that it is also likely to influence 
their motives and decisions. This is in accordance with Lindberg, Orjuela, Wezeman & Åkerström 
(2011) who argue that internal conflicts “cannot be understood in isolation, since they are in many 
ways dependent on and affected by global actors and phenomena” (p. 12). 
Most of the research has been done with an emphasis on the domestic characteristics of the 
place where the genocide occurred. Although not completely ignored, external variables have been 
considered peripherally in the analysis of the onset of genocide. Analyses of genocide have showed 
that states committing the crimes have had the support of Western states (for instance, Fein 1980, 
1993; Kuper 1981, Jones 2004, 2011; Kroslak 2002; Klinghoffer 1998; Scherrer 1999). They have 
studied the role of colonialism in creating the internal political, social and economic conditions 
that create inequality or fragmented societies (Kuper 1981). Scholars have also studied 
international military intervention in cases of genocide (for instance, Wheeler 2000; Welsh 2003; 
Weiss 2001; Badescu & Weiss 2011; Kuperman 2009; Janssen 2008). For instance, studies on 
Rwanda have shown that external state and non-state actors had the opportunity to prevent and 
deter the genocide but chose not to do it (Stohl 1987; Kroslak 2002; Klinghoffer 1998). Scholars 
have also warned about the unexpected consequences of intervention and how by intervening 
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external actors could be creating conditions that spark genocides (Finnemore 2000; Hehir 2010; 
Chomsky 1979). 
In assessing how mass atrocities occur, Alex J. Bellamy (2011) argues that three factors 
need to be present:  
First, there needs to be a reason to commit mass atrocities. Second, potential 
perpetrators require the means to commit mass atrocities. At the very least, they 
require a sufficient number of people who are prepared to commit atrocity 
crimes. Third, they require the opportunity to commit mass atrocities, whether 
enabled by a weakening of domestic institutional restraints or the support and/or 
acquiescence of external actors (p. 12). 
 
According to this view, external actors can provide the opportunities leaders need to 
commit the atrocities. However, both reasons and means can also be provided, exacerbated, or 
limited by external conditions. For instance, as Mayersen explains: Rwanda was at a higher risk 
of genocide during the 1960s than in the 1990s.  
Hutu powers had not only just secured independence for the nation but also 
managed to secure almost all organs of power under their own leadership in the 
process. Victory had resulted from a fierce, racially driven campaign … Then, after 
eighteen months of quite peaceful nation building, the Bugesera invasion shook the 
country deeply. Superficially at least, the risk of the emergence of a genocidal 
ideology at this point seems great. The Kayibanda government, however, simply 
did not have the resources or sufficient control of the country to contemplate such 
a course of action. Its army was woefully inadequate; its leadership only just 
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grasping the rudiments of running a country … A quarter of a century later, by 
contrast, Habyarimana and the akuzu had a far tighter grip on the nation as they 
contemplated genocide (Mayersen 2010, p. 30-31). 
 
 In this case, a change in leadership can partly explain the genocide in 1994, but, as 
Mayersen also mentions, Rwanda did not have resources, control or adequate army to carry out a 
strategy of genocide in the 1960s. By the 1990s, however, Rwanda had received economic support 
from Canada and France. Following Bellamy’s analysis, this support may have provided their 
political leaders the means to carry out their plans, with the ensuing result of genocide. 
Another way external actors can provide opportunity to target civilians is by not doing anything; 
by remaining in the sidelines.   
Because genocide/politicide require the systematic attack on civilians by state agencies, 
this requires resources, preparation and organization; it is not a spontaneous decision. And so, 
states that engage in mass killings targeting a specific segment of the population do so when the 
expected outcome is favorable and so they consider the external context. Leaders assess if they 
will obtain the means to carry out their plans (weapons for instance) and if they will have the 
opportunity to do so (assessing whether other states will interfere or assist them politically).  
Additionally, scholars have found that genocide is more likely to occur in places where it 
has happened before (Horowitz 2002; Harff 2003; Fein 1993; Thaler 2012). While one explanation 
is that people become accustomed to violence and that the same leadership is in charge, it is also 
that leaders assess external response to previous events of genocide and consider that before 
engaging in the crimes. Repeat offenders occur in a permissive international environment 
(Midlarsky in Straus 2007; Thaler 2012; Stanton 2011). States hide behind the curtain of 
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sovereignty, both to justify actions toward their own population as well as to not intervene in a 
conflict when it is not to their interests. Decision-making in the United Nations Security Council 
(or lack-thereof) may influence leaders engaging in genocide as do international norms. More 
research is needed to understand how international norms impact state decision-making regarding 
genocides and politicides (Stanton 2011).  
 
The onset of genocide-politicide:  when do they occur? 
 
"It is a paradox that the eruption of genocide is unpredictable, yet never seems to occur 
without prior warning", says Mayersen (2010 p. 20).  Genocides and politicides always emerge in 
a situation of violence, but they do not occur everywhere where there is violence (Valentino 2000; 
Straus 2007; Harff 2003; Fein 2007; Mayersen 2010). Conflicts can be happening for some time 
and somehow they escalate to these other crimes or they do not. Conditions that lead to genocide 
can form over many years or decades, but the unleashing of genocidal violence may occur over a 
much shorter timeframe and at a moment in time which is difficult to forecast with confidence. 
Arguing that the current genocide theories do not predict the actual onset of genocide, Mayersen 
(2010) devised an eight-stage model to predict the onset of genocide: “Can a society progress from 
a low risk of genocide to a high risk of genocide rapidly … can there be stagnation at particular 
levels of risk, or even a regression? What triggers risk escalation?” (Mayersen, 2010, p. 21).  
Using the cases of the genocide in Rwanda and Armenia, she created an eight stage model 
across a temporal dimension:  
“1. The presence of an out-group. This can be defined as a relatively powerless minority, with 
whom relations are politicized, and which is subject to legal discrimination. 
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2. Significant internal strife. Significant, ongoing destabilization that affects the dominant group 
and the out-group, and for which there is no clear solution. 
3. The perception of the out-group as posing some kind of existential threat to the dominant 
power. 
4. Local precipitants and constraints determine the nature and time of the dominant group’s 
response. A violent response is typical, with the onset of massacres quite likely. 
5. A process of retreat from the intensity of the circumstance, or further escalation. While the 
process is commonly one of retreat, repeated cycles of escalation through the preceding stages 
followed by retreat ultimately facilitates further escalation. 
6. The emergence of a genocidal ideology within the dominant power, typically accompanied by 
concerted efforts by the dominant group to further augment their power, and a deepening 
perception of the out-group as posing an existential threat.  
7. An extensive propaganda campaign, a key component of which features attempts to present the 
victim group as a grave threat to the dominant power. 
8. Case-specific precipitants and constraints determine the precise timing of an outbreak of 
genocide.” (p.20 - 21) 
 
In this model, structural and socio-psychological theories would explain first stages of 
genocide (1 – 4), while stages five to eight detail the onset and evolution of the crimes. It is at 
stage five where she identifies a “cyclic process of retreat or escalation” when “genocide will often 
first be predicted” (p. 33). At stage six, a genocidal ideology emerges and it is when the risk of 
genocide is severe, and it seems that it is here (stages 5 and 6), when perpetrators’ motives and 
objectives would be more clearly defined.   
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This model provides a great way to bring together different theories on the causes of 
genocide and integrate them in a temporal dimension. However, this model does not consider 
whether external conditions could have an impact at any of these stages (either to prevent or to 
support). There are two points in time in which we can assess the effect of external factors on this 
model. One is to look at the role of external conditions in creating the internal socio-economic-
political conditions in countries that have experienced genocide (stages 1 and 2). For instance, the 
role of colonialism or the process of independence in creating ethnic divisions could be analyzed. 
The second point in time in which to assess external factors is at the moment when leaders make 
the decision to engage in these crimes, that is, at the onset of genocide (Stages 5-8). It is necessary 
to analyze the effect that external conditions have during Mayersen’s cycle of escalation and 
retreat. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
Objectives  
 
The starting premise for this dissertation is that external factors affect genocide and 
politicide and that external factors need to be assessed to explore their significance at the onset of 
these crimes. The main research question that guides my dissertation is the following: To what 
extent do external conditions impact the onset of genocide/politicide? With the goal of answering 
this research question, the main objective is thus to identify the role of these external conditions in 
either increasing or decreasing the probability of genocide and/or politicide, as well as to 
understand how they interact with internal variables. The methodology employed to achieve this 
is described below. 
 
Barbara Harff’s model 
 
The dissertation builds upon Barbara Harff’s (2003) model of genocide/politicide1. This 
model is ideally suited for the purposes of this dissertation because it is a major research effort in 
which external factors were not strongly considered in a statistical model for the prediction of the 
onset of genocide/politicide. This study will focus on external factors as well as how they 
interacted with the domestic variables significant in the model.  
                                                          
11 This will be referenced throughout the dissertation as the model, the statistical model or Harff’s model. 
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Harff’s study comprises 126 cases of internal war or regime collapse, 37 of which 
progressed into genocide/politicide according to her definition. Her work aimed at building a 
model which would explain why some conflicts escalated to genocide/politicide while the others 
did not.  Her model accurately predicted 74% of the cases. The cases misclassified by the model 
fall into two categories: 
 
1. False negatives: Cases that according to Harff’s definition were genocode/politicides but 
the model did not predict (Uganda 1972, Iraq 1963, Yugoslavia 1992, and Sri Lanka 
19892). 
2. False positives: Cases that according to the definition were not considered 
genocide/politicides, but the model predict them as such (Pakistan 1983, Brazil 1961, 
Algeria 1991, China 1988, Mozambique 1976, Bangladesh 1974, and Indonesia 1997). 
 
Her final model included the following variables: (1) political upheaval, (2) prior genocide, 
(3) exclusionary ideology, (4) regime type, (5) ethnic character of ruling elite, and (6) trade 
openness (see description below). There is a similar model which Harff made as part of the State 
Failure Task Force (SFTF) reports, and their differences will be briefly discussed below. 
 
When considering the misclassified cases, while it is possible that by changing some of the 
settings of the statistical model the genocide/politicide the model would have predicted accurately 
the misclassified events, it is also likely that factors not considered by the model can explain these 
                                                          
2 There are other 5 cases in this category: Afghanistan 1978, El Salvador 1980, Chile 1973, Sudan 1956, and 
Philippines 1972. She claims, however, that these cases are predicted by the model if the starting date of the conflict 
is changed (p. 69) and thus these cases will not be included in the analysis. 
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events. This dissertation analyzes how external variables can explain the misclassified cases. In 
the case of false negatives, external factors could have contributed to escalating the conflict 
towards genocide or politicide beyond what the internal factors alone could do. For cases identified 
as false positives, external factors could have alleviating or constraining effects, diminishing the 
likelihood of the crimes. When appropriate, the dissertation will discuss whether the external 
factors show a stronger effect on the six individual variables six identified by Harff. 
 
The Score and Variables (Harff’s model)  
 
The score of the internal variables, as well as the final model score for the cases included in the 
dissertation, was as follows: 
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Indonesia 1956 1 1965 1 1 18 15.7 1 1 0.956 YES
Iraq 1980 1 1988 2 1 30.5 48.1 1 1 0.907 YES
Indonesia 1975 1 1975 1 1 15.5 38 1 1 0.796 YES
Indonesia 1997 0 N/A 1 1 10 51.3 1 1 0.594 NO
Iraq 1961 1 1963 1 0 6 66.5 1 1 0.185 NO
Sri Lanka 1983 1 1989 1 0 12 60.5 0 1 0.157 NO
Sri Lanka 1971 0 N/A 1 0 0 64.3 0 0 0.018 YES
Non Genocide/Politicide classified incorrectly (were not genocide but were classified as such)
Genocide/Politicide classified incorrectly (were genocide but were classified as non genocide)
Non Genocide/Politicide classified correctly 
Internal Variables
Genocide/Politicide classified correctly (SFTF)
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Variables included in Harff’s model 
 
The variables in Harff’s model are described below (p. 62-65): 
 
Ethnic and Religious Cleavages: “Ethnic and religious divisions”. The score is: Elite ethnicity 
not salient, salient with a majority, salient with a minority (0, 1, 2). This is the main difference 
between Harff’s model in 2003 and the one she did earlier for the Task Force. In the one in 2003, 
she combined ethnicity and religion (although in her description of the variable she only refers to 
ethnicity) and also included the variable of prior genocide. In the one in the Task force, prior 
genocide was not included and ethnicity and religion are kept separate. Overall, the way the model 
was built is very similar. 
 
Ideological orientation of ruling elite or Exclusionary ideology: “Episodes of genocide and 
politicide become more likely when the leaders of regimes and revolutionary movements articulate 
an exclusionary ideology, a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that 
justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people” ( p. 62-63). The 
score for the cases: Exclusionary: Yes/ No (1/0). 
 
Political Upheaval: (excludes prior genocide) Higher-Lower: The higher the political upheaval 
the higher the threat of genocide: “defined as an abrupt change in the political community caused 
by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries, or 
defeat in international war. Types of political upheaval include defeat in international war, 
revolutions, anticolonial rebellions, separatist wars, coups, and regime transitions that result in the 
ascendancy of political elites who embrace extremist ideologies” (p. 62). The score of the cases 
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range from low (1-9); medium (10-20); high (21-34) and very high (35-60). Although there are 
some external factors considered within political upheaval, direct and/or indirect assistance to the 
regime or to the militant groups are not considered. 
 
Trade openness: Harff measured trade openness as a means of quantifying how interdependent   
(or isolated) a country may be. According to Harff, “Countries with low trade openness had two 
and a half times greater odds of having state failures culminate in genocide/politicide. High trade 
openness (and the underlying economic and political conditions it taps) not only minimizes the 
risks of state failure in general, as shown in other State Failure analyses, but reduces substantially 
the odds that failures, if they do occur, will lead to genocide/politicides.” The scores were as 
follows: Very low: < 2 /  Low 21-40 / Medium 41-70 /  High 71-100 / Very high > 100 and are 
calculated as total trade as a percentage of GDP. Although trade openness is an indicator of 
external relations, the state itself often has a significant influence over whether and how much to 
trade with the outside world, so it is in large part also a domestic issue. 
 
Regime type/Autocracy indicator: Autocracies/Partial or full democracies. Indexed using the 
Polity global data set’s 0-to-10 point scales: Full democracies: 7-10/ Partial democracies: 1-7 / 
Autocracy: 0. In the SFTF study, this category was binary, with 0 for autocracy and 1 for 
democracy at various levels. 
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Ethnic 
character 
of ruling 
elite 
Ideological 
character 
of ruling 
elite 
Upheaval Trade openness 
Autocracy 
indicator 
Religion 
Fractionalization 
Yes 1 Yes 1 Low 1-9 Very low < 2 Yes 1 Yes 1 
No 0 No 0 Medium 10-20 Low 21-40 No 0 No 0 
        High 21-34 Medium 41-70         
        
Very 
high 35-60 High 71-100         
            
Very 
high >100         
 
Prior genocide: Yes/No (1/0). The probability of genocide increased for cases where a genocide 
occurrence had previously happened, where at least four years have passed between two 
occurrences. Events that began four or more years after the end of a prior event where treated as 
separate cases. As mentioned above, this was included in Harff’s 2003 model but not in the one 
for the SFTF report. 
 
Harff’s structural model 
 
Harff’s model is described in the following way: “the universe analysis consist of all 
countries already in state failure. The dependent variable represents the conditional probability 
that a genocide or politicide will begin one year later in a country already experiencing failure… 
the model is estimated using as cases all genocide/politicides since 1955, including multiple 
episodes that occurred in the same country” (Harff 2003, p. 65).  
 Harff based her model on the model for State Failure, in which the cases were selected “on 
the dependent variable: Those experiencing failure are matched with otherwise similar cases that 
did not experience failure. Logistic regression is then used to analyze data on the conditions in 
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‘problem’ countries shortly before the onset of state failure with conditions in the control. The 
results are expressed as regression coefficients and as odds ratios that approximate the relative 
risks associated with each factor” (Harff 2003, p. 65). Harff then took this approach and adapted 
it for the occurrence of genocide/politicide. States in state failure which had conflicts progressing 
to genocide/politicide were compared to cases of state failure in which that did not happen. In this 
way, a more valid comparison is made, as only high-risk countries are considered (Harff 2003, p. 
65). 
 
The cases included in the dissertation 
 
Out of the cases that were analyzed through Harff’s model, the events in Indonesia, Iraq, 
and Sri Lanka were chosen for their potential to cover cases in which Harff’s model had accurately 
and inaccurately predicted the outcome. One thing all these cases have in common is that the state 
was the major actor behind the atrocities. Even in the case of the invasion of East Timor by 
Indonesia, although the annexation of East Timor was not recognized by the United Nations, with 
Indonesia declaring it part of its territory the citizens of East Timor became citizens of Indonesia 
and thus the state was targeting its own people. The cases are summarized in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
  Predicted Not Predicted 
  Gen Non-Gen Gen Non-Gen 
Iraq 1   1   
Indonesia 2     1 
Sri Lanka   1 1   
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 Iraq had two instances of genocide, one beginning in 1963 (not predicted by the model) and 
the other one beginning in 1988 (predicted by the model). 
 Indonesia had three: 1956 (predicted); 1975 (predicted); and events during the last years of 
the 1990s (not genocide, but predicted by the model as genocide). 
 Sri Lanka: one non-genocide accurately predicted and 1 genocide not predicted. 
 
Hypotheses and research questions 
 
The dissertation’s main objective is to analyze the role external factors can have at the 
onset of genocide and politicide (genocide/politicide), either lessening or aggravating the domestic 
factors that lead to these crimes. For this study, an external factor is a condition originating from 
actors outside the country at risk of genocide/politicide. The overall question is to what extent do 
external factors impact the onset of genocode/politicide? The goal is to identify the external factors 
that have an effect and to assess the degree to which they affect the probability of 
genocide/politicide. There are two follow up questions: (1) What external factors have most impact 
on the onset and progression of genocide and politicide? And (2) how do these factors interact 
with domestic variables to generate the conditions that give rise to such events? 
The main hypothesis to be assessed is the following: The potential for genocide and 
politicide inside a state is strongly affected by the presence of external factors. This can be further 
refined in the following two premises: a) external variables can provide the means and opportunity 
for genocide/politicides, and b) external variables can make an impact at the moment of escalation 
or retreat, affecting leaders’ decision-making, lessening or aggravating internal factors that lead to 
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genocide/politicides. 
Selecting cases that include events that were accurately and inaccurately predicted by 
Barbara Harff’s model allows for within-case comparison. The external variables can be then 
analyzed in different instances for the same state, with the internal variables providing sufficient 
explanation for the genocide/politicide in at least one instance. Moreover, the chosen cases help 
avoid selection bias which could occur if only cases that were not explained by the model were 
included. By including events of genocide and non-genocide/politicide as well as including cases 
that were misclassified and classified correctly by the model, it is possible to assess if the external 
variables contributed to increasing or decreasing the probability of genocide, at the same time that 
it allows assessment of whether the external variables are in accordance with Harff’s model or not. 
 
Research Methodology: Case-studies 
 
This dissertation is a qualitative study and will follow a comparative case study, mainly 
following guidelines set forth by George and Bennett (2004). Their approach to case studies 
consists of three interdependent phases: (1) research design, (2) carrying out the research and (3) 
drawing the implications of findings for theory. The research design phase allows the researcher 
to approach the different cases systematically. The design includes the following components: 
Specification of problem, variables, cases, variance in variables, and formulation of questions (p. 
73-88). The second phase, carrying out the research, is supported by the research design. This 
phase includes data gathering, case study analysis and case explanations (p. 89-108). The final 
phase consists of analyzing the implications of case findings for theory development and testing 
(p. 109-124). 
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Although this methodology is not without limitations3, there are many advantages of using 
case studies, including: “potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures 
for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized 
role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing 
causal complexity” (George & Bennett 2004, p. 19-22). This methodology facilitated the study of 
external factors by focusing empirically on two or three events within the same state and then 
making comparisons across cases. This approach enabled analysis not only of which external 
factors were important in each event, but also of which external factors were present or absent 
across cases. 
 
Determining a framework of analysis 
 
A useful approach to study the interaction of external factors and internal variables is Peter 
Stoett’s (2004) categorization of the level of involvement based on the “degrees of distance from 
the acts themselves:” (1) “Resonant complicity rises from historical abuses, distant in time but still 
present in implication”; (2) “Indifference and selective intervention refer to ethical claims that, 
even when physical proximity to the acts existed, actors neglected their obligation to intervene to 
stop them”; (3) “Material contributions, by way of technical and financial assistance or collusion”; 
(4) “Direct participation, when external actors have pulled triggers, dropped bombs, and 
performed other acts of murder” (p. 34). Looking at this categorization it can be argued that the 
first three are forms of indirect involvement (which could occur with or without knowledge about 
                                                          
3 For instance, selection bias, lack of representativeness, among others (George & Bennett p. 22-34) 
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the events to unfold) while the fourth one is direct participation, that is, when states are committing 
genocide in another state4. This categorization could be seen as a continuum of external state 
involvement at the onset of cases of genocide/politicide. Stoett adds a fifth category: (5) 
Globalization. For him, this is “closer to an ideological position than an analytical tool, and it 
requires us to move beyond immediate intentionality and engage with a more structural level of 
analysis” (p. 43).  
For the purposes of the dissertation, only the first three categories are included. Although 
Stoett only focuses on state-to-state relations, this dissertation also includes state-to-militant group 
as well as militant group-to-militant group relations. 
 
Resonant complicity 
 
For the dissertation, resonant complicity refers to colonialism and its consequences in 
setting the social, political, and economic conditions identified by structural theories and 
highlighted in Harff’s statistical model. Research revealed that many cases of genocide and 
politicide occur after colonization. Kuper (1981) and Scherrer (1999), for example, have concluded 
that genocides in Africa and Asia have occurred in a context of decolonization: Rwanda, Burundi, 
India, Nigeria (Kuper, 1981, p. 17), Burma, Indochina, Sudan (Scherrer, 1999, p. 21). Similarly, 
Harff and Gurr (1988) found “a particularly heavy concentration of new episodes 
[genocides/politicides] between 1961 and 1966 … associated mainly with the decolonization of 
Africa” (p. 367).  
                                                          
4 For instance, debates regarding whether the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were genocidal. 
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It is true that many countries in the world have been colonized by major powers and not all 
of them have engaged in genocide/politicide. Certainly, many of these states could have genocidal 
potential but never engaged in one. As Kuper (1981) says, “genocide is not an inevitable 
consequence of certain social conditions within a society”5 (p. 56). Structural conditions, created 
by colonialism or otherwise, will not automatically translate into genocide or politicide; leaders’ 
decision-making in the aftermath of independence as well as institutional setup will also impact 
the potential for genocide/politicide. The dissertation focuses on the role of external actors at the 
moment of independence. More specifically, the emphasis is on which states supported which 
groups, as well as why and what the consequences were.  
 
Indifference and selective intervention  
 
A second category to study external state involvement in cases of genocide/politicde is 
“indifference and selective intervention”. As devised by Stoett, this category assesses whether 
states could have intervened to prevent and/or halt a genocide or politicide from happening. 
Indifference refers to the victims; states decide not to intervene either militarily or diplomatically 
to stop a government from targeting its own population because it is not in their interests to do so.    
According to the UNGC, states have agreed to “prevent and punish” genocide (UNGC, 
article 1). However, as many scholars have observed, actual obligations are not clear and scholars 
debate the right to intervene and the type of strategies would be better to employ (for example, 
Stohl 1987; Wheeler 2000; Welsh 2003; Weiss 2001). In this dissertation, an analysis will be made 
                                                          
5 He continues his argument: “There may be extreme pluralism in a society, with highly antagonistic, polarizing 
ideologies, division expressed in religion, segregation, employment, social networks, and political party affiliation, a 
long history of reciprocal violence, and periods of highly escalated conflict. Yet the struggle may stop short of 
genocide. Northern Ireland is an example of such a society” (Kuper 1981, p. 56). 
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regarding the impact that the choice to intervene or not by external powers has in the onset of 
genocide, particularly on the decision of the perpetrators to push ahead with the crimes. 
Another aspect to consider about intervention are the unintended consequences of 
diplomatic, political, and military involvement in a third country, whether the objective of the 
intervention is to prevent or stop atrocities or to support one of the factions. Looking at the 
experiences in Rwanda and in the ex-Yugoslavia, Bellamy cautions that “conflict prevention 
activities may inadvertently create incentives to commit atrocities” (2011, p.8). In a similar note, 
Hehir (2010) argues that diplomatic interventions could be viewed as creating conditions in 
another country that would be favorable to Western powers which could create further conflicts. 
Martha Finnemore (2000) has also claimed that intervening sometimes actually “produces 
precisely the substantive outcomes they were intervening to avoid” (p. 12). The argument here is 
not to say that intervention should be avoided, but to say that having a better understanding of how 
external factors impact the onset of genocide or politicide, would provide a better outlook when 
designing strategies for intervention and thus not contribute to further conflict or worsening a 
situation.  
 
Material contributions 
 
External states may not directly commit genocide, but could provide material support, thus, 
making them complicit. Material contributions include weapons, financial assistance, technical 
expertise, and military training, among others. Material contributions can be a primary driver of 
genocide if leaders of the states perpetrating the crimes can rely on external actors to provide 
means to carry out the genocide.  
As Fein says:  
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 The many ‘coincidences’ of war and genocide and the devastating toll of victims 
and of refugees puts a grave responsibility and onus on states arming perpetrators 
of genocide and reinforcing the level of armaments in civil wars (wars in which 
genocide is most likely to occur); they may be accessories to genocide. Rather than 
contributing to maintaining domestic order, patron states are contributing to death, 
refugee flows, and famine (Fein 1993, p. 102).  
 
Material contributions could have tangible effect on the progression of the crimes but at 
the same time it is not a clear dimension of involvement; material contributions could be intended 
for other purposes and misused by the local governments. For example, Canada was giving 
development money to Rwanda.  In addition, material contributions could fluctuate across time, 
and patron states can also change. Thus, analyzing when the material support was provided could 
be helpful in understanding the development of the conflict.  
 
Variables for External Context 
 
Based on Stoett’s classification discussed previously, variables for the External Context to 
the conflict studies are determined. These variables can then be tied to Bellamy’s concept of 
providing means and opportunity and to Mayersen’s model of progression of a genocide case. 
Variables related to resonant complicity affect the reasons for committing the crime and the first 
two steps on Mayersen’s progression (creation of an out-group and internal strife). Variables 
related to material contributions (direct assistance) as well as indifference and selective 
intervention (indirect assistance) can affect in the stage of escalation and retreat in Mayersen’s 
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model by providing the means and the opportunities for the government to commit genocide or 
politicide.  
 
Dependent variable 
 
Onset of genocide and politicide. The variable measures whether a state at risk had a 
conflict deteriorate into genocide/politicide. The value to this variable for every case study is as 
determined in Harff’s study. 
 
Independent variables 
 
Based on the framework of analysis described above, three independent variables were 
identified. The aspects of each of these are discussed below. 
Effects of colonialism at state creation: Assessing the effects of colonialism on the onset 
of genocide. This variable encompasses the resonant complicity concept from Stoett. The main 
focus is on the role of external states during the process of independence. The following are 
considered:  
1. The role the colonial power played in the process of independence;  
2. The role of other powers in the process of independence. 
3. In either instance, were there unresolved group claims on new sovereignty?  
The variable does not involve what happened during colonial time, but in the years previous 
to independence and during independence itself. This makes sense because it is certain that 
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colonial powers changed the dynamics within the population of a colony and that these dynamics 
were later exploited or instrumental in the way the state organized itself politically and 
economically after independence.  
 
Indirect assistance: This variable follows Stoett’s category of indifference and selective 
intervention. It is analyzed by assessing the action or inaction of third states involved in the region. 
For this variable, intention and/or knowledge of the outcome of the action by the third state will 
be discussed. It is measured mainly through looking at: 
1. De facto approval for committing the crimes (for instance, meetings between government 
officials); 
2. Action or inaction by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council;  
3. Strategic indifference: States choose to ignore certain atrocities or clear signs of violence 
because they want to maintain the status quo. For instance, media manipulation and denial of 
assistance to victims, among others. 
 
Direct assistance: Resources provided by other state or non-state actors to the government 
and/or militant groups in a country. The main focus is to assess reasons why the support was 
provided and its timeline. Direct assistance is analyzed in the following manner: 
1. Conventional arms trade using SIPRI’s (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 
database;  
2. Intelligence support;  
3. Military training and other forms of direct assistance to governments and/or militant groups. 
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Assumptions 
 
The following assumptions serve as foundations for the analysis presented in this 
dissertation:  
1. Internal conditions are necessary but not sufficient causes of genocide and politicide. This 
creates the need to analyze external conditions to create a complete picture.  
2. External factors by themselves do not provide a sufficient explanation for cases of 
genocide/politicide committed by a government against its own population (otherwise it is 
direct intervention/war by that third country and it is not genocide/politicide as described here).  
3. Targeting an ethnic group or a political group does not inherently make one crime worse than 
another. This allows using all the cases identified by Harff, extending the universe of analysis. 
4. An event is still a genocide or politicide even if the victims start to defend themselves. 
5. The internal variables as they are defined by Harff may incorporate or reflect some 
secondary/minor effects associated with external factors. However, the external factors are not 
explicit and as a result they are not fully represented in these variables, thus suggesting that 
separate consideration may provide better results.  
 
Limitations of the dissertation 
 
The dissertation seeks, ultimately, to improve the potential for prevention by enhancing 
our understanding of the causes behind these crimes. The issue of military intervention will only 
be considered as it relates to future crises emerging but not as a topic on itself. The issue of how 
states respond to a crisis is also outside of the reach of the dissertation, as is reconstruction after a 
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crisis.  The dissertation is about what happens before a crime takes place. The study of the impact 
of international organizations such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund) or other 
organizations, funds and programs and how they affected the economic situation or the political 
situation was not included. Similarly, economic sanctions and/or embargoes were not included in 
the analysis.  
This dissertation analyzes a prominent set of external variables to see if they are consistent 
or contrary the results of Harff’s model for each case studied and help explain the cases that were 
mis-predicted. 
 
About the sources used 
 
Genocide has been studied by different academic disciplines: Political Science, 
International Relations, Sociology, Anthropology, International Human Rights, and International 
Law, among others. Thus, the main source of information was scholarly books and journal articles 
from all these disciplines. In addition, documentation by international organizations such as 
Genocide Watch, Human Rights Watch, and the UN, were also reviewed given that they provide 
a firsthand perspective on these issues, as were government documents released by the National 
Security Archive at George Washington University. SIPRI’s database was also used to assess 
trends in arms transfers for all the cases. 
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Chapter 3: Indonesia and East Timor 
 
Three violent episodes in Indonesia were included in Harff’s statistical model (see chapter 
2 for details). The model accurately predicted two of these as geno/politicide, but incorrectly 
classified one event as genocide/politicide:  
Year of Event Final model score Interpretation Classified Correctly? 
1965 0.956 Gen/Pol Yes 
1975 0.796 Gen/Pol Yes 
1997 0.594 Gen/Pol No 
 
The first event occurred within the recognized political boundaries of Indonesia. From 
1965 to mid-1966, in a period known as “the Killings”1, hundreds of thousands of Indonesians 
were killed directly and indirectly by state agencies, mainly the military, for political reasons: the 
victims were targeted for being communists or alleged communists. It is estimated that around 
500,000 people were killed. The second event began in 1975 with Indonesia’s invasion of East 
Timor, right after the small island unilaterally declared its independence from Portugal. It was 
occupied by Indonesian forces until 2001 and during this period it is estimated that 25% of the 
population, around 200,000 people, died as a result of the invasion. Although this event occurred 
outside its borders, Indonesia annexed the territory by declaring East Timor its 27th province.  
Both of these events fit Harff’s definition of genocide/politicide and were classified 
correctly by the model. The final score (0.956 for 1965 and 0.796 for 1975) means that domestic 
variables were sufficient explanation for both events: political upheaval, prior genocide, 
exclusionary ideology, regime type, ethnic character of the ruling elite and trade openness (see 
                                                          
1 I am using upper case “K” simply to differentiate this period from 1965 to 1966 from other instances of mass killings. 
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chapter 2 for more details on domestic variables). While the victims belong to different ethnic and 
national identities, the perpetrator was the same: the Indonesian military. In both occasions the 
Indonesian military received external support, directly and indirectly, that allowed them to engage 
in these crimes. It is argued that in these cases the role of the external variables had a magnifying 
effect on the domestic variables as predictors of genocide (this means that the event would be more 
likely to occur but does not imply that the event will be more violent, have a higher number of 
deaths, or last longer). 
The third violent episode considered occurred in 1997 with mass protests in Jakarta as well 
as renewed fighting and riots in East Timor. This was included in the model as a control case (none 
of these violent instances in Indonesia and in East Timor are classified by Harff’s definition as a 
case of genocide or politicide). Considering the internal conditions in 1995, the model assessed 
the probability of genocide or politicide occurring a few years later. In theory, the model should 
have classified this event as non-genocide/politicide, but it misclassified it as genocide, with a final 
score of 0.594. This means that the internal/domestic variables that are significant in the model 
were present in 1997 and yet, a genocide/politicide did not occur. In this instance, the external 
variables had a decreasing effect on the probability of genocide/politicide.  
The following chart shows the indicators used in Harff’s statistical model for each of the 
three instances in Indonesia: 
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Genocide/Politicide classified correctly (SFTF) 
Indonesia  1956 1 1965 1 1 18 15.7 1 1 0.956 YES 
Indonesia  1975 1 1975 1 1 15.5 38 1 1 0.796 YES 
Non Genocide/Politicide classified incorrectly (were not genocide but were classified as such) 
Indonesia 1997 0 N/A 1 1 10 51.3 1 1 0.594 NO 
 
In the case of Indonesia, the domestic indicators remain constant throughout the years. The 
main difference is that trade openness increased, from low in 1956 to medium by 1997. 
Interestingly, political upheaval remained somewhat constant, in the medium category, although 
according to the classification political upheaval decreased a little in 1997. Interestingly, the ethnic 
and ideological character of the ruling elite as well as the autocracy indicator remained the same. 
The dissertation’s main objective is to assess the extent to which external factors impact 
the onset of genocide and politicide. Each of the case studies analyze events that were both 
accurately and incorrectly predicted by Harff’s statistical model within the same state. This chapter 
answers the following main questions:  What are the external factors that were most significant in 
cases of genocide/politicide? In which ways did these interact with domestic variables? How did 
the external affect the probability of genocide/politicide in each instance? The external factors will 
be analyzed to see if they are contributors to increasing the probability of genocide in the first two 
cases, to see if they support the eventual result of the conflict as well as Harff’s model. As for the 
third case, the external factors would be studied to understand whether they reduce the probability 
of genocide and whether their absence from the model could be a reason for its misclassification. 
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Part 1 
 
This section presents an overview for each event. While it is not a comprehensive historical review, 
an explanation of key issues is provided. The interaction between domestic and external factors 
for each case is analyzed in part 2. 
 
Event 1: The Killings 
 
In October 1965 a coup and counter-coup, a few political murders and fear and rejection 
of communism sparked a killing spree of at least 250,000 and up to 1,000,000 people who either 
belonged to or had links to the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI)2. 
This event has been called the Killings. In addition to the murders, hundreds of thousands were 
imprisoned, tortured and/or raped.  The driving force behind the Killings was the military-led 
government that took over the presidency after the counter-coup under the leadership of President 
Suharto. The Killings were virtually over by mid-1966, although political imprisonment, torture 
and discrimination continued throughout President Suharto’s term.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 There is a debate in the literature about the magnitude of attacks on other victim groups, mainly Chinese citizens in 
Indonesia. The debate questions how many Chinese were targeted and whether they were targeted for being Chinese 
or for belonging to the PKI. 
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President Sukarno and communism in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia3 was colonized by the Dutch from 1670 to 1949, when after four years of 
fighting, the Netherlands recognized Indonesia’s independence. Independence leader, Sukarno,4 
obtained support from the Japanese who had invaded the Dutch islands during World War II. 
However, nation-building for the new state after independence was not an easy task. The Dutch 
had controlled the archipelago by creating a political and social system that entrenched differences 
among the population. Cribb (2001) highlights three features that allowed the Dutch East Indies 
Company to rule over the archipelago that blocked a common sense of nationality throughout the 
islands: (1) the Dutch “devoted political energy to preserving and strengthening the status and 
standing of the archipelago’s many traditional elites as long as those elites were willing to put 
themselves at the service of Dutch colonial interest”; (2) they restricted access to education; and 
(3) they created “a complex and changing system of ethnic classification” (p. 223-225). Cribb 
concludes that Indonesia was a political creation of its leaders, fighting for independence in order 
“not to recover the cultural state … but to reopen the possibility of change and development, to 
give people the chance to take what they saw as the best of Western culture … and to create a 
society that was modern and prosperous” (Cribb 2001, p. 223). 
 The differences among the people of Indonesia were also political. Following Cribb’s 
assessment (2001), by the time of independence three distinct political thoughts or ideologies had 
already emerged: (1) the developmentalists, who believed that Indonesia’s first priority should be 
to modernize (under a Western model); (2) the Islamists, who believed that Indonesia’s political 
                                                          
3 Before independence the territory was known as the Dutch East Indies and afterward as the Republic of Indonesia. 
4 Sukarno had been in exile and was assisted by Japan to return to Indonesia (BBC Timeline 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15114517). 
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and social order should be guided under Islam; (3) and the communists, who thought the order 
should be guided under socialism.  Although the three political currents were united in their fight 
for independence and in their idea of a greater Indonesia, the contradictions among them set up 
conditions for intolerance of others’ political thoughts and led to political fragmentation. After 
declaring independence on August 17, 1945, the government was in the hands of the 
developmentalists, but communists and Islamists were still fighting to achieve political power in 
Indonesia5.  
 It was under President Sukarno’s authoritarian system that the fight among the three was 
controlled. President Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” (1959-1965) attempted to balance (or 
neutralize) these three political ideologies through the program of “NASAKOM--Nationalism 
(which stood for developmentalism), religion (standing for Islam) and communism” (Cribb 2001, 
p. 229). Although Sukarno did not belong to the Communist Party, he made communism “part of 
the state ideology” (Cribb 2009, p. 237) and so the perception was that the real beneficiary of 
Sukarno’s policies was the PKI (Cribb 2001; Thaler 2012). While the PKI had been excluded from 
politics before 1957, by 1965 the communist party had great influence over many aspects of the 
political, social and economic life in Indonesia6. Sukarno had allowed the PKI to create “a so-
called ‘fifth force’ of workers and peasants which would operate under its influence alongside the 
army, navy air force and police” (Cribb 2001, p. 229). Sukarno had also strengthened his ties with 
communist states (Thaler 2012, p. 205). 
                                                          
5 Cribb (2001) further explains that developmentalists obtained power after independence for two reasons: (1) the 
communists were weakened by their fight against the Dutch and had been repressed by Japan; (2) the Islamists had 
been persuaded to take a backseat role since it was feared that minorities would join the Dutch; (3) Islamists and 
Communists were fighting each other. However, neither the Islamists nor communists were ready to give up power 
and in several occasions fought against the new government. Although eventually defeated, both groups were still 
waiting for their opportunity to take over power (p. 226-227).  
6 With three million members by 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party was “the largest communist party in the non-
communist world” (Cribb 2001, p. 229). 
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The Coup and counter-coup of 1965 
 
Because NASAKOM was maintained more because of Sukarno’s own personal politics 
than because of state policies, it was believed that the PKI “had a real chance of coming to power 
if Guided Democracy could be sustained long enough and if the army could somehow be prevented 
from seizing power itself” (Cribb 2001, p. 230). Thus, when Sukarno’s health declined, combined 
with economic decline in Indonesia, political uncertainty increased. Anti-communist army 
generals feared that the PKI would take the opportunity to seize power. The economic decline was 
blamed on socialist policies and in this context of uncertainty about the future of Indonesia a coup 
and a counter-coup occurred.  
On October 1, 1965 a group of military officers led by Lieutenant–Colonel Untung 
(commander of the President Guard) attacked and killed six Army commanders –three killed on 
the spot and three abducted and killed at a different military base7. Untung declared that he had 
acted to prevent a military coup against President Sukarno by a ‘Council of General’. Untung and 
his officers, --known as the 30th September Movement-- created a ‘Revolutionary Council’ and 
declared they were taking over state power. In response, Lieutenant-General Suharto (commander 
of the Army Strategic Reserve or KOSTRAD) mobilized troops and defeated Untung. However, 
Suharto sidelined President Sukarno and took the presidency8.  
 Although there are different versions of what actually happened, these can be grouped in 
two main categories: Officially, the coup was blamed on the PKI and the communists. The 
                                                          
7 Defense Minister, General Abdul Haris Nasution escaped, but his daughter was killed. 
8 After the coup Suharto had virtually all power, but Sukarno was not officially deposed until 1967 (Thaler 2012, p. 
210). 
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alternate version claims that the mastermind behind the coup was Lieutenant-General Suharto, 
who had received support from the United States. The official version, the one exploited by 
President Suharto was that the PKI was implicated in the coup and Untung and his officers were 
either under PKI or President Sukarno’s orders (Cribb 2001, p. 231-232). In this view, the reason 
for the coup was to take power “before the army took power from President Sukarno” (Yazid 2014, 
p. 1). Although no evidence has been uncovered that the PKI was involved9 (Thaler 2012, p. 206), 
monuments and textbooks in Indonesia explained the 1965 coup in this light (Vickers & McGregor 
2011, p. 44-3). Suharto was presented as a national hero, and the Killings were explained by 
arguing that it was an act of “self-defense” (Vickers & McGregor 2011, p. 44-3) and by saying 
that the communists had it coming, making “themselves so hated over the years prior to 1965 that 
‘the people’ attacked them as soon as they had the chance” (Roosa 2013, p. 3).10  Nonetheless, if 
the communists were involved, the end result was the opposite of what they would have wanted. 
With the rise of Suharto to power, the likelihood for the PKI to achieve power diminished 
significantly (Cribb 2001).    
Another version of the 1965 coup is that it was planned by General Suharto. In this version, 
the objective of the coup was to prevent the communists from taking power upon the imminent 
decline of Sukarno. The military was divided into two main camps, one supported President 
Sukarno, including General Yani and the other camp was “anti-communist and pro-America led 
by General Nasution and Suharto” (Yazid 2014, p. 2-3). With the exception of General Nasution 
--who was not killed-- the 30th September Movement targeted army leaders that supported Sukarno 
(Yazid 2014, p. 3). During the 1970s, Western authors began to argue that Suharto had received 
                                                          
9 Cribb (2009) thinks that it is probable that “a clandestine bureau of the PKI” was involved in the coup but that with 
the exception of a few leaders, the PKI “was certainly unaware of the plot” (p. 237-238).  
10 “Schoolchildren are still taught that the Communists brought the violence upon themselves by plotting to take over 
the country” (Cochran 2014, New York Times). 
 56 
assistance from the United States and from the CIA in particular (Vickers & McGregor 2011, p. 
44-3). 
  
The aftermath of the coup: the Killings 
 
The coup and counter-coup was a defining moment in Indonesian history. After the coup, 
the state, under the leadership of the military government of Suharto, used the climate of fear and 
insecurity to its advantage and began a campaign to eradicate communists from Indonesia. Authors 
agree that anti-communist propaganda was a vital tool that allowed the military and paramilitary 
groups to kill upwards of 500,000 people. The anti-communist propaganda sparked the willingness 
and acceptance of the Killings (for example, Pohlman 2013; Thaler 2012; Wahyuningroem 2013; 
Vickers &  McGregor 2005; Cribb 2010; Cribb 2009). Even though the Killings stopped in 1966, 
the propaganda against communism continued for years (Wahyuningroem 2013). In short, 
communists were blamed for all the maladies in Indonesia, including the coup and the state of the 
economy11. False rumors spread that the communists were preparing to kill all their enemies as 
well. In addition, the 30th September Movement was associated with the name Gestapu (Thaler 
2012) and all references to the movement became associated with the PKI and Gestapu12. The net 
effect was to create an environment of fear of communists, in which people were even forced to 
choose between camps – a “kill or be killed” situation (Thaler 2012, p. 207)13. Ironically, even 
                                                          
11 Under Guided Democracy, Indonesia opposed to foreign investment –which was perceived as neo-colonialism or 
neo-imperialism. In Cribb’s assessment, lack of foreign investment contributed to a decline in standard of living (p. 
230). Regardless of the causes of the economic decline, Sukarno’s policies and communists were blamed for the 
economic decline.   
12 The PKI/Gestapo reference was dropped after the fall of Suharto, although some authors still refer to the G-30-S as 
Gestapo. In 2006, the PKI was dropped from the G-30-S/PKI reference in text books, however, it was reinstated again 
(Wahyuningroem 2013, p. 127). See Vickers & McGregor (2011) for an analysis of books in Indonesia discussing the 
1965 coup and how these were used politically 
13 Some authors argued that people used communism as an excuse to settle any type of religious, ethnic or economic 
dispute; basically taking advantage of the situation (for instance Thaler 2012). However, Cribb (2001) had already 
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though communists were being killed, the PKI as a political party was not banned until March 12, 
1966 (Djakababa 2013, p. 9). After the Killings, the PKI as a political force was virtually destroyed 
(Cribb 2009, p. 243). 
Although Central and East Java, Bali, and North Sumatra were the territories most affected, 
“there were massacres in every part of the archipelago where communists could be found” (Cribb 
2010, p. 233). Estimates of the casualties range between 250,000 to 1 million14, with the most cited 
number being up to 500,000. In addition, between 1 million and 1.5 million were imprisoned (in 
prison or prison camps).   
Many details about the way the Killings were carried out are not known (Cribb 2010). 
Events are clouded in myth and false recounts (Woodward 2011). It is accepted that these were 
organized by the army and because Suharto, an army general, controlled the government, the 
Killings were orchestrated by the state. Although youth associations and militias (political and 
religious) participated in the killings15, the army was the driving force behind them, providing 
them not only with training and weapons but also by allowing them to kill without any 
consequences16  (Pohlman 2013; Cribb 2010, 2009; Thaler 2012). A good description of the way 
the Killings worked is described by Cribb:  
In most cases, the killings were triggered by the arrival of anti-communist 
special forces, especially the RPKAD para-commandos, or when local 
                                                          
argued that this is a “misconception” because “the Communist Party had been so successful in taking sides in social 
conflicts across the breadth of the archipelago that most grudges had a political dimension” (Cribb 2001, p. 234). 
14 Human Rights NGOs, like Amnesty International reported up to one million dead (Amnesty International 1994 in 
Djakababa 2013). Other non-academic sources reported up to 2 million. For example: NPR news. Pat Dowell. July 
27, 2013. Film Unveils Underpinnings Of Mass Killings In Indonesia. 
Online:http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=206153204 
15 All the militias or youth associations who participated in the Killings are referred to as “coalition of violence” 
(Gerlach 2010: 17 in Wahyuningroem 2013, 119) or “militant Action Front” (Thaler 2012, p. 207). 
16 The issue of the perpetrators could be further analyzed. Not all perpetrators were willing participants and, as 
Woodward (2011) claims, some of the perpetrators could be viewed as victims.  
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armed forces made it clear that they sanctioned the murder of communists. 
In some regions, military units themselves took a major role in the killing, 
but more commonly they used local militias. ... These organizations 
typically moved systematically from village to village using lists and local 
informants to identify party members, who were then taken away for 
execution. In some cases, entire villages were wiped out, but for the most 
part, the killers were selective, taking only those that were identified as 
‘guilty’. Teachers and other village intellectuals were especially common 
on the lists of victims. The killing was largely done with knives or swords, 
but some victims were beaten to death and some were shot. Sometimes the 
bodies of the victims were deliberately mutilated, an act which, for 
Muslims, damages the spiritual integrity of the victim’s soul. In some 
cases, the victims were forced to dig their own shallow, mass graves in 
secluded places, or the bodies were dumped in rivers, or concealed in 
caves. There are some reports of mass graves beneath the main square in 
towns in central Java. In a few cases, the bodies, or body parts, of victims 
were put on display, sometimes laid out on rafts, which were floated down 
rivers (Cribb 2010, p. 233).  
 
In general, people accused of being communist did not fight back. One explanation is that 
most of them did not even know about the coup of 1965 (Thaler 2012, p. 208). Another reason is 
that people thought that by not resisting they would show that they had not been involved in the 
coup (Cribb 2009, p. 239).  
 59 
  
Event 2: the Invasion of East Timor 
 
President Suharto consolidated his power after the Killings. Having destroyed the 
communist forces in Indonesia, Suharto aligned Indonesia with the Western world.  Although there 
were no mass killings after 1969, discrimination, political imprisonments, and torture continued 
well into the 1980s (Wahyuningroem 2013; Cribb 2001). Suharto’s authoritarian regime also had 
consequences for other islands in the archipelago. For instance, in 1962 Indonesia occupied West 
Papua and annexed it in 1969. Less than ten years after reaching power, Suharto invaded and 
annexed East Timor. Although condemned by the United Nations and the Security Council, 
Indonesia occupied East Timor from 1975 to 2001, with only the local resistance (Fretilin) fighting 
against the Indonesian army. The occupation left around 25% of the population of East Timor 
dead.  
 
East Timor’s failed independence 
 
Portugal had colonized Timor since the mid-17th century. The island was divided in 1915 
into East and West Timor; the West was controlled by the Dutch and the East by the Portuguese. 
When the Dutch recognized Indonesia’s independence in 1949, West Timor became part of 
Indonesia but the East was still under Portuguese control.17 The wave of decolonization after 
WWII had not affected East Timor. Portugal had refused to grant independence to its colonies 
                                                          
17 During World War Two, Japan invaded Timor. Australia assisted the Timorese in fighting the Japanese for a while. 
However, when Australia withdrew around 60,000 Timorese (13% of the population) were killed by Japanese forces 
(Jones 2011, p. 310). Portugal recovered East Timor at the end of the war.  
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despite numerous calls from the UN for decolonization. Local independence movements emerged 
in Portugal’s colonies –Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau-- but Portugal sent its 
army to crush the rebels. In East Timor, Dom Boaventura had led rebellions against Portugal, but 
the military began a tactic favoring certain local leaders over others, contributing to lack of 
cohesion among Timorese (CAVR 2005, p. 4) and thus reducing the probability of united fighting. 
Even though it is a small island, there are around “thirty ethnic groups speaking fourteen distinct 
languages” (Kiernan 2004, p. 204). 
It was not until April 25, 1974 with Portugal’s Carnation Revolution and the end of their 
military authoritarian dictatorship18 that East Timor’s prospects for independence became tangible, 
as well as for other Portuguese colonies.  In preparation for the 1979 scheduled independence, 
political parties were formed and elections to select a National Constituent Assembly to prepare 
for independence were scheduled for 1976. Although this plan was set in motion for independence 
and to transfer power, people in East Timor were divided, as represented by the main political 
parties that were created: (1) the UDT or Timorese Democratic Union, (2) Fretilin19 or 
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, and (3) Apodeti (Timorese Popular 
Democratic Association). The Fretilin were influenced by Maoism (Kiernan 2004, p. 203). Both 
the UDT and Fretilin advocated for independence (CAVR 2005, int, p. 4), although they had 
different timelines for it, with the UDT asking for longer time associated with Portugal before 
independence and Fretilin asking for immediate independence (Thaler 2011). On the other hand, 
the Apodeti wanted to join Indonesia (Thaler, 2012, 211). 20 Hence, despite the real chances for 
                                                          
18 Portugal had been under the authoritarian dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar from 1932 to 1968 when he 
became sick and was succeeded by Marcello José das Neves Caetano. However, Portugal remained an authoritarian 
regime.  According to Varela & Alcântara (2014), the reasons for the revolution to end the dictatorship in Portugal 
were the combination of an economic crisis and the wars to impede the independence of Angola, Cape Verde, 
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau (p. 175). 
19 It was originally named ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association). 
20 Other parties included Association of Timorese Warrior Sons (KOTA) and Labour (Trabalhista). 
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East Timor to be independent, its future remained uncertain.  
 
The short civil war 
 
From March to July 1975 Portugal organized village-level elections to form the National 
Constituent Assembly to prepare for independence. Fretilin, who had “strong support in the 
country side” (Jones 2011, p. 310), obtained 55% of the vote (Kiernan 2002, p. 168), which meant 
that they were going to push for independence in a short period of time. The UDT did not accept 
Fretilin’s victory and began an armed attack against Fretilin on August 11, 1975. The confrontation 
lasted three weeks and it is estimated that between 1,500 and up to 3,000 people died (Niner 2001, 
p. 17). Although UDT’s attack was backed by Indonesia, it was not successful and Fretilin emerged 
victorious. Fretilin was able to resist the attack because they appealed “to the Portuguese-trained 
East Timorese military units” (Kiernan 2004, p. 205). 
There is evidence that Indonesia’s incursion in East Timor began at least one year before 
the civil war. In October 1974 Indonesia began Operation Komodo to destabilize the island. Some 
of their tactics included (1) media manipulation to exploit fears of communism21 (Thaler 2012; 
Dunn 2009), (2) infiltration (Thaler 2012, p. 211), “courting” (Dunn 2009, p.271), and provision 
of military training to the UDT (Niner 2001, p. 18; CAVR 2005, Int, p. 5), and (3) supporting and 
infiltrating Apodeti (Niner 2001, p. 18; CAVR para 16, p. 5; Dunn 2009, p. 270). One strategy 
used by Indonesia was that Lt. General Murtopo informed the UDT leadership “that his 
intelligence agents had uncovered a Fretilin conspiracy to launch a coup, and he encouraged them 
to take pre-emptive action” (Dunn 2009, p. 271). 
                                                          
21 Fretilin was accused of being a communist organization. Although some members of Fretilin belonged ideologically 
in the far-left, “the mainstream of the Fretilin leadership was centre-left” (CAVR 2005, part 3, p. 28).  
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The same strategy of media manipulation used during the Killings was also used during 
the invasion (this was not, however, exclusive to Indonesia: Fretilin and the UDT also relied in the 
same strategy (CAVR 2005)). To justify its intervention, the Indonesian army reported false 
allegations and alluding to fears of communism, Indonesia was able to justify the military 
intervention. For example, the media reported that “Chinese communists who had fled the Killings 
had relocated to East Timor to use the territory as a launching pad for further destabilization of 
Indonesia” (Thaler 2012, p. 211). Likewise, Indonesia “falsified accounts of links between 
[Fretilin], Peking, and Hanoi” (Dunn, 2009, p. 270). When the civil war started, Indonesia “falsely 
reported heavy fighting and atrocities committed by Fretilin, prompting many East Timorese living 
near the border to flee into Indonesian West Timor. Here they became pawns, used by Indonesia 
as evidence of the instability of East Timor, the threat it posed to Indonesia itself, and thus the 
need for intervention”  (Thaler 2012, p. 211). Members of the UDT militias –who sided with the 
Indonesian army (CAVR 2005 Int, p. 5) -- and refugees both fled to West Timor. Amid the chaos, 
Indonesia took over the 14,874 sq km island. “Jakarta extended its support to the side that lost 
(politically and militarily) and used the losers’ existence to obtain ‘an invitation’ to invade and 
annex East Timor” (Falk 2001, p. 149). The first attacks occurred in October 1975 in Bobonaro, 
by air, sea and land (CAVR 2005, int, p. 5).  
Upon the imminent military involvement of Indonesia, and upon Portugal’s refusal to 
provide support22, Fretilin leaders declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of East 
Timor in November 28, 1975. The following day the other political parties sided with Indonesia 
and signed, “under pressure”, the Balibo Declaration in Bali “proclaiming Portuguese Timor’s 
integration with Indonesia” (CAVR 2005, p. 5). In the absence of international commotion over 
                                                          
22 The Portuguese had left in August 1974 (CAVR 2005, p. 5). 
 63 
the fate of East Timor, Indonesia mobilized troops (by air, sea and land—from West Timor) and 
fully invaded East Timor on December 7, 1975. Just in the first days of the invasion two thousand 
people were killed in Dili (Niner 2001, p.18).   By July 1976 East Timor became the 27th Province 
of Indonesia23.  
 
Life under the invasion 
 
The Indonesian army attacked the East Timorese with brutality and army- and paramilitary-
led massacres were reported in almost all villages (Thaler 2012, p. 212; Jones 2011, p. 311). Tens 
of thousands of people escaped to the mountains from where Fretilin established a de facto 
government and from where Falintil, an armed resistance of twenty thousand troops commanded 
by Xanana Gusmao and with access to “an arsenal of modern NATO weapons taken from 
Portuguese stocks” (Niner 2001, p. 18), began a guerrilla warfare against the Indonesian army24. 
Ultimately, Indonesia did not have full control of the island. In fact, according to José Ramos-
Horta (1978), representative of Fretilin at the United Nations, three years after the invasion 
Indonesia only controlled 25% of the territory25 (p. 192). “Australian sources reported by late 1976 
that Indonesia had lost 10,000 troops killed, wounded, or missing” (Kiernan 2004, p. 208). 
During the invasion, hundreds of thousands of people were directly killed by military raids, 
both by the Indonesian military as well as paramilitary groups. Rampages in villages and bombings 
were common although the tactics used changed throughout the occupation26. In May 1981 
                                                          
23 Indonesia supposedly annexed East Timor in response to calls for integration from East Timor’s Popular 
Representative Assembly. However, the UN did not find it a legitimate act of self-determination given that the 
Assembly consisted of “hand-picked Timorese” by Indonesia (CAVR 2005, Int, p. 5). 
24 Fretilin’s resistance was divided. See Kiernan (2004) and Bartu (2001). 
25 Ramos-Horta also reports that Indonesia had spent $1 billion from 1975 to 1978 with little result: Heavy casualties 
on the Indonesian side and little territory control.  
26 The Indonesia military also used napalm (Thaler 2012, p. 212; Dunn 2009, p. 274). 
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Indonesia began “Operation Security”, as described by Thaler (2012): 
Tens of thousands of men between the ages of 15 and 50—though sometimes as 
young as 9 and as old as 60—were ordered to march in front of Indonesian troops 
as they approached suspected Fretilin positions so as to force Fretilin soldiers to 
choose between shooting their countrymen and surrendering. This method, known 
as pagar betis, or ‘the fence of legs,’ had previously been used in Indonesia to 
round up suspected Communists during the Killings… Pagar betis was also part 
of a plan to ‘Timorize’ the war, in which some Timorese came to the Indonesian 
side in exchange for pay or the opportunity to loot, in addition to those forced to 
participate (Thaler 2012, p. 213).   
 
People were also killed indirectly by poisoning and/or by cutting off food supply, which 
occurred due to continuous scorched-earth raids and blockades of the mountains, causing people 
to die due to disease and starvation. The fate of the people who did not escape to the mountains 
and survived the rampages in the villages was not better. Survivors were sent to “model villages” 
(Thaler 2012; Jones 2011, p. 312), refugee/prisoners camps where people also died from “disease, 
starvation and forced labor” (Jones 2011, p. 312). People who were in refugee camps in West 
Timor were also attacked: in June 1976 “Indonesian troops who had been badly mauled by Fretilin 
units took their vengeance on a large refugee settlement which housed some 5000 to 6000 people” 
(Dunn 1978 quoted by Kiernan 2004, p. 211). 
 It is estimated that around 25% of the population died as a result of the invasion (Kiernan 
2003 in Jones 2011, p. 312), with the most cited estimates ranging from 120,000 to 200,000. 
Although the absolute number of people killed in East Timor is significantly less than other 
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genocides, “in terms of proportion of population killed” the genocide was as severe as the Jewish 
Holocaust (Jones 2011, p. 310). “Samuel Moore writes, ‘The East Timorese continued to live 
under one of the most intensive military occupations of modern history’, with ten to fourteen troops 
stationed in each village and neighborhood, a soldier for every thirty-eight civilians” (Kiernan 
2004, p. 223). In addition to killings, the army and paramilitary committed other crimes, including 
mass rapes, forced sterilization and torture (Thaler 2012). 
 
Event 3: 1997/Non-genocide 
 
The end of the 1990s marked another turning point in the history of Indonesia and 
consequently for East Timor. The end of the Cold War had changed interests and alliances 
throughout the archipelago. In addition, in 1998, after the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Suharto 
was forced to resign. While international response to the Killings and the occupation of East Timor 
was practically muted, during the late 1990s voices were raised about the situation on the island. 
The change of leadership in Indonesia in 1998 not only allowed the situation of East Timor to be 
revisited, but it also allowed a deeper understanding of the Killings. People were embolden to 
protest against the military regime in Indonesia after the Asian economic crisis in 1997. Mass 
protests in Jakarta and other cities both against Suharto and the occupation of East Timor erupted. 
Although these protests were repressed, Suharto was forced to resign. His fall marked another 
turning point in Indonesia, opening the door to an exploration of the past and providing the 
opportunity for the liberation of East Timor. Even before Suharto’s fall, a series of events began 
to change the odds for ending the occupation: (1) In 1988 East Timor was granted “‘equal status’ 
with Indonesia’s other twenty-six provinces’” (Kammen 2001, quoted by Kiernan 2004, p. 222-
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223); (2) Suharto began Operation Smile (Kammen 2001, quoted by Kiernan 2004, p. 222-223), 
allowing “eight of East Timor's thirteen districts … [to] be open to entry by Indonesians and 
foreigners”27 (Niner 2001, p. 22). This opening allowed more press coverage as well as more 
“communication with resistance forces inside and outside” (Niner 2001, p. 22). However, “‘greater 
openness was accompanied by the heightened used of covert operations and terror’” (Kammen 
cited by Kiernan 2004, p. 222-223). Also, by 1990 power was “…transferr[ed] to local troops and 
paramilitary troops, although they were under the direction of Indonesia” (Kiernan 2004, p. 233). 
 
The Santa Cruz massacre 
 
Although the UN had never recognized East Timor’s annexation, no external power 
intervened in favor of East Timor. In fact, the events on East Timor were not really known outside 
of East Timor28. This changed in the beginning of the 1990s, especially after the Santa Cruz 
Massacre in 1991 which was known to the outside world because witnesses were able to leave the 
country with film footage: On November 12, 1991 people were protesting peacefully in Dili, in 
the Santa Cruz cemetery, when Indonesian troops attacked. 270 were killed on the spot (Jones 
2011, p. 312; Thaler 2012, p. 213) and around 200 more were murdered in the hospitals in the 
following days (Scheiner 2001, p. 109).   
 
 
                                                          
27 The International Red Cross was allowed to return in the second half of 1979 (Dunn 2009, p. 273). 
28 There are some exceptions to this. Jones (2011) says that in Australia people had been trying to bring the issue of 
East Timor to the forefront, especially WWII veterans that had fought alongside East Timorese against Japan. 
Similarly, the question of East Timor was always present in the General Assembly, though nothing happened. 
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The fall of Suharto 
 
Suharto’s resignation from power was mostly due to the economic crisis of 1997 and the 
mass protests against the authoritarian-military government in Indonesia and its hold over East 
Timor and other regions, including Aceh and West Papua. Although the mass demonstrations were 
repressed by the government and violence increased in East Timor, this time, outside powers were 
not in agreement with Indonesia’s repressive policies. Pressured from outside and pressured from 
inside, Suharto was forced to resign: “On May 22, 1998, the day after Suharto resigned, the U.S. 
Senate unanimously called on President Habibie to support democratic and economic reforms in 
Indonesia and East Timor and to ‘support an internationally supervised referendum on self-
determination’” (Simpson 2004, 470). Power was transferred to the vice-president B.J. Habibie, 
who promised in January 1999 to “let East Timor go” (Jones 2011, p. 312). 
 
The Vote in 1999 
 
A referendum or “Popular Consultation”, organized by the United Nations and Portugal, 
was scheduled for August 30, 1999. East Timorese would have two choices: Accept or reject 
special autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia (rejection meaning independence). Although 
Habibie officially was willing to let East Timor go, the expectation was that people would be 
fearful to even vote. During the registration period, the Indonesia military, through the use of local 
paramilitary forces, attacked (Jones 2001, p. 312; Thaler 2012, p. 213; Scheiner 2001, p. 112). 
Amid the violence prior to the vote, the UN, ironically, left security to the Indonesian army29. 
                                                          
29The UN sent UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor) to assess the situation. In May 1999, the UN, 
Portugal and Indonesia met to discuss the security issue in East Timor. The accords are known as the 5 May accords. 
Robinson (2001) explains that UN officials thought that this was the only way Indonesia was going to let the vote to 
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Despite the increased violence, 98.6% of those who had registered, voted.  The results were 
announced on September 4: 78.5% chose independence (Robinson 2001, p. 58). Within hours of 
the announcement, Operasi Guntur (Operation Thunder) began; the Indonesian military as well as 
paramilitary groups began a new wave of violence: It is estimated that at least 1,500 people were 
killed30 (Jones 2011, p. 313). Additionally, rapes and forced migration to West Timor were also 
reported (Thaler 2012; Dunn 2009), and villages and cities physically destroyed (Kiernan 2004; 
Jones 2011), leaving East Timor without infrastructure. 
 Australia led the operation to secure East Timor. Under the UN, Australia, the United States 
and others, in a “coalition of the willing” arrived in East Timor on September 20th. Indonesian 
troops left East Timor and power was transferred to the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).  Although virtually destroyed, East Timor held 
elections in August 2001. The first free parliamentary elections gave the victory to Fretilin with 
57% of the votes; presidential elections in April 2002 gave victory to Xanana Gusmao (former 
Frelitin’s leader), with 79% of the votes (Kiernan 2004, p. 203). The UN transferred power to the 
new state of East Timor on May 20, 2002. 
There were different reasons why Indonesia had refused independence to East Timor. First, 
Indonesia was worried about a domino effect in the archipelago; allowing independence for East 
Timor might signal to other regions (especially Aceh and West Papua) that had been fighting for 
their liberation as well that they too could obtain independence (Dunn 2009; Thaler 2012). Second, 
members of the military had an economic interest in the island since some of them “had amassed 
huge economic holdings in East Timor over the previous twenty-five years” (Jones 2011, p. 312). 
                                                          
proceed. Also, East Timorese people were not eager to postpone the vote. See Robinson (2001) for further evaluation 
of UNAMET. 
30 Dunn (2009) argues that the death toll could be more than 2000 because many bodies were thrown into the sea and 
it was impossible to count (p. 280). 
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This economic stake was true as well for other Indonesians who arrived in East Timor during the 
1980s and had some of the most fertile regions of the island in the 1980s (Thaler 2012, p. 213). 
    
Part 2 
 
Part 1 above presented a brief historical review of the three events in Indonesia considered 
in Harff’s statistical model. The domestic variables significant in the model can be identified in all 
these events (for details on domestic variables refer to chapter 2; for a cross-case comparison and 
evaluation of the interaction between domestic and external variables for all cases presented in the 
dissertation, see chapter 6).  
In Event 1 and Event 2 (the Killings and the occupation of East Timor in 1975) domestic 
variables provide a sufficient explanation of the genocide/politicide: Although external factors 
were present (see sections below), the model was able to predict the genocide/politicide by 
focusing only on domestic factors. On the contrary, the model wrongly predicted Event 3. The 
result from the model indicated that after 1997 there should have been a genocide/politicide, except 
it did not happen.  It is argued below that external factors explain this: mainly, a change in the 
policies of other states toward Indonesia as well as pressure from within Indonesia and East Timor 
forced Indonesia to let East Timor go (although the military fought until the very last minute). The 
role of external variables and the interaction with domestic variables is reviewed using Stoett’s 
(2004) categorization of external involvement (a detailed discussion of this categorization is 
presented in chapter 2). First, the section of resonant complicity evaluates the effects of 
colonization at the moment of independence. The main conclusion of this section is that the effect 
of resonant complicity in Indonesia and East Timor diminishes as time passes. Second, material 
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contributions analyzes the direct contributions made by external states to the perpetrator and/or 
victims. This section argues that material contributions provided to the Indonesian military 
provided the means they needed first to persecute communists in 1965, during the Killings, and 
second to conquer and maintain control over East Timor. Third, indifference and selective 
intervention (or indirect assistance) is assessed in all three cases as well by evaluating the indirect 
assistance provided to both state and non-state actors. In the first two events, indirect assistance 
provided the opportunity for the government of Suharto to carry on with its plans. However, when 
indirect assistance was denied by mid-1990s, President Suharto and the Indonesian military had to 
let East Timor be an independent state. 
 
Effects of Colonialism 
 
The category Effects of Colonialism encompasses the concept of resonant complicity and 
includes actions of states “distant in time but still present in implication” (Stoett 2004, p. 34), in 
particular the effects of colonization in the moment of independence. Following Cribb’s (2001) 
evaluation above, a heterogeneous group of people in Indonesia, both ethnically and politically, 
was united in their fight for independence. What they all had in common was that they had been 
colonized by the Dutch. Once the state of Indonesia was independent, the diverse and contradictory 
political views and national aspirations divided the population further, and political fragmentation 
was so devastating that it culminated in the Killings. In part, it is evident that the political and 
social system installed by the Dutch contributed to create these divisions. But this lack of national 
identity and differences in ethnicities are also the result of geography with more than 10,000 
inhabited islands and more than 15 different ethnic groups and around 300 different dialects. There 
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have been other cases of violence in Indonesia that were about ethnicity, with numerous calls for 
independence and separatist movements that have emerged in different regions --for instance Aceh 
and West Papua. But it was not differences in ethnicity or a desire to separate that sparked the 
Killings; rather, it was a struggle for power and for control of the government. The different 
programs for development that existed in Indonesia (developmentalists, Islamists and communists) 
were a reaction to the colonial past, a response to a way forward for Indonesia to become a state. 
This explains the political upheaval that occurred right before the Killings.  
 The process of independence for East Timor, or more accurately, the disruption of the 
process of independence, had a direct effect on the occupation of East Timor and, consequently, 
the genocide. The effect was twofold: On the one hand, the Portuguese had created a system that 
was not conducive to national unity in the island. Similar to other cases of colonialism, systems 
were left in place in which one group was favored by the colonizing power, creating or 
exacerbating differences among the population and reducing probabilities of presenting a united 
front. This facilitated Indonesia’s exploitation of opposing views in East Timor and allowed the 
Indonesian military to turn East Timorese against each other. On the other hand, the process of 
independence itself was hijacked by Indonesia’s involvement and by lack of response to East 
Timor from abroad. It was not only that Portugal abandoned the island before the process of 
independence was complete31, it was also that Portugal, the United States and Australia did not 
object to Indonesia’s plans to take East Timor: 
It was poor, undeveloped, remote, and unconnected to the global network of 
commercial and tourist communications. It possessed no apparent strategic 
value to any nation, with the possible exception of Indonesia. Its status was 
                                                          
31 The Portuguese had left in August 1974 (CAVR 2005, p.5). 
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therefore of little consequence, in perceptions of national interest, other than 
to Portugal, Indonesia, and Australia. By the end of that year, the Portuguese 
themselves, with their · empire now falling apart, had turned to Europe and 
were little interested in the fortunes of a distant colony of very little economic 
value (Dunn 2009, p. 269). 
 
By 1997 East Timor had been invaded for more than twenty years. While the failed process 
of independence is the root of the conflict, this does not explain the nonexistent genocide/politicide 
after 1997. There is a second way to analyze resonant complicity, considering Indonesia’s invasion 
and annexation as a case of colonialism. Although these two issues (hindering East Timor’s 
opportunity for independence and Indonesia’s invasion) occurred almost simultaneously, they can 
be analyzed as two separate issues with different consequences. Indonesian colonialism explains 
the violence that ensued in East Timor: Fretilin’s fight against the colonial power and Indonesia 
refusing to let them be independent. However, this effect does not explain the non-
genocide/politicide after 1997. 
The Killings did not occur immediately after independence but sixteen years later. It was 
Sukarno’s leadership that maintained certain order and balance among the different powers in 
Indonesia. But the immediate antecedents for the Killings and what opened the door for a renewed 
struggle for power were the economic decline and Sukarno’s own personal and political decline 
that led to the coup. Suharto and his followers took the opportunity to crush an opponent from a 
permissive environment, as discussed in the following sections. On the contrary, the failed process 
of independence for East Timor was the immediate reason for the occupation. Because Portugal, 
the colonizing power, did not object and because the United States and Australia supported 
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Suharto, Indonesia occupied the island. However, the failed process of independence back in 1975 
and the occupation of East Timor do not fully explain the non-genocide/politicide after 1997.  
 
Direct assistance 
 
Although resonant complicity helps to put a conflict in perspective and provides insight 
into the reasons for the violence, it only explains genocide/politicide when violence erupted right 
after independence. Although subsequent violence can be explained as a result of what happened 
during colonization or during the fight for independence, there are other factors that have weight 
in leaders’ decision-making. Stoett’s category of material contributions provides explanation to 
understand the means available to the leaders to commit the crimes. This category focuses mostly 
on tangible military assistance among states: Training, weapons, supplies, intelligence, etc. In 
other words, this is direct assistance provided from abroad. Although Indonesia had received 
material contributions continuously, there are variations throughout the years. Using SIPRI’s data, 
the graphs below show the transfers of conventional arms to the government of Indonesia32. The 
following graph (G3.1) shows that state-to-state arms transfers to Indonesia were indeed constant, 
but there are some years in which these were significantly higher than others. The first graph shows 
the main states that delivered weapons to Indonesia33, as well as the total weapons, in terms of TIV 
                                                          
32 SIPRI’s statistical data measures “the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons using a 
common unit, the trend-indicator value (TIV). The TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of 
weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer 
[…] This data is intended to provide a common unit to allow the measurement if trends in the flow of arms to particular 
countries and regions over time […] SIPRI TIV figures do not represent sales prices for arms transfers ... They are 
best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers over periods of time, global percentages 
for suppliers and recipients, and percentages for the volume of transfers to or from particular states” (SIPRI). See 
chapter 2 for further explanation. 
33 SIPRI’s data reports the country from which the arms were delivered, but it may not reflect the country that actually 
made the transfer.  
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received from 1950 to 2013.  
 
G3.1. *Note: “Others” include all states whose total arms transfers from 1950- 2013 were less than 
10% of the total arms transfers (Australia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia/Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Poland, Singapore, 
Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UAE, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, 
and ‘others’ in SIPRI’s data).* 
 
The graph above (G3.1) shows two clear peaks in the transfer of conventional weapons to 
Indonesia. The first one from 1958 to 1962 and the second from 1978 to 1982. It is evident that 
from 1958 to 1965, Indonesia’s major supplier was the Soviet Union. This was before the coup of 
1965 and the subsequent transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto. This can be explained by 
Sukarno’s closeness to communism. The second peak shows that, although the United States was 
one of the major contributors of weapons, “other” states combined made more arms transfers, in 
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terms of TIV (the graph does not show if the United States transferred weapons via a third country). 
After the second peak, the fluctuations are less extreme. The first peak occurred in the period 
previous to the coup. The second peak occurred during East Timor’s occupation, precisely after 
1978, when the Indonesian army had suffered many losses and could not control Fretilin. The 
graph also shows that the arms transfers had reduced significantly by the late-1990s, when Western 
states began to pressure Indonesia to liberate East Timor. During these years, states that had not 
sent conventional weapons to Indonesia began to do so, for instance Singapore, Slovakia and 
Ukraine.  
Upon his ascendency to power in 1965, President Suharto inaugurated what later became 
known as the New Order: aligning Indonesia politically and economically with the West. In 
addition to the persecution and killing of communists and the banning of the PKI, relations with 
China were frozen and Indonesia joined ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations). By 
containing communism and by joining the capitalist world, Indonesia became a key ally of the 
West. His reward, unquestioned support: investments and assistance from the West followed 
(CAVR 2005 part 3, p. 18). This change in ideology is evident in the graph above, with the USSR 
providing arms almost exclusively in the early 1960s, while in the 1970s that support was provided 
by Western states. 
In terms of military assistance, the United States trained Indonesia’s special forces, the 
Kopasus Red Berets (RPKAD), who were directly involved in the Killings.  Additionally, the 
United States also provided assistance by giving the Indonesian military lists of names of people 
to be removed34 (Cribb 2009, p. 240; Vickers & McGregor 2011, p. 443). Another way of 
providing material support was to contribute to the anti-communist propaganda. The United States, 
                                                          
34 Cribb explains further that Suharto had to rely on this list to remove senior communists because “it was so unclear 
who was to be trusted” (p. 240). 
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Malaysia and the United Kingdom were involved in this (Thaler 2012, p. 206). For instance, 
Marshal Green, the United States Ambassador to Indonesia recommended “increased covert 
efforts ‘to spread the story of the PKI's guilt, treachery, and brutality,’ although he was unsure of 
the evidence of the PKI's role” (Thaler 2012, p. 206, quoting Jaechun Kim (2002)).   
 There is no evidence that the PKI received support from external sources (at least none of 
the authors consulted mention this). SIPRI’s data does not include any arms transfers made to the 
PKI either. The fact that people who were being attacked did not respond with violence (Thaler 
2012) further indicates that the PKI was not receiving external support. It is likely that if the PKI 
had received material contributions the Killings could have escalated into full-blown war. 
Western states continued their support during the occupation and annexation of East Timor, 
even though it was illegal and despite knowledge of the atrocities committed by the Indonesian 
army. According to SIPRI’s database, however, in the years previous to the invasion Indonesia did 
not receive significant arms transfers. But by 1978, when Indonesia was losing men and resources, 
the second peak in support can be seen in the graph. The next graph (G3.2), also made using SIPRI 
data on Indonesia, shows the percentages of arms transfers received by the government of 
Indonesia from 1950 to 2013. The columns are sized per the percentages at the left axis of the 
graph and mark the volume of arms transfers per year as a percentage of the total received during 
the period studied. The percentages at the right axis reference the line that crosses diagonally and 
are the cumulative percentages from 1950 to 2013 (thus, the line starts at nearly zero and finishes 
at 100%). In terms of yearly percentages, the cluster of years from 1958 to 1964 have 4,803 TIV, 
which represent 28.5% of the total studied). It was in 1962 that Indonesia received more arms in 
general (7% of all the arms transfers from 1950 to 2013 were made in 1962). The second peak in 
arms transfers, the cluster from 1978 to 1983 accounts for 2,843 TIV, which represent 18.2%).  
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 G3.2 
 
Although the United States was the main supplier of weapons and training, other states 
were also involved: “More than $1 billion in military equipment, supplied to Indonesia mostly by 
the United States, but also by Britain, France, and Australia, had made this genocide [East Timor] 
possible” (Kiernan 2004, p. 212). However, looking at arms transfers reported by SIPRI, the 
contributions made by Australia and France were not very significant (compared to other states). 
Australia’s arms transfers, considering the period from 1950 to 2013 is less than 1% and France 
transfers account for 6% of the total contributions. In 1983, Australia “increased efforts to improve 
Indonesia-Australia ties and sought specifically to build ties to the Indonesian military” and in 
December 1995 they signed “the Canberra-Jakarta ‘Agreement on Maintaining Security’ (AMS) 
[which was] negotiated in secret and insulated from parliamentary oversight…” (Huntley and 
Hayes 2001, p. 181).  
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In particular, the material support provided by the United States continued throughout the 
invasion. Training was continuous from the early 1960s to the late 1990s (Scott 2004; Kiernan 
2002; Nairn 2001).35 According to data gathered by Simpson (2004), “military aid and weapons 
sales to Indonesia during the Carter administration nearly doubled to more than $200 million in 
fiscal year (FY) 1979, when the killings in East Timor peaked” (p. 459). Authors highlight certain 
weapons provided by the United States during the invasion: “The paratroopers dropped from U.S. 
C-130s. They used new U.S. machine guns to shoot the Timorese into the sea” (Nairn 2001, p. 
163). The United States also provided OV-10 Bronco aircraft (Ramos-Horta 1978 p. 191; Nairn 
2001, p. 163), as well as tanks, armoured cars and trucks (Ramos-Horta 1978, p. 191) and 
helicopters (Nairn 2001, p. 163). In addition, in early 1978 President Carter authorized “the sale 
of 12 F-5E jet fighters to Indonesia” (Ramos-Horta 1978, p. 192). And during the Dili massacre in 
1991, the military carried United States-supplied M-16 automatic rifles (Nairn 2001, p. 163; 
Scheiner 2001, p. 109). In addition to weapons, material contributions also included military 
advisors: There are reports of American and ASEAN military advisers in East Timor in 1977 
(Ramos-Horta 1978).  
 By 1997, however, material support in terms of arms transfers had reduced significantly 
(though not completely gone). From 1990 to 2001, Indonesia received 2,138 TIV (13.7% of the 
total arms transfers made from 1950-2013), but there was a sharp drop after 1996, as indicated in 
chart G3.2. Some of the support the Indonesian military continued to receive came from the United 
States Pentagon (Scheiner 2001; Nairn 2001; Jones 2001), without the knowledge of the U.S 
Congress, which had banned training to Indonesian troops in 1992, cancelled the IMET 
(International Military Education and Training), and banned the supply of weapons to Indonesia 
                                                          
35 Furthermore, there are reports of US military fighting alongside the Indonesians, mainly after 1977, after three years 
of no real military victory for the Indonesians (Ramos-Horta 1978).  
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(Scheiner 2001; Nairn 2001), including “the cancellation of deals for F-5 and F-16 fighters” (Nairn 
2001, p. 172). Nonetheless, the Pentagon continued to train Indonesians in another program, the 
JCET (Joint Combined Exchange Program until 1998 (Simpson 2004, Nairn 2001). It is evident 
that there was internal conflict within the United States on continuing support towards Indonesia, 
and even though the support continued covertly for some time, this conflict was another sign of 
the overall reduction in support. The decrease in material support was joined by a decrease in 
indirect support, as explained in the section below.  
 
Indirect support  
 
While material contributions provided Suharto with the means to commit the crimes, other 
type of assistance provided the opportunity: The category of indifference and selective intervention 
assesses the failure of external actors “to intervene to stop them” (Stoett 2014, p. 34). But in this 
dissertation, this category was extended to also include political approval for the crimes, strategic 
indifference, and other actions of external states that can result in increasing the probability of 
genocide/politicide.  This indirect effect may often be even more important than material support. 
Having tacit approval from the international community enabled the authorities in Indonesia to 
commit the crimes in the first two events. By 1997, the international environment had changed and 
Indonesia had to adjust accordingly.  
In the world of the Cold War, the Killings were viewed as a net positive for the Western 
world36. The victims were communists and the regime doing the mass killing was an ally of the 
                                                          
36 Of the states that were “Indonesia’s major trading and donor partners –the United States, Japan, West Germany, 
Australia, and the Netherlands only the last-mentioned showed concerned at the government level” (Dunn 2009, 
footnote p. 295). 
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West. During the invasion of East Timor, the threat of communism was also used as a justification 
for the invasion, both in Indonesia and abroad. However, while the Killings were welcomed by the 
West, where the press favorably reported Suharto’s actions, the events in East Timor were hidden. 
For instance, Time described Suharto’s attack on communists as “’the West’s best news for years 
in Asia’” (Kerson 1966 quoted by Kiernan 2002, fn. 43). On the contrary, the genocide in East 
Timor was concealed and when the question of East Timor was discussed the number of dead was 
significantly reduced and violence explained away as domestic violence (Dunn 2009, p. 276). Both 
the United States and Australia attempted to bury the issue of East Timor and they perceived it to 
be in their interests to do so; in the United States, “The State Department’s 1977 Human Rights 
Report did not mention East Timor, and that year the New York Times gave zero coverage to 
events there, while tens of thousands perished” (Kiernan 2002, p. 173). During the late 1970s and 
1980s the United States and Australia, the two main actors in the region, strategically sided with 
Indonesia. The principal concern at the time was to contain communism. In the case of the United 
States, it was part of the global strategy to balance the Soviet Union; in the case of Australia, the 
objective was to halt a communist threat at home.  
The indirect support provided to Suharto is more evident in the occupation and annexation 
of East Timor. First, there is evidence that the governments of the United States and Australia 
knew about Operasi Komodo (the infiltration of the Indonesian armed forces in East Timor and 
their plans for the occupation) and did nothing to prevent it (Dunn 2009, p. 269-270). Second, 
neither state objected to Indonesia’s plans of occupation of the island. Suharto assessed the 
willingness of external powers to allow him to invade and annex East Timor. In a series of meetings 
with the United States and Australia, Indonesian leaders assessed their position regarding invading 
East Timor. Indonesia met with the United States on two occasions before the invasion. First, 
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Suharto visited the United States on July 5, 1975 and met with United States President Gerald Ford 
and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Members of the Indonesian military also met with the 
American military: “General Ali Murtopo came to the White House and met with General Brent 
Scowcroft” (Nairn 2001, p. 163)37. The second meeting was in Jakarta on December 6, 1975. 
Likewise, Suharto met with Australian representatives in September 1974. Australian Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam told President Suharto that he agreed that “East Timor’s integration with 
Indonesia was the best solution” (Dunn 2009, p. 269). Suharto only made the decision to invade, 
according to Dunn (2009), in September after “Generals Murtopo, Murdani, and Sugama … 
assure[d] him that the governments of greatest importance to Indonesia, among them the United 
States, Japan, Australia, the Netherlands, and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
would accommodate a military operation to secure East Timor's integration into Indonesia" (p. 
272).  
The rationalization for supporting Suharto in this case was that East Timor was not going 
to be able to survive as a state on its own: “The Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, shared 
Indonesia’s view that an independent Timor-Leste would not be viable and was advised that the 
annexation of Portuguese Timor was ‘settled’ Indonesian policy” (CAVR 2005, part 3, p. 19). 
Suharto had argued, after meeting with President Carter, “that East Timor lacked the economic 
basis for viable independence” (Kiernan 2004, p. 204). Although Portugal was still the legitimate 
administrator of East Timor, Portuguese officials in East Timor had left the island and the new 
government, after the Carnation Revolution, was not interested in a tiny island in the Pacific (Dunn 
                                                          
37 There were also personal relationships between the Indonesian and American members of the military. For instance: 
United States Defense Secretary William Cohen had trained Indonesia Army General Prabowo, who had graduated 
from Fort Benning, Georgia and now commanded the Kopassus Red Beret (Narin, 1998 cited by Scott 2004, p. 151). 
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2009).38 Suharto’s weighed external responses because he did not want to put at risk the economic 
assistance that was provided by the West (Dunn 2009, 2008; CAVR 2005) and because he wanted 
to secure military assistance. The invasion of East Timor began one day after President Ford and 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger left Jakarta. According to Burr & Evans (2001), on December 
4th or 5th, “Kissinger received a cable from the State Department suggesting that the Indonesians 
had "plans" to invade East Timor39. Suharto explained in the cable that Indonesia had no territorial 
ambitions but that all political parties in East Timor, with the exception of Fretilin, were in favor 
of integration, and stated “’We want your understanding … if we deem it necessary to take rapid 
or drastic action’”. According to the researchers, both “Ford and Kissinger took great pains to 
assure Suharto that they would not oppose the invasion” (Burr & Evans 2001).  
The simplest explanation for the support provided by the West to Suharto is that 
Indonesia’s New Order “fulfilled important political conditions”: “it was large … oil producing 
… anti-Communist” and “the archipelago straddled the division between the strategically 
important Pacific and Indian Oceans” (Dunn 2009, p. 275). During the Killings, states like the 
United States looked the other way because an anti-communist regime, friendly toward the West 
was ruling Indonesia. During the invasion of East Timor, not only was Indonesia controlling a 
potentially communist regime, but the invasion of East Timor was a symbolic winning for the 
West40 and Indonesia was becoming a key ally in the region. The war in Vietnam had just ended 
                                                          
38 The United States, Australia and Portugal were not the only Western state supporting Suharto. Declassified British 
documents revealed that “On December 24, 1975, British Ambassador John A. Ford told Britain's Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in a secret telegram that Indonesian invading forces in Dili, East Timor had gone "on a 
rampage of looting and killing […] If asked to comment on any stories of atrocities," Ford advised the FCO in this 
still partly withheld telegram, ‘I suggest we say that we have no information.’” (Dowson, NSA, N/D). 
39 The cable, Plans for Indonesian Invasion of East Timor, remains classified (Burr & Evans 2001). 
40 A genocide in Cambodia, from 1975 to 1979 resulted in the death of 1.5 to 2 million people on the hands of the 
Khmer Rouge. This genocide was condemned by the West. For Chomsky and Herman (1979) the explanation is that 
Indonesia was an ally of the West (cited by Jones 2011, p. 315). As explained by Kiernan (2004): “U.S. policy opposed 
Vietnamese expansion and supported Indonesian expansion. Washington approved the independent existence of the 
Khmer Rouge regime, but not the independence of East Timor. It was prepared to sacrifice that independence to 
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with a communist victory and the United States was therefore “eager to avoid any further 
deterioration of its strategic position in Southeast Asia” (Falk 2001, p. 153). Declassified 
documents also show that the United States had explicitly supported Suharto’s invasion of East 
Timor mainly to address the issue of communism in the area, especially after Vietnam, as well as 
the spark of insurgency movements in Thailand and in Malaysia. Telegram 1579 on December 6th 
1975 reveals that  “Ford told Suharto that he would be “enthusiastic” about building an M-16 plant 
in Indonesia to provide small arms to help Southeast Asian governments counter regional 
insurgency movements” (Burr & Evans 2001). The cold war and the anti-communist ideology 
explain the support, both direct and indirect, provided to Suharto. At a national level, states were 
also interested in combating communism, especially Australia who is very close to both Indonesia 
and East Timor. Kiernan argues that Australia’s “priority was not to address problems facing East 
Timor, but to combat ‘communist’ influence at home"  (Kiernan 2002, p. 172-173).  
Furthermore, there were other, more tangible, interests in the region41. States like Japan 
and Australia were interested in the oil deposits (CAVR 2005, Thaler 2012; Falk 2001). It is 
recognized, for instance, that Australia’s move to recognize the annexation was “partly prompted 
by the then Australian government's interest in entering into negotiations with Indonesia for a deal 
covering oil deposits in the Timor Gap" (Falk 2001, p. 159; also Huntley and Hayes 2001, p. 181). 
For its part, the United States wanted access “deep-water passages in the Timor Sea for its nuclear 
submarines” (Thaler 2012, p. 211). 
There are yet other reasons why states sided with Suharto. On the one hand, “there was 
little interest in the West in investigating the past misdeeds of what was to become one of the 
                                                          
strengthen U.S. influence in Jakarta” (p. 200). 
41 The economic importance of the region is not new: “The archipelago has played a key role in long Asian trade 
routes for over 2000 years, both as a producer of spices and forest products and as a staging post on the route between 
China and the West” (Cribb 2010, p. 223). 
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West’s most important allies in Asia“(Cribb 2001, p. 234). On the other hand, these states were 
also concerned about opening a door to harsh criticisms of their own policies and crimes (Jones 
2004, 2009; Kiernan 2002). 
Although "Indonesia’s foreign minister, Adam Malik, gave assurances of Indonesian 
noninterference in East Timorese internal politics”, army officers began Operation Komodo in 
East Timor (Thaler 2012, p. 211). This could mean two things: One that the Indonesian government 
was divided; two, that Indonesia was “testing the waters”, assessing what the external reaction 
would be. Operation Komodo had the positive effect that the violence could be blamed on the East 
Timorese because the UDT was fighting against Fretilin, and because Malik was saying that 
Indonesia was not interfering, Indonesia had a defense.  
On the other side of the conflict, Fretilin’s declaration of independence did not have the 
external reaction they had hoped for. Fretilin leaders declared independence in November 28, 1975 
in order to try to bring East Timor to international attention (CAVR 2005, p.5).  However, powerful 
states sided with Indonesia and on December 7, 1975 the Indonesian military invaded East Timor. 
Despite the fact that the United Nations had condemned the invasion and had declared the 
annexation illegal, the UN was not able to do act. The UN did not recognize the annexation and 
still considered Portugal as the legitimate administrator of island. Nonetheless, the UN was unable 
to change the situation and could only protest in a series of resolutions. The Security Council 
recognized East Timor’s right to self-determination in 1975 and 1976 and the General Assembly 
protested the occupation from 1975 to 1982. Although the question of East Timor remained on the 
agenda of the General Assembly and some states opposed the annexation (mainly states that had 
been colonized as well), there were no further resolutions. This was the result of actions by the 
United States, which "… supported Indonesia's efforts to remove the East Timor question from the 
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active agenda of the General Assembly, and no further resolutions of censure were thereafter 
forthcoming"42 (Falk 2001, p. 150).  
The indirect support provided to Suharto, which had allowed him to control East Timor for 
so long began to change in the mid-1990s. A new international regime that now was beginning to 
embrace the protection of human rights forced Indonesia to play a new role. As explained by Falk, 
when power was transferred from Suharto to Habibie, he “sought to convince its former friends 
and future creditors that it was once more a respectable country as assessed by the more 
normatively oriented geopolitics of the 1990s. To make this shift seem genuine meant adopting a 
more persuasive image of constitutional respectability, and there was no faster way to move in this 
direction than by appearing to resolve the still smoldering conflict involving East Timor by a 
recourse to democratic procedures” (Falk 2001, p. 156). According to Simpson (2004), when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in 1990, “President Saddam Hussein expressed his surprise at the international 
community’s reaction to his aggression against Kuwait, commenting that the world had turned a 
blind eye to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor. Hussein’s remarks prompted more than half the 
members of the U.S. Congress to sign a letter to President George Bush pushing for greater action 
on behalf of the Timorese” (Simpson 2004, p. 458). 
 At the beginning of 1990s things had already started to change in East Timor. While they 
were still being repressed by the Indonesian military, it was becoming more difficult to hide the 
situation of East Timor from the press and news of the violence began to reach abroad. 
Domestically, East Timorese also united, either with NGOs or within political parties. The two 
main events that brought East Timor to international attention were the Dili massacre in 1991 and 
the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to two East Timorese in 1996. In addition, the opening of the 
                                                          
42 The question of East Timor remained in the agenda but was not addressed. However, “the Secretary General 
continued … to pursue diplomatic negotiations involving Portugal, Indonesia, and East Timor” (Falk 2001, p. 161). 
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borders of East Timor also allowed grassroots movements within East Timor to expand their reach 
to the outside world. ETAN (East Timor Action Network) was a key NGO that reached worldwide 
and “organized demonstrations and lobbied governments to condemn Indonesian repression” 
(Jones 2011, p. 312).  Additionally, the different political parties reconciled in September 1998, 
and created “the Timorese Council of National Resistance (CNRT), and elected the political 
prisoner Xanana Gusmao as president” (Kiernan 2004, p. 224). At the same time, NGOs in 
Indonesia also began to question the events of 1965 (Wahyuningroem 2013, p. 122). ETAN in 
particular was essential in pressuring governments to change their policies toward Indonesia and 
East Timor; they were behind the campaign to cut military training for Indonesia (IMET) in 1992 
and block transfer of F-5 fighters (Simpson 2004, p. 460). 
It was due to the increasing pressure from NGOs that the United States changed its foreign 
policy toward Indonesia –from supporting the military regime in Indonesia to supporting East 
Timor. But this change was not linear from support to non-support; there was not a consensus 
within the United States to remove that support. For instance, Jones (NSA, 2011) evaluated 
declassified documents which show that even in 1996, J.S. Roy, the Ambassador to Indonesia, 
asked President Bill Clinton "to intervene” and “advocate for” the President of Indonesia to buy 
F-16 fighter jets manufactured by the US corporations General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin". 
According to Jones’ findings, these jets had originally been intended to go to Pakistan and were 
already paid for (685 millions of dollars), but because the United States had imposed an embargo 
to Pakistan, the weapons could not been delivered. By trying to sell them to Indonesia, which, 
ironically also had an embargo on small weapons, the companies could then reimburse Pakistan. 
Indonesia bought nine of the jets, after United States Secretary of State Strobe Talbott advised Roy 
to send a letter to Suharto, “stat[ing] it was from President Clinton”. But this was done covertly: 
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“you won’t find a copy in the Clinton Presidential Library.  Talbott instructed, “’There will be no 
signed original’” (Jones, NSA 2011). 
At the same time the United States increased its criticism of Indonesia regarding East 
Timor. For instance, in 1993 President Bill Clinton cosponsored a resolution against Indonesia’s 
actions in East Timor at the UN Human Rights Commission (Simpson 2004, p. 460). Furthermore, 
“in May 1997, President Clinton met with Bishop Belo, an act that outraged authorities in Jakarta 
(Simpson 2004, 468). By June 1997, Indonesia decided to purchase Russian fighters instead of 
American-made F-16s (Jones, NSA 2011).  
In January 1999 Australia –who had been the only state to officially recognize the 
annexation—changed its policy to one of self-determination for East Timor; it was after this that 
President Habibie announced his decision to let East Timor go (Niner 2001, p. 24). And in 
September “President Bill Clinton cut off military aid to Indonesia” (Burr & Evans 2001). 
Although the UN was criticized for the May 5 agreements, which left security in the hands 
of the Indonesian armed forces during the vote in 1999, the mere fact that the UN was already 
involved in the situation reflects a dramatic change in international politics. Likewise, although 
“neither the United States nor any other government put even the slightest pressure on Indonesia 
to improve the agreement by accepting international responsibility for security” (Scheiner 2001, 
p. 113), they did not object to the referendum. There are debates whether the United States and 
other states actually had leverage to avoid the Indonesian military from “securing” the vote. UN 
officials justified the May 5 agreements as the only choice –other than postponing the vote, which 
East Timorese did not want to do—because they [UN officials] believed that China, at Indonesia’s 
request, would have vetoed any Security Council resolution that did not leave the TNl [Indonesian 
military] in charge, and that the East Timorese leadership and public wanted the vote to take place 
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while the window of opportunity was open” (Scheiner 2001 p, 113). Similarly, although Australia 
and the United States waited until Habibie authorized the UN-led intervention (Dunn 2009; 
Kiernan 2004), this had more to do with these states not wanting to set a precedent of sending 
forces without the authorization from the country in question, rather than from any true support 
for Habibie. 
With the end of the Cold War and a new international political environment by the mid-
1990s the support provided to Suharto began to decline. The events after 1997, especially 
beginning in 2000 show that external pressure combined with internal pressure changed 
Indonesia’s policies toward East Timor. In a nutshell, external support once provided to Suharto’s 
regime shifted and by the late 1990s the Indonesian government was being pressed from abroad 
as well as from below to cease the occupation and to push the question of East Timor back on the 
international agenda. This shift was the result of a change in the international political 
environment: The end of the cold war and the surge of NGOs combined with a new emphasis on 
humanitarian intervention (with situations like Somalia, Rwanda, and the ex-Yugoslavia,), as well 
as “international rejection of Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait” (Dunn 2009, p.266) contributed to the 
renewed attention to the situation in East Timor. The shift was also the result of new interests for 
the region. But it was not until the Asian economic crisis of 1997, which not only created domestic 
discontent in Indonesia, but also abroad, that Indonesia felt the pressure from abroad. All these 
combined were key elements that allowed the prospects of East Timor’s independence to increase.  
Although there was violence before and after the referendum in 1999, the violence was thwarted 
by international forces, showing that whatever support Indonesia had received in the past, was no 
longer forthcoming (at least until the situation in East Timor was resolved).   
In 1996, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two East Timorese (Carlos Filipe Ximenes 
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Belo and José Ramos Horta) who had been advocating the liberation of East Timor43. The Nobel 
Peace Prize Committee declared that they hoped the award would “spur efforts to find a diplomatic 
solution to the conflict in East Timor based on the people's right to self-determination” (Nobel 
Prize. Press Release). In fact, when independence was finally achieved in 2001, Ramos Horta said 
that the Nobel Peace Prize had contributed significantly to it (Nobel Prize, Ramos Horta Facts).  
All of this external context put pressure on governments to stop the support they had provided to 
Suharto and Indonesia.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Harff’s genocide/politicide model included three violent events in Indonesia and East 
Timor from the period of 1965 to 1997. According to the conceptual definition of 
genocide/politicide, the Killings in 1965, and the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, beginning in 
1975, are both classified as genocide/politicide. The third episode in 1997, included as a control 
case in the statistical model, was analytically classified as a non-genocide/politicide. The statistical 
model, however, resulted in a different story: while the first two events were accurately predicted 
as genocide/politicide, the third event was incorrectly also predicted as genocide/politicide. For 
the first two events, domestic variables provided sufficient explanation for the occurrence of 
genocide/politicide; this however, does not imply that external variables had no effect. In these 
two instances, external variables had an aggregating effect in the probability of 
genocide/politicide. But the most interesting case is the third one, the one misclassified by the 
                                                          
43 The Prize was given to Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the bishop of East Timor and to José Ramos Horta, one of 
Fretilin’s leader who had been traveling all over the world for the East Timor cause: “for their work towards a just 
and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor” (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1996/). 
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model: by looking at domestic variables there should have been a genocide/politicide in 
Indonesia/East Timor anytime from 1997 to 2002, but there was not, according to Harff’s own 
classification. In this instance, the external factors had a constraining effect in the probability of 
genocide/politicide.  
In the first two events, Cold War dynamics explained the support provided to Suharto: 
Indonesia was a big state that had just defeated communist threats within its boundaries in 1965 
(the Killings) and who was a key ally in the Indian Ocean. When Suharto began targeting 
communist factions within Indonesia in 1965, both the United States and Australia (as well as 
other Western states) were sympathetic to the attacks. Evidence suggests that the United States 
was involved in the coup that replaced Sukarno, a president with communist policies in Indonesia, 
with Suharto, who sided with the West. Direct assistance flowed to Indonesia since the 1960s. 
There was not much uproar about the killings of thousands of communists in 1965. External 
security concerns in the region were the principal reason behind the backing of Indonesia. When 
Indonesia began plans for the invasion of East Timor, neither Australia nor the United States were 
interested in antagonizing Indonesia. For the United States, its “defeat in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia had reinforced the Ford Administration’s determination to shore up anti-communist 
regimes around the world, no matter how odious, and Kissinger hardly was inclined to challenge 
Indonesia over a place seemingly as insignificant as Timor” (Simpson 2004, p. 455). But at the 
same time, for the same reason that the United States had been involved in these conflicts it 
probably did not have the resources to stand up to Indonesia to defend East Timor’s right of self-
determination. Australia’s interests involved energy security as shown by the signing of a treaty 
with Indonesia over oil in East Timor.  
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Authors had hypothesized that one key reason for the United States and Australia’s support 
for Indonesia, both directly by providing Suharto with weapons as well as indirectly by hiding the 
atrocities of East Timor and choosing to ignore the issue, was that Indonesia was a mighty state –
in terms of territory, military power, population and market – and thus they were not interested in 
the fate of tiny East Timor. However, by the late 1990s, when official support from the United 
States and Australia began to decline, all these issues were still true, and yet, the world began to 
care for tiny East Timor. In fact, the world had changed for Indonesia and East Timor: By the late 
1990s Indonesia was facing a deep economic crisis and its inhabitants had been demanding the 
removal of the military regime with a democratic regime. NGOs and human rights activists began 
to vociferously bring the question of East Timor to the agenda of the powerful states and of the 
United Nations, shaming governments and lobbying for support of East Timor. In addition, the 
cold war had been over for some time and old dynamics and interests were no longer as relevant. 
So when the Indonesian military attempted to curtail the independence vote in East Timor in 1999, 
Western powers and the United Nations took the side of the East Timorese. The most important 
factor was the increase in NGO’s power. NGOs like ETAN were critical in bringing the issue of 
East Timor to the forefront. 
The change in policy was not straightforward, though. For example, in the United States, 
Congress had prohibited the training of Indonesians while the military continued to do so, covertly 
and under a different program. But the tendency in the United States, Australia and other Western 
states was to tilt in favor of East Timor’s right of self-determination. Even though Habibie had 
declared that he was ready to let East Timor go when he took power, the military was not. It is 
evident that they tried to hold on to East Timor. It is also evident that other states were still hesitant 
in their support to East Timor, for while they agreed to let East Timorese vote, they still allowed 
 92 
the Indonesian military to “secure” East Timor before and during the vote, a decision that led to 
further attacks and destruction. But at the same time, it was the external powers, through the United 
Nations, that halted the Indonesian military and paramilitary and ensured the independence of East 
Timor. The setting was similar to the invasion back in 1975, when Indonesia justified the invasion 
as a response to the civil war –which they had sponsored. In 1999 however things were different: 
People in East Timor were united and the international community did respond. 
The preceding analysis shows that state-to-state relations were not the only dynamics 
taking place in Indonesia. Personal relationships between the United States military and Indonesian 
military were key to maintaining Suharto and later keeping Habibie well supplied. But personal 
relationships also worked toward decreasing the probability of genocide: For instance, Australian 
soldiers who had fought alongside East Timorese during World War II had been among those few 
voices pressing the Australian government for the liberation of East Timor.  
The intersection between the external and the internal is evident in Indonesia, and 
especially during the third event (the non-genocide/politicide). New actors had emerged and 
acquired power, for instance ETAN, raising voices of liberation for East Timor across the world. 
At the same time, both in Indonesia and in East Timor people increasingly protested against the 
government, as did people abroad. Ultimately, what this discussion shows is that material 
contributions provided the means for committing the crimes, but the indirect support was the 
catalyst for both increasing and decreasing the probability of genocide/politicide. External 
variables for these cases are shown to agree with the model when it was accurate (first two events) 
and help explain why genocide/politicide did not occur when the model erroneously predicted it 
would (third event). 
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Chapter 4: Iraq 
 
There were two events of genocide/politicide in Iraq, as classified by Barbara Harff', in the 
second part of the 20th century. The first event began with the arrival of the Baath party to power 
in 1963 and ended in 1975 with the downfall of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) rebellion. 
The second instance of gen/pol considered in Harff’s model occurred from 1988 to 1991, the Anfal 
campaign. Harff's final model did not accurately predict the first event: 
 
Year of 
event 
Final model 
score Interpretation 
Classified 
correctly? 
1963 0.185 NonGen No 
1988 0.907 Gen--Pol Yes 
 
As seen in the chart above, the final score for gen/pol 1 was very low (0.185) which 
indicates that the probability for genocide, given internal characteristics at that moment, was very 
low. And yet, according to Harff’s own definition, there was genocide/politicide during this time. 
This means that internal variables by themselves are not sufficient explanation for the different 
attacks toward the Kurdish civilians throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  In contrast, the second 
episode, the Anfal campaign, was accurately predicted by the model. The final score showed a 
result of 0.907, a very strong probability of a genocide/politicide occurring given the internal 
variables at the time. This score indicates that domestic conditions are sufficient explanation for 
the Anfal campaign. 
Because in the first episode (1965-1976) the internal variables were not able to predict the 
genocide, it is expected that the external variables had a higher impact in determining the 
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occurrence of genocide than in the second event. However, the change in the final score from one 
episode to the next, from very low (0.185) to very high (0.907) also indicates that the internal 
variables (at least those that were significant in the model) changed from 1963 to 1988. This 
chapter argues that external factors contributed to the deterioration of those domestic variables that 
led to genocide/politicide of 1988. In particular, the events that took place between the two 
episodes of politicide/genocide, the Iran-Iraq war in particular, provided reasons, means and 
opportunity to the Iraqi government to "solve" their Kurdish Problem.  
The following chart shows the indicators used in Harff’s statistical model for the two events 
of genocide/politicide in Iraq: 
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Genocide/Politicide classified correctly (SFTF) 
Iraq 1961 1 1963 1 0 6 66.5 1 1 0.185 NO 
Genocide/Politicide classified incorrectly (were genocide but were classified as non-genocide) 
Iraq 1980 1 1988 2 1 30.5 48.1 1 1 0.907 YES 
 
According to the model's settings, there were differences in the domestic variables in 1961 
and then in 1980. Most significant was political upheaval. While in 1961 it was low, by 1980 
political upheaval was high. Trade openness, regional fractionalization remain, and the autocracy 
indicator remained the same. 
The dissertation’s main objective is to assess the extent to which external factors impact 
the onset of genocide and politicide. Each of the case studies analyzes events that were both 
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accurately and incorrectly predicted by Harff’s statistical model within the same state. This chapter 
answers the following main questions: What are the external factors that were most significant in 
cases of gen-/politicide? In which ways did these interact with domestic variables? How did the 
external affect the probability of genocide/politicide in each instance? External factors are 
expected to increase the probability of genocide/politicide in the case of 1963 while in 1980 it is 
expected that the external factors had either a neutral or an increasing effect. 
Part 1 presents a brief historical review of the main events. The relationship between the 
domestic and external factors and their impact is discussed in Part 2.  
 
Part 1 
 
Politics of independence 1938 
 
The Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without their own state. Most Kurds 
live in the states of Iraq and Turkey, but they are also in Iran and Syria. It is estimated that there 
are around 25 million Kurds in total – “more than the entire population of Iraq, twice that of Syria 
and several times the number of Palestinians” (Human Rights Watch 1991) and they represent the 
fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East (Yildiz 2007, p. 9).  
After World War I and the defeat and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the idea of the 
state of Kurdistan began to gain strength. The Treaty of Sevres in August 1920, which stipulated 
the partition of the Ottoman Empire, allowed the possibility of a Kurdish autonomous region in 
Turkey in articles 62 and 64, “if the League of Nations were persuaded of their [Kurds] capacity 
for such independence” (McDowall 1996, p. 137). However, nationalists’ movements in Turkey, 
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headed by Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk”, began to fight for an independent Turkey that would not lose 
much territory. The United Kingdom, afraid of further destabilization in Iraq and Syria, signed the 
Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923 in which the borders of Turkey were recognized and hopes 
for Kurdistan disappeared.  
Iraq had become a protectorate of United Kingdom after the First World War. Although 
the British had promised to give some autonomy to the Iraqi Kurds, the British feared that allowing 
Kurdistan could have negative effects for the region. On the one hand, they did not want to risk 
antagonizing the new Turkish state (McDowall 1996; Charountaki 2010). On the other hand, the 
British were also concerned about “Iraq’s viability as a state (given the location of its oilfields in 
the North)” (Charountaki 2010, p x). Although a League of Nations delegation had reported that 
Iraqi Kurds wanted an independent state, the Kurds were portrayed "as a bunch of rebellious and 
uncivilized tribes, who could not be tamed except by melting them into the neighboring, more 
civilized Arab, Persian, and Turkish communities" (Ahmed 2012, p. 1-2).  
During the British mandate, the ones who had access to government were the “educated 
Sunni Muslim minority which had previously worked for the Ottoman administration” (UCDP). 
Sunni Arabs were also trained militarily by the British (Rudd 2004, p. 10). Those who were not 
Arabs were excluded, including the Kurds (UCDP; Dawoody 2006, p. 486). 
Iraq received its independence in 1932 (although was occupied once again by the United 
Kingdom during World War II) and power was left in the hands of the Hashemite Monarchy, under 
King Faisal. Unfortunately for the Kurds, the discriminatory policies against Kurds did not change. 
In fact, "the discriminatory practices against the Kurds by British officials, who were strongly pro-
Arab [Sunni Arab], became a norm under sovereign Iraq" (Ahmed 2012, p. 3). The cycles of 
violence, started by Kurdish rebellions and followed by government reprisals also continued: 
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“When any group rebelled, the Royal Air Force habitually assisted the army in suppressing them, 
a practice continued by the Iraqi Air Force in later years” (Rudd 2004, p. 11). Also just like the 
British had done before them, “the Iraqi Army attempted to control minority dissent by 
manipulating Kurdish tribal groups against each other” (Rudd 2004, p. 12).  
 
Revolution of February 8, 1963 
 
With a socialist and Pan-Arab ideology, a military coup headed by Brig Abd al-Karim 
Qasim and thirteen other officials known as the Free Officers’ Movement overthrew the pro-
Western Monarchy in 1958 and declared a republic. In a complete change in policy, the new Iraqi 
government under Qasim moved away from the United States and closer to the Soviet Union. In 
June 1961 Qasim moved to annex Kuwait1. The Soviet Union vetoed Kuwait's admittance into the 
United Nations (Mathews, 2011, p. 639), providing de facto approval of Iraq's integration of 
Kuwait. Additionally, Qasim also “confiscated the unused concession area of the Iraq Petroleum 
Company" (Matthews 2011, p. 639), even though they did not have the capacity to exploit that oil 
(Brown 1979). The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), owned by foreigners, including British, 
American, French and Dutch, have “had exclusive petroleum rights to nearly all of Iraq" (Brown 
1979, p. 108). This became an issue of contention between Iraq and external powers. 
In 1963, there was a new revolution which led to the establishment of the Baath regime. 
The revolution was welcomed by both the United States and the Iraqi Kurds. In the case of the 
United States, "Administration officials perceived that the new regime in Baghdad changed the 
                                                          
1 During the 1930s the US-British Kuwait Oil Company had discovered large oil reserves and by this time, Kuwait 
was a major exporter of oil (BBC). Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait a second time in 1991, initiating the first Gulf 
War. 
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balance of power in the Middle East--to the benefit of the United States--both at the level of U.S.–
Soviet rivalry and at the level of inter-Arab relations (Matthews 2011, p. 640). In short, the Soviet-
friendly Qasim had been replaced with an American-friendly regime. Although most of the 
documentation remains classified, Mathews (2011) concluded that the United States had helped 
the Baath party to achieve power. 
Domestically, the change in regime was at first welcomed by the Kurds. Kurdish leader, 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani had been forced to escape to the Soviet Union after a failed attempt to 
create a Kurdish state in Iran in 1946. Encouraged and supported by the Soviet Union (Little 2010; 
Rudd 2004), Kurds from Iran and Iraq joined forces and declared the Republic of Mahabad in 
January 22, 1946. In Mahabad, Mullah Mustafa Barzani created the KDP (Partiya Demokrata 
Kurdistan; Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq. However, the Republic was short lived; the Soviets 
and Iranians reached an agreement in which the Soviets were "guaranteed access to the Azeri oil 
fields" in exchange for their agreement to stop supporting the Kurds2 (Little 2010, p. 67).  
 Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his followers fled to the Soviet Union (Rudd 2004; Little 
2010); Barzani returned to Iraq in 1958, when Qasim extended its government to the Kurds 
(O’Leary 2012; Rudd 2004). The new Constitution even recognized the two major ethnicities in 
Iraq: the Arabs and the Kurds (Dawoody 2006, p. 487). However, once Qasim’s power was 
consolidated and he needed no further assistance from the Kurds, he turned on them (O’Leary 
2012, p. 26). By the end of 1961, the Iraqi government had made land reforms to detriment of 
some Kurds, outlawed the KDP as a political party, and ordered air raids on Kurdish villages 
(UCDP). In December 1961 the KDP peshmergas’3 insurgency began.  
                                                          
2 According to Rudd (2004), the Iranian government received support from the United States at this time (p. 13). 
3 The Kurdish militants called themselves peshmerga--"those who face death" (Middle East Watch 1993; Fischer-
Tahir 2012). 
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 The Kurds were not the only ones fighting Qasim. As early as March 1959 Colonel Adbul 
Wahab al-Shawaf attempted a coup but failed. In February 8, 1963 the Baath Party was successful 
in its attempt to overthrow Qasim. The KDP claimed to the new regime that the pershmergas’ fight 
had weakened the government of Qasim, and their reward “should come in the form of Kurdish 
autonomy" (Little 2010, p. 69). Negotiations failed and by 1964 the KDP resumed their 
insurgencies.  
 
Event 1: 1965-1975 
 
Domestically, the new regime began a series of policies that affected the Kurdish 
population. The policy of Arabization began in 1963 and continued on and off until 1990, with 
periods of more intensity. It consisted of evicting local Kurdish families and replacing them with 
Arab population, mainly in villages but also in cities, especially in those cities with more resources. 
A second policy was the physical destruction of Kurdish villages by using bulldozers and forcibly 
transferring people to government-controlled areas. It is estimated that since the Baath took power 
in 1963 until the late 1990s more than 4,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed (Middle East Watch 
1993, Nezan 1998). At the same time, the Iraqi armed forces had been violently repressing the 
Kurdish rebellion, especially during 1974-1975. It is estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 
Kurdish people died during this first event (Middle East Watch 1993). 
In 1968, Saddam Hussein and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr took power and established a socialist 
state in 1968, and the new regime continued the policy of closeness to the Soviet Union. Iraqis and 
the Soviets had been negotiating oil since the late 1960s. Due to internal rifts within the Baath 
party and because the new regime of Saddam Hussein felt threatened by Iran (who was supporting 
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the KDP4) and by Israel, Saddam Hussein and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr began negotiations with the 
KPD. The result of the negotiations was the March 11, 1970 Peace Agreement, or Manifesto. 
Among other issues, the agreement declared that both Kurdish and Arabic were official languages 
in areas with Kurdish majorities; Kurds would be allowed to participate in government and the 
army. In addition, it established that “The Constitution will be amended to read ‘the Iraqi people 
is made up of two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality’”; it also 
established the “unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-governing unit” among other 
issues (McDowall 1996, p. 327-328). In return, “the peshmerga would surrender their heavy 
weapons and Barzani and the KDP would formally recognize Baghdad’s sovereignty over 
Kurdistan" (Little 2010, p. 74). 
However, the deal was less than what Barzani demanded: It contained only half of the 
agricultural lands and excluded oil-rich areas in Kirkuk and Suleimaniyeh (Middle East Watch, 
1993). Although some clauses of the deal were implemented, “crucial provisions concerning the 
return of Kurdish villagers and participation of Kurds in legislation and state planning were not” 
and in addition the “KDP accused the Iraqi government of expulsions of ethnic Kurds from 
disputed areas such as Kirkuk and of assassination attempts on KDP-leader Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani and his sons” (UCDP). 
 By 1972, Barzani declared the oil fields in Kirkurk as part of Kurdistan  (Middle East 
Watch, 1993) and the KDP fighting resumed with assistance from the United States, Iran, Israel 
and Syria (see part 2). The program of Arabization intensified; “Kirkuk was split up into two … 
and its boundaries redrawn to give an Arab majority" (Middle East Watch 1993) and violence 
intensified. 
                                                          
4 For instance, in 1969, with support from Iran, the KDP attacked IPC installations in Kirkuk (Yildiz 2007, p. 18). 
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In 1972 Saddam Hussein signed the fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship. "The treaty called 
for increased cooperation and coordination between the two countries and 'constant cooperation in 
the development of economic relations’" (Brown 1979, p. 121) and the IPC was finally 
nationalized in 1972, after an agreement with the USSR in 1969 that established that they would 
assist them with over $140 million to exploit the fields and transport the oil5 (Brown 1979, p. 110). 
According to Little (2010), the owners of IPC were not compensated.  
 
The Algiers Accord, 1975 
 
The KDP had been able to halt the advances of the Iraqi military because they had external 
support (see part 2). However, this ended when Iraq and Iran signed the Algiers Accord in 1975. 
After the agreement was signed support for the Kurds dropped and the army of Saddam Hussein 
overpowered the Kurds.  
Iraq and Iran had been disputing some borders since the end of World War I. With the 
Algiers Accord, “Iraq granted Iran shared access to the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway” (Middle 
East Watch 1993) and Iraq was to abandon “its claim to Khuzistan, one of Iran’s oil-rich regions” 
(Yildiz 2007, p. 23). In addition, the Algiers Accord also stipulated a "cordon sanitaire" along the 
border, especially in the Sulemaniyeh region (it is estimated that up to 200,000 people were 
removed from this area). (Middle East Watch, 1993).The Shah of Iran “abruptly withdrew his 
military and logistical support from the Iraqi Kurds" (Middle East Watch, 1993). While Iran had 
negotiated a two-week ceasefire, the Iraqi army began a military campaign against the Kurds, not 
                                                          
5 According to Brown (1979), they did not nationalized it before because they were expecting a boycott to their oil, 
just like what happened to Iran in the 1950s and the government in Iraq could not afford loss of revenue from oil (p. 
109). 
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only members of the peshmerga but also civilians. The army destroyed an estimated of 1,500 
villages and thousands fled to Iran (Yildiz 2007, p. 23). According to data from the UCDP, “70 
percent of KDP's fighters … gave themselves up to the Iraqi government under an amnesty plan 
and KDP-leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani went into exile” (UCDP). “In 1979 Mustafa Barzani was 
succeeded by his son Massoud Barzani as the leader of KDP.” (UCDP). In June 1975 the KDP 
split and Jalal Talabani created the PUK (Yekitiya Nistimaniya Kurdistan or Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan), with backing from the Syrian government (UCDP).6 This internal division further 
weakened the Kurdish movement.  
 
Iraq-Iran war 
 
Despite the Algiers Accord, the problems between Iran and Iraq renewed after Iran’s 
Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran’s new leader, Ayatolla Ruhollah Khomeini, "hinted that the new 
Islamic regime might resume Iran's earlier support for the Iraqi Kurds" (Little 2010, p. 85). Iraq 
also worried that the Islamic Revolution could further destabilize Iraq, given its own Shiite Muslim 
minority (UCDP)7.  
The Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980. During the early years of the war, attacks on 
Kurdish villages were somewhat reduced (although not stopped completely). Iraqi soldiers were 
redeployed to the Iranian front and this provided Kurdish forces the opportunity to reclaim 
                                                          
6 The Kurdish militia was “made up of young men from the villages and from the urban middle- and lower-classes, 
while most of the party leaders came from an upper-class background and the old-established social, political, and 
religious elites that emerged before the second half of the twentieth century ... Women stood at the margins of this 
world: a number of armed women in the units of the ICP and PUK and the many women who joined their peshmerga 
husbands or fathers.” (Fischer-Tahir 2012, p. 96). 
7 The UCDP also reports that one of the reasons Iraq had for attacking Iran was that Iraq “wanted to revise the terms 
of the Algiers Agreement that favored Iran” (UCDP). 
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autonomous control of some territory. According to Human Rights Watch, "by 1987, the 
mountainous interior of Iraqi Kurdistan was effectively liberated territory" (Middle East Watch 
1993) 8. However, the KDP and the PUK were not able to work out their differences and could not 
take advantage of the situation. At the beginning of the war, both the PUK and the KDP had joined 
the Iranians in the fight against Iraq. However, while the KDP had joined the Iranian army, the 
PUK had joined the Iranian Kurdish rebel group KDPI (Hizbi Demokirati Kurdistani Eran; 
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran), which “opposed the Iranian government. Thus, when the tide 
had turned in favour of Iran in 1983, Iran launched its counter attack not only against the Iraqi 
government forces, but also against PUK.” (UCDP).  
In 1983, the KDP helped the Iranians to access the town of Haj Omran. Iran had captured 
the city, but the Iraqis did not move to recover it9. Instead, they captured between 5,000 and 8,000 
Barzani men10 and made them disappear and bulldozed the city (Yeldiz 2007). 
By December 1983, the PUK began to negotiate with the Iraqi government, but fighting 
between the Iraqi armed forces and the PUK resumed in 1985. In October 1986, both the KDP and 
the PUK were in negotiations with Teheran. Iran provided them with weapons and financial 
assistance and carried out several attacks (see part 2). Ironically, while Iran was encouraging the 
Kurds in Iraq to fight Saddam Hussein, Hussein was encouraging Kurds in Iran to fight against the 
regime (Little 2010, p. 86). To complicate matters even further, “dissenting Kurds in Iran also 
sided with Iraq” (Rudd 2004, p. 15) and the United States and other states were providing Saddam 
Hussein with direct assistance (see part 2). 
                                                          
8 Nonetheless, as explain in the same report, the living conditions were not good: "Villagers learned to live with a 
harsh economic blockade and stringent food rationing, punctuated by artillery shelling, aerial bombardment and 
punitive forays by the Army and the paramilitary jahsh" (Human Rights Watch, 1993). 
9 This is one of the cities that was gassed after Anfal. 
10 It is interesting to note that even by the lowest estimates these are more men than those that were killed in Srebrenica. 
Srebrenica is considered genocide by the UN. 
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Event 2: The Anfal Campaign 
 
The PKU and the KDP collaboration with Teheran was the very justification that the Iraqi 
government and armed forces used for attacking the Kurds during the Anfal campaign and other 
chemical attacks11 to Kurdish cities and villages between 1987 and 1991. The first chemical attacks 
occurred on April 16, 1987 in the Balisan valley, killing 400 people (Nezan 1998). The Anfal 
campaign began in April 1988. It consisted of at least "forty separate attacks on Kurdish targets, 
some of them involving multiple sorties over several days ... Each of these attacks were war crimes, 
involving the use of a banned weapons (poison gas, including mustard gas and Sarin or nerve agent 
GB); the fact that noncombatants were often the victims added to the offense12" (Middle East 
Watch 1993). The first seven campaigns were directed against the PUK and Final Anfal (carried 
out after the war with Iran was over) was targeted toward the KDP strongholds "which the regime 
regarded as a lesser threat" (Middle East Watch 1993). The first Anfal began on February 23, 1988 
against the PUK headquarters at Sergalou-Bergalou (Middle East Watch 1993) and surrounding 
villages (Leezenberg 2009, p. 463). The Final Anfal began on August 25, 1988: "Sixteen divisions 
and a chemical weapons battalion, totaling 200,000 ground troops plus air support, conducted a 
                                                          
11 Chemical weapons are not legal internationally; they are in violation of the Geneva accords: these weapons do not 
discriminate (the targets are not just armed people, but anyone who is living in the same area) and the effects in 
survivors are seen for many years after the attacks. An argument can be made that it’s worse than other type of 
“traditional” weapons. The chemical attacks on the Kurds were not limited to Iraqi territory; they were also attacked 
in Iranian Kurdish towns (Hiltermann 2007, p. 83). 
12 "There are significant differences in the execution of the successive operations. In the first Anfal, few noncombatants 
were "disappeared". In later operations, adult males were taken to mass execution sites far away from the Kurdish 
region. In the Final Anfal, captured men were often executed on the spot. Likewise, only in the operations in the 
Kirkuk region do women and children appear to have been executed. It is not clear whether such variations reflect an 
escalating logic of violence, a differentiated reaction to the degree of resistance encountered, or simply the whims of 
local field commanders" (Leezenberg 2009, p. 467). For details of the different Anfal campaigns as well as survivors 
accounts, see Middle East Human Rights Watch Report 1993. 
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"final cleansing operation" in the Kurdish province of Bahdinan along the Turkish border" (Nezan 
1998).13 A few days later, "the Iraqi regime made its de facto declaration of victory by announcing 
a general amnesty for all Kurds" (Middle East Watch 1993). The attacks were not only with 
chemical weapons. As described by Jones, “the standard Iraqi strategy was to attack Kurdish 
settlements with artillery and airstrikes, conduct mass killings on the spot, and cart off the 
remainder of the population for “processing” further south. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds were 
trucked to concentration camps, most notoriously the Topzawa camp near the northern Iraqi city 
of Kirkuk” (Jones 2006, p. 120) 
The estimates of death from all the Anfal attacks is between 50,000 and 200,000 with the 
addition of the physical destruction of 703 villages (Middle East Watch 1993, Yildiz 2007). The 
city of Halabaja, near the border with Iran was also attacked in 1988 (although not technically part 
of the Anfal campaign). The death toll in Halabaja alone is estimated between 1,500 and 6,500. 
On March 15, 1988, Iran and the KDP had taken the city of Halabaja, a strategic city since it was 
located “seven miles east of the Darbandikhan Lake, whose dam controls a significant part of the 
water supply to the Iraqi capital, Baghdad" (Middle East Watch 1993). The KDP-Iranian attack to 
Halabaja may have been in part to relieve the PUK from the first Anfal (Leezenberg 2009, p. 469). 
On March 16, the Iraqis gassed Halabaja14.  
                                                          
13 These attacks were not spontaneous; they took planning and preparation. The government had created the 
Directorate of Northern Affairs, with Ali Hasan al-Majid (known to the Kurds as Chemical Ali) as director. He was 
the one who ordered the attacks (Middle East Watch 1993).  
14 "The peshmerga had been strong here [Halabaja] for almost thirty years ...As a reprisal against local support for 
the peshmerga, Iraqi troops had already bulldozed two entire quarters of the town, Kani Ashqan and Mordana, in 
May 1987. ..The town lay on the very edge of the war-zone, and dozens of small villages between Halabja and the 
Iranian border had been razed in the late 1970s, their inhabitants resettled in complexes on the edge of the city" 
(Middle East Watch 1993). On the morning of March 16, 1988, “Iraqi bombers appeared out of a clear blue sky. The 
people of Halabja were used to the successive attacks and counter-attacks of the Iraq-Iran war that had ravaged the 
region since September 1980. They thought they were in for the usual reprisal raid. .. Wave after wave of Iraqi Migs 
and Mirages dropped chemical bombs on the unsuspecting inhabitants. .. The bombing stopped at nightfall ..." 
(Nezan 1998).  
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 When the Iran-Iraq war ended, the Iraqi government granted amnesty to refugees. But 
many were killed upon reentry, including non-Kurdish refugees (Leezenberg 2009). There are 
accounts of further gas attacks and possibly thousands more dead in the months that followed the 
Final Anfal: Dozens more Kurdish villages were burned and bulldozed, including Qala Dizeh, with 
a population between 70,000 to 100,000.  "It is impossible to tell where this continuing process of 
repression and destruction would have led if it had not been interrupted by the 1990 Gulf Crisis 
and the ensuing war and uprising"(Leezenberg, 2009, 470).  
As explained in Part 2, the Iraqi government had been receiving external support in their 
fight against Iran. However, this support changed in August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The 
experiences of the Kurds in Halabaja and in other cities and villages attacked during the whole 
Anfal campaign were used abroad to discredit the Iraqi government (Hiltermann 2007) (two years 
too late for the Kurds). Operation Desert Storm began early in 1991 and by February 1991 Iraq 
announced its withdrawal from Kuwait (UCDP). 
 
The Kurds and the Gulf War15 
 
A new Kurdish uprising began in 1991. There is debate whether the United States actually 
encouraged the Kurds to fight Saddam Hussein in 1991, during the First Gulf War. (O'Leary, 
p.2002 26-27; Little 2010; Nezan 1998). According to Little’s (2010) findings, President George 
Bush used a CIA-controlled radio to send a message to the Kurds, saying that the United States 
was going to support a new uprising (p. 91). At first the Kurds were able to make some advances, 
                                                          
15 The events described in this section were not included in Harff’s model but are summarized here to further 
illustrate how support for the Kurds continuously fluctuated. 
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but by the end of March 1991 the Iraqi armed forces began “a scorched-earth offensive against the 
Kurds”. 'Where is George Bush?' one peshmerga leader screamed" (Little 2010, p. 91). Rudd 
(2004) argues that it was “Turkey’s critical role in the economic blockade of Iraq [which] 
discouraged the coalition from supporting Kurdish nationalism” (p. 19). Yildiz (2007) estimates 
that up to 300,000 people died and almost two million became refugees (O'Leary, 2002, p. 27) in 
the 1991 uprising. The refugees fleeing to Turkey and Iran “prompt[ed] “the Allies to create a safe 
area and no-fly zone. This provided the Kurds with a territorial autonomy that has lasted, in effect, 
until the present” (Jones 2006, p. 121) 
 
Part 2 
 
It is evident that the conflict of the Kurds in Iraq has been greatly affected by external 
powers and their interests. These factors will now be discussed following the framework specified 
for this dissertation. 
 
Effects of Colonialism 
 
The aftermath of World War I and the creation of Iraq under a British mandate set the 
modern background for the Iraqi-Kurdish fight. Although it had been intended that the Kurdish 
population of what was the Ottoman Empire would have an independent state, or at the very least 
to have some degree of autonomy, external political and economic interests in the region took 
precedence over the appeals from the Kurdish population. The delineation of the borders of Iraq 
reflected the United Kingdom's interests in the region's resources, especially oil (Middle East 
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Watch 1993; Ahmed 2012, p.2) and its trade route for this oil (Ahmed 2012, p.2). The treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923, created to appease the new state of Turkey16 rescinded any guarantee of a 
Kurdistan. During the British mandate and later during the Iraqi Monarchy, the Kurds were 
discriminated against and denied access to politics.  
The Treaty of Sevres was not a guarantee that Kurdistan could even be possible. For 
instance, the delineation of the lands that would encompass Kurdistan was not clear and it excluded 
areas where Kurds lived (Rudd 2004; McDowall 1996). Indeed, it is clearly impossible to know 
what would have happened had the treaty of Sevres been implemented and the League of Nations 
had recognized the state of Kurdistan or if the British had provided some autonomy to the Kurds 
in Iraq during their mandate.  
The state of Kurdistan by itself would be no guarantee that violence could have been 
avoided, both internally and externally. As evident in the historical review above, the Kurds in 
Iraq were not a cohesive unit (they spoke different languages, professed different religions, and 
had different positions regarding autonomy and independence) and they were fighting against each 
other (the same is true for Kurds in other states in the Middle East). Additionally, there are other 
minority groups living in the region of Kurdistan, who would have become a minority in a new 
state. Likewise, there is no way to know that Kurdistan could not have been invaded by an external 
power. Nevertheless, the main consequence for the Kurds was that the confrontation between them 
and the Iraqi armed forces was deemed a domestic issue. Given that the events were occurring 
within the legal boundaries of Iraq, international law gave Iraq a right to control the insurgencies: 
"To be sure, Iraq--like any other sovereign nation--had legitimate interests in combating 
                                                          
16 To court to Turkey, the British also liberated people who had been imprisoned under crimes against humanity and 
civilization for the crimes committed against Armenians and other Christians minorities (Jones 2011, p. 9). 
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insurgency"17, and did it in a way that was harsher than necessary (Middle East Watch, 1993).  
As years passed, the Kurds confronted different regimes (the British, the Monarchy, the 
government of Qasim, the government of the Baath Party). The opposition began as small, 
contained rebellions, but began increasing in magnitude starting in the 1960’s when some external 
support for the Kurdish cause was available. Unfortunately, the strengthening of this movement 
resulted in much harsher oppressive measures by the central government. The different attempts 
of negotiation had all failed mainly because control over oil-rich cities was the critical point of 
contention. In short, "That Kurdistan is not a separate nation … [was] due, in part, to its abundant 
natural resources: two of Iraq's major oil fields, rich agricultural land, minerals and the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers" (Human Rights Watch 1991). Moreover, the contention was not only between 
the Kurds and the Iraqis. External powers have had interests in the region. While at first the politics 
of the post-World War I defined the borders of the Middle East, leaving the Kurds spread out 
across the region, the politics of the Cold War amplified the grievances of the Kurdish population. 
The analysis through the category of resonant complicity shows that the fate of the Kurds was 
linked to the international politics of the Middle East. 
 
Direct support to the Iraqi government 
 
Sporadic and uncoordinated rebellions in the past changed into major opposition in the 
1960s, when the KDP began to obtain material contributions or direct support from abroad. 
However, unfortunately for the Kurdish cause, the support provided to the KDP was not intended 
                                                          
17In this quote, Middle East Watch was making reference to the chemical attacks on the Halabaja and Anfal. The 
quote continues to say that although Iraq had a right to combat the insurgency, they did it in a disproportionate way 
and using banned weapons. The argument can also apply to the first event, the gen-/politicide from 1965-1975. 
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for them to actually separate from Iraq. For the most part, the Kurds received external support 
when outside powers desired to weaken the Iraqi regime, but since there was no true interest in 
helping the Kurds get their own state, the material contribution was never enough. In general, 
regional politics and economic interests dictated who obtained support and when. The fact that 
both sides received external support contributed to the violence and political upheaval within Iraq. 
However, because the government of Iraq had access to resources, when external states stopped 
their support to the Kurds, the consequence was not a reduction in violence but an increase in the 
harsh measures against them. At the end of 1974-1975 the Kurdish were heavily attacked and 
because they did not have support from abroad anymore, they were massacred. The same occurred 
in 1988, when they were attacked with chemical weapons. 
This section evaluates the material contributions or direct assistance provided to the Iraqi 
government and the Kurds (the KDP and the PUK). This category focuses mostly on tangible 
military assistance: Training, weapons, supplies and intelligence. Using SIPRI’s database, it is 
evident that the government of Iraq continuously received weapons throughout the period. On the 
other hand, research by scholars indicates that the support to the Kurds was intermittent and from 
different sources, resulting in some advances followed by heavy retaliation when support waned. 
The graph below (G4.1), made with data from SIPRI’s database18, shows the percentage of 
arms transfers made to Iraq from 1950 to 2013. The columns are sized per the percentages at the 
left axis of the graph and mark the volume of arms transfers per year as a percentage of the total 
received during the period studied. The percentages at the right axis reference the line that crosses 
                                                          
18 SIPRI’s statistical data measures “the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons using a 
common unit, the trend-indicator value (TIV). The TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of 
weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer 
[…] This data is intended to provide a common unit to allow the measurement if trends in the flow of arms to particular 
countries and regions over time […] SIPRI TIV figures do not represent sales prices for arms transfers ... They are 
best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers over periods of time, global percentages 
for suppliers and recipients, and percentages for the volume of transfers to or from particular states” (SIPRI).  
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diagonally and are the cumulative percentages from 1950 to 2013 (thus, the line starts at nearly 
zero and finishes at 100%). According to this data, in the period of the first event, 1965 to 1975, 
Iraq received 7,080 TIV, or 14.7% of the total arms transfers. During the period of 1974-1975, 
when Barzani launched the offensive with support from Iran, Israel and the United States, the 
government of Iraq received, 2,539 TIV or 5.3% of the total.  
 
G4.1 
  
It is also evident that during 1965 to 1975 the arms transfers made to the Iraqi government 
were not as significant as those made during the war with Iran. Throughout the period of the first 
event, most of the arms transfers came from the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (see graph 
G4.2 below) 
The increase in arms transfers reflected in SIPRI’s database is logical when considering 
the cooperation that occurred starting in the late 1960s between Iraq and the Soviet Union: "On 
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June 2, 1969 the Soviet Union announced the loan of $72 million in equipment, technical 
assistance, and training toward the exploration and exploitation of Iraq's southern fields. On July 
4th, 1969 a $70 million loan that provided for drilling material, equipment, pipelines, and Soviet 
assistance in the areas of transportation and marketing was announced. Soviet assistance to a 
noncommunist nation in the areas of transportation and marketing of petroleum was 
unprecedented" (Brown 1979, p. 120-121). In 1972, in addition to guarantee a market for their oil, 
in September 1972 "the Soviet Union had agreed to provide Iraq with roughly 250 million dollars’ 
worth of Soviet military hardware, including T-52 tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and MIG-23 jet 
fighters." (Little 2010, p. 74-75). 
The 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq and the 
nationalization of the IPC preoccupied the United States because with Soviet weapons, Iraq had 
"'the potential for trouble-making in the Gulf’" (NSC Staff Report 1972 in Little 2010, p. 74). 
Although SIPRI does not have a record of arms transfers made to the Kurds, either the KDP or the 
PUK, academic and non-academic sources consulted agree that Iran, Israel, and the United States 
began to support with material contributions, intelligence, and other technical support to the Kurds 
in the mid-1970s and this allowed Barzani to launch the new rebellion. It is clear that the cluster 
of arms transfers to Iraq begins in the mid-seventies and increases significantly during the 1980s, 
during the Iran-Iraq war. The graph shows that in 1984 alone Iraq received 6,972 TIV, or 9% of 
all the weapons, significantly more than in other years.  
The graph below (G4.2) shows the state-to-state arms transfers to the government of Iraq19. 
Interestingly, SIPRI’s data shows that the main source of conventional weapons during the war 
with Iran was the Soviet Union (as it was from 1965 to 1975).  
                                                          
19 SIPRI’s data reports the country from which the arms were delivered, but it may not reflect the country that 
actually made the transfer. 
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G4.2 
 
During the first episode, 1965 to 1975, the Soviet Union provided 6,634 TIV to Iraq. 
During the Iran-Iraq war, the amount provided was 16,716 TIV. In 1984, the year of the “tilt”, the 
government of Iraq received 4,572 TIV, of which, 2,492 came from the Soviet Union, 960 from 
France, 836 from China and 285 from others. SIPRI does not have a record of arms transfers 
coming from the United States, although it provided different types of direct support (SIPRI does 
not show if the transfers were made via a third country or some other means). 
It is evident that the first peak in the volume of arms received by Iraq was in 1974 during 
Barzani’s insurrection. This increase in arms by the Iraqi armed forces, combined with the Algiers 
Agreement which curtailed the support received by the Kurds, provoked the defeat of the Kurds 
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in 1975. The second peak coincides with the Iran-Iraq war, with a significant peak in 1984. These 
material contributions allowed the government of Saddam Hussein to liberate some resources and 
attack the Kurds in 1987 and 1988.  
 While the supply of weapons to Iraq began to grow in 1973, the flow increased to extremely 
high numbers beginning in 1980. During the 1970s the United States supported the Kurds in 
opposition to the Baath regime because of its closeness to the Soviet Union. The change in regime 
in Iran created a new problem for the United States and other states in the Middle East, and Iraq 
was now seen as a line of defense against the Islamic regime of Iran: "One of the key pillars of US 
power projection in the region had fallen, a regime and a leader who had protected Western access 
to vast reserves of oil, thus guaranteeing a sustainable price. The Islamic Republic, by contrast, 
made no secret of its hostility toward Western interests, a fact graphically illustrated by the US 
embassy seizure and the ensuing hostage crisis" (Hiltermann 2007, p. 22).  
By 1980 the political situation in the Middle East had changed dramatically when the Iran-
Iraq war started and the United States began to support Iraq against Iran. At the beginning of the 
war both the United States and the Soviet Union declared neutrality, but according to SIPRI’s data, 
the Soviet Union did not stop transferring weapons to Iraq. Similarly, as early as 1982, the United 
States provided Iraq “with intelligence and military support (in secret and contrary to the country's 
official neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from President Ronald Reagan” (Battle 
2003). The “tilt” toward Iraq became evident in 1983 when the United States provided Iraq with 
“billions of dollars in loan guarantees and other credits” (Hiltermann 2003). The “tilt” toward Iran 
was also a response to Iran-supported “terrorists attacks on US Marines stationed in Lebanon" 
(Little 2010, p. 87) and it increased after 1986, when the Iranians took control over the Fao 
Peninsula, cutting Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf (Middle East Watch, 1993). “In the words of 
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the UN’s Giandoménico Picco, it was ‘the disruption in the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf that 
would finally concentrate the minds, if not the hearts, of the global community on the Iran-Iraq 
war’” (Hiltermann 2007, p. 100). 
In its fight against Iran, Iraq "had the support of East and West and of the whole Arab world 
except Syria” (Nezan 1998). Iraq had obtained weapons “from its Arab allies Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and Jordan who… began bankrolling the war and serving as suppliers of and transit 
countries for arms, including from the US" (Hiltermann 2007, pg. 23-24). Among the Western 
states, France was one of the key sources of arms to Iraq, as evident in graph (G3.2): France sold 
“Mirages and helicopters to Iraq, it even lent the regime Super Etendard aircraft” (Nezan 1998).  
The Kurdish militant groups, the KDP and the PUK, received support from abroad. But 
this was not comparable to the material support provided to the Iraqi government, especially during 
the war with Iran. The support provided had emboldened the Kurds to fight against the 
government, but the support stopped. The Iraqi government, on the contrary, had a constant supply 
of weapons (from one state or another). By 1987, Iraq began to attack Kurdish villages and cities. 
Chemical attacks were followed by the bulldozing of villages and the transfer of survivors to 
concentration camps. The attacks were possible because Iraq had the resources needed to fight 
against Iran and attack the Kurds. At the same time, the Kurds had united with Iran, which provided 
the Baath regime with the justification to attack them. Once again, the support obtained by the 
Kurds had translated into massacres. The material contributions provided to the Iraqi government 
to fight Iran clearly affected the onset of the genocide in 1988. 
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Direct Support to the KDP and the PUK 
 
Every time that the Kurds received external support, there was more violence because with 
that support they fought, but later the support was taken away. Without any external power having 
significant interest in the Kurds, they were left alone to face the retaliation by the Iraq government, 
a retaliation which extended beyond the militias and onto civilians in the cases analyzed in this 
dissertation. 
Early in the 1960s the KDP began to receive support from Iran20, Israel and the United 
States to fight the government of Qasim and install the Baath regime in power (Middle East Watch 
1993; UCDP). (It is ironic, therefore, that the Baathist regime turned out to be the perpetrator of 
both genocide/politicides against the Kurds). But the material contributions were not significant. 
In fact, previous to 1972 the United States did not actively support the Kurds “on account of the 
spillover effect on the communities in Turkey and Iran, both US allies” (McDowall 1996, p. 331). 
Nonetheless, documents declassified by the National Security Archive show that since the 1950s 
the United States had been trying infiltrate Iraqi Kurds and to spread anti-Communist/Soviet 
propaganda (Harper 2012). 
A few months after the Baath’s revolution, Barzani attempted to play Cold War fears to 
the KDP’s advantage: Barzani asked the United States for assistance, claiming that if they did not 
receive support they would turn to the Soviets instead. “On 1 May, U.S. diplomats in Baghdad 
warned that unless the Baathists ‘make serious counterproposals to Kurdish demands, … early 
resumption of revolt appears very likely,’ which would mean ‘protacted guerrilla warfare … with 
                                                          
20 Iran had also provided support to other factions within Iraq, in particular to Shi'i Iraqis who were looking to depose 
Saddam Hussein: SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq). They operated from Iran. SCIRI 
“remained based in Tehran until 2003, and also received weaponry, training, and financial support from the Iranian 
government” (UCDP). 
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every likelihood of Soviet support for [the] Kurds’” (Embassy Baghdad to DOS, Telegram 4 May 
1963 in Little 2010, p. 70). To contain the issue, "U.S. envoys tried to broker a deal between the 
Baathists and the Kurds using surplus wheat from the U.S. Food for Peace program", hoping that 
this would help the Iraqi government to negotiate peace with the Kurds but the proposal was 
rejected by the Baath Party, who instead "sought arms from the Soviet Union" and attacked the 
Kurds (Little 2010, p. 70). Iran, Israel and the United States mobilized to provide assistance to the 
Kurds.  
Israel, for its part, had been collaborating with the Kurds since at least 1965. In May 1966 
"Barzani's peshmerga, with help from Mossad advisers, ambushed an Iraqi army brigade near 
Mount Hendrin in Kurdistan. When the shooting stopped, more than 2,000 Iraqi soldiers lay dead, 
whereas the Kurds lost just twenty guerrillas. Stunned by this debacle, Rahman Arif agreed to a 
ceasefire that lasted nearly two years" (Little 2010, p. 73). Also, during the Israel-Arab war, the 
KDP “had attacked government positions during the June 1967 war in order to distract Iraq from 
the Israeli front. By mid-September he was receiving a stipend of US$50,000 from Israel to distract 
and undermine the Baath” (McDowall 1996, p. 331). 
The assistance to the Kurds intensified after the 1972 deal between the Soviet Union and 
Iraq. What worried the US was not what the Iraqi government would do with those weapons inside 
Iraq, against the Kurds, but what they could do with them in the Middle East. "Horrified by Iraq's 
new alignment with the Soviet Union, the Israeli government and the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency trained senior KDP leaders and kept Barzani generously supplied with intelligence and 
arms, including heavy weaponry. The Shah of Iran, meanwhile, provided an indispensable 
rearguard territory as well as logistical support." (Middle East Watch, 1993). Israel began to 
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transfer Soviet weapons that had been seized by Israel to the Kurds (Little 2010, p. 80-81). In 
addition to Iran, Israel and the United States, the KDP also received weapons from Syria (UCDP). 
With all this support, in 1974 the KDP decided to launch a new military campaign. The 
result of the insurgency was a defeat. Two main issues affected the Kurds: (1) The material 
resources that the Kurds had did not compare to what the Iraqi government obtained from Bagdad 
(Rudd 2004, p. 15); (2) While Barzani thought that the material contributions from Iran, Israel and 
the United States were going to continue throughout the conflict, Iran and Iraq were negotiating in 
Algiers; after signing the agreement, support to the Kurds was removed.  
The United States was informed of the plans for the Algiers Accord: “Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger “informed President Ford on 19 February 1975 that the Shah [was] planning on 
meeting ... Saddam Hussein' very soon and 'seem[ed] tempted to try to move in the direction of 
some understanding with Iraq regarding the Kurds'. Kissinger, however, saw no reason to mention 
this disturbing bit of information in the reassuring message he sent to Barzani the next day. As a 
result, the Kurdish leader remained in the dark about Iran's intentions" (Little 2010, p. 81). 
According to Kissinger’s own accounts of the events (1999), the Shah informed him on February 
18th that he was “exploring a negotiation with Saddam Hussein”, but because “the Shah had not 
mentioned that a deal was imminent or that he would acquiesce in total Iraqi control of the Kurdish 
area … I [Kissinger] still continued to encourage Barzani” (p. 592-593). Kissinger continues his 
account: “A little more than two weeks later, on March 6 … the Shah stunned us with the 
announcement that he had reached an agreement with Saddam Hussein in which he in effect 
abandoned the Kurds” (Kissinger 1999, p. 594). 
The KDP collapsed in 1975 with Iran’s abrupt withdrawal of support (O'Leary 2002). "A 
CIA postmortem summed up the debacle well: ‘Since the mid-1960s, Iran aided and abetted Israeli 
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help to the Kurdish rebels. Israel provided financial and material assistance and sent military and 
intelligence advisers to train Kurdish tribesmen at sites in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran'. In the absence 
of Iranian logistical support, 'armed resistance by Kurds on the scale of 1974 is now out of the 
question'" (The Implications of the Iran-Iraq agreement 1975 in Little 2010, p. 82). Additionally, 
the United States was in no position to help. According to Kissinger there was nothing the United 
States could have done to convince the Shah not to sign the Algiers Accord; furthermore, the 
United States had pressing demands and, “absorbed with liquidating Indochina, could not even 
consider opening another military front and … even political support was doubtful” (Kissinger 
1999, p. 594). The end objective was not the actual creation of Iraqi Kurdistan and in 1975, Iran 
was still an important ally of the United States in the Middle East and thus it was also more 
strategically important for the United States to maintain friendly relations with Iran rather than to 
aid the Kurds in their pursuit of autonomy and independence.  
After the revolution in Iran in 1979 and the beginning of the war between Iran and Iraq, 
politics in the Middle East shifted. The United States had now a stronger interest in helping Iraq 
defeat Iran. As the war progressed, Iran began to once more provide support to the Kurdish militias 
so that they would also attack Iraq’s army, and the Kurds once more renewed their fight. However, 
not only the United States but many other states were also in favor of Iraq, providing ever 
increasing resources. The “tilt” toward Iraq took the form of direct assistance (covertly and 
overtly); however, the “tilt” also took other forms: States decided to ignore signs that the Iraqi 
government was committing genocide against the Kurds.   
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Indirect assistance 
 
Material contributions provided Saddam Hussein with the means to carry out the atrocities 
against the Kurds. The opportunity to do so was provided via indirect support to the regime. The 
category of indifference and selective intervention assesses the failure of external actors “to 
intervene to stop them” (Stoett 2014, p. 34). But in this dissertation, this category also includes 
indirect support for the regime: political approval for the crimes, denying assistance to victims, 
media manipulation, among others. This indirect support may often be even more important than 
material support, as was the case in the second genocide event against the Kurds. Because other 
states were more concerned about containing Iran, they decided not to intervene as the Kurds were 
being attacked with chemical weapons, therefore providing indirect assistance to the Iraqi regime; 
the “tilt” toward Iraq also meant that by assisting the Iraqi regime to fight Iran, they were also, 
indirectly, assisting Iraq to fight the Kurds.  
Previous to Anfal, there were two clear instances when external states could have 
intervened in favor of the Kurds; these two events in particular go beyond controlling a rebellion 
and by themselves constitute genocide (Middle East Watch 1993). By choosing to ignore these 
events, the Iraqi government obtained indirect support for the attacks on the Kurds.  
The first event occurred in Haj Omran in 1983. The KDP and Iran had collaborated to take 
over Haj Omran during the war. As a reprisal, the Iraqi armed forces captured an estimated of 
8,000 Barzani men (Jones 2006). Saddam Hussein explained what happened: “They betrayed the 
country and they betrayed the covenant, and we meted out a stern punishment to them, and they 
went to hell” (Jones 2006, p. 120). This was not the first time that Barzani men had been 
systematically targeted by the government. Leezenberg (2009) describes how thousands of men 
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had been deported to Southern Iraq in 1976 and relocated to a concentration camp, Qushtepe 
mujamma'a in 1981 (p. 468-469). When the Barzani men disappeared in 1983, the issue was 
brought to the United Nations but it was ignored (Middle East Watch 1993). Middle East Watch 
argues that this "emboldened Baghdad to believe that it could get away with an even larger 
operation without any adverse reaction. In these calculations, the Baath Party was correct" (Middle 
East Watch 1993). 
The chemical attack on Halabaja in 1983 was also disregarded. When survivors reached 
Iran, journalists documented and publicized the story. The Iranian government (Middle East Watch 
1993) and the PUK (McDowall 1996) brought the issue to the United Nations. However, the other 
governments did not respond as Teheran had hoped21: "the United Nations Sub-Committee on 
Human Rights voted by 11 votes to 8 not to condemn Iraq for human rights violations" (Nezan 
1998). Because Halabaja occurred at a time when Iraq was still in war with Iran, the United States 
and other Western powers were interested in not bringing negative attention to Iraq. France and 
the United States diminished the issue by claiming that Iran was also involved in the attacks. After 
seven weeks, the United Nations Security Council made a call to both governments not to use 
chemical weapons, which “diffused the effect of its belated move” (Hiltermann 2003).  
 Battle’s (2003) analysis of declassified documents show that the attack on Halabaja was 
not the first time Iraq had used chemical weapons. In 1983, Iran approached the United Nations to 
condemn Iraq, but “a diplomatically isolated Iran received only a muted response to its 
complaints”22 (Battle 2003). Moreover, Battle reports: “The U.S. … had intelligence confirming 
                                                          
21 “Only the Scandinavian countries, Australia and Canada, together with bodies like the European Parliament and the 
Socialist International, saved their honour by clearly condemning Iraq" (Nezan 1998). 
22 Since the beginning of the war, the United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions with the expectation 
to halt the confrontation. As early as September 28th, 1980 for instance, Resolution 479 called for a ceasefire. Iran 
rejected it because it was not willing to accept the borders established in the Algiers Agreement of 1975 (Simons 1994, 
p. 139). Further resolutions and attempts of mediation were also rejected by Iran. On the one hand, Iran did not want 
to recognize the borders, on the other hand, Iran contended that the UN was siding with Iraq (Johnson 2013, p. 65). 
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Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost daily" use of chemical weapons … The 
intelligence indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a 
November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish insurgents" as well” (Battle 2003).  
While the United States State Department “briefed the press on its decision to strengthen 
controls on the export of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response to intelligence 
and media reports that precursors supplied to Iraq originated in Western countries” (Byrne 2003), 
numerous cables from the State Department show that the State Department priority was to 
improve its relationship with Iraq (Battle 2003; Byrne 2003). Furthermore, “The U.S. delegate to 
the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a general motion of ‘no 
decision’ on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate was to abstain on the 
issue” (Battle 2003).  
 It was not only the United States and other Western states that were silent after Halabaja 
and even after the Anfal campaigns: "The Muslim world, including Turkey and the Arab League, 
maintained total silence” (Ahmed 2012, p. 4). The threat of Iran’s Islamist regime was greater than 
protecting the lives of the Kurds. As Jones (2006) summarized: “Governments, both Western and 
non-Western, were too committed to the Iraqi side in the Iran–Iraq war, too covetous of Iraqi oil, 
and too anxious to sell Iraq weapons and chemical ingredients, to care much about the fate of a 
dispossessed minority” (p. 120). 
In short, "Saddam was considered an important bulwark against the spread of Iranian-style 
Islamic fundamentalism to the strategic and oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Accordingly, the 
West supplied and armed him throughout his campaigns against both the Iranians and the Kurds, 
eventually providing the critical intelligence information that allowed Iraq to emerge victorious in 
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the war against Iran" (Jones, http://www.gendercide.org/case_anfal.html). Of course, the help to 
the Iraqi government was not necessarily intended to hurt the Kurds, and knowing that the Iraqi 
government had been targeting the Kurds in the past was not going to be reason enough to deprive 
them of the means to halt Iran. But the consequence of this, unintended as it may have been, was 
devastating to the Kurds. It could be that the help provided to attack Iran had an indirect effect 
(unintended, perhaps), that Saddam was able to attack the Kurds because he had the means and he 
also had the opportunity (the cover of the war and the implicit approval by the West because they 
were more worried about the balance of power than about the future of the Kurds). First, because 
the Iraqi army received external support, the government could afford to release some of its forces 
to target the Kurds, which they could not do before. In addition, the materials necessary to create 
chemical weapons were provided from abroad23. At the same time, the Kurds gained territory, with 
support from Iran. This partnership with Iran earned the Kurds their title of "saboteurs" (Middle 
East Watch 1993) and were then attacked with chemical weapons.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Harff’s model (2003) included two events, classified analytically as genocide/politicide: 
attacks on the Kurds from 1965 to 1975 and the Anfal campaign in 1988. While Harff’s statistical 
model did not predict the first episode, the model accurately predicted the second one. The scores 
of each episode indicate that the domestic variables present in Iraq were not conducive to genocide 
from 1965 to 1975 but were by 1988. In the first event, external variables account for the 
                                                          
23 “Germany supplied Baghdad with a large part of the technology required for the production of chemical weapons" 
(Nezan 1998). In addition, there is evidence that "Iraqi and Iranian officers both participated in chemical defense 
training programs in the US" (Hiltermann 2007, p. 26).  
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genocide/politicide. Cold War dynamics and balance of power in the Middle East trickled down 
to the Iraqi Kurds. In an attempt to balance each other, not only the United States and the Soviet 
Union, but also Iran, Israel and Iraq used the Kurds by giving them support and stopping that 
support when it was deemed necessary to achieve larger strategic goals in the Middle East. These 
dynamics continued in the period in between the two events. The Iran-Iraq war added to the 
complexity of the patterns of support/lack of support that had characterized the previous decade. 
During the Iran-Iraq war it also became evident that the United States and allies were more 
concerned about general security issues in the Middle East than for the fate of the Kurds. The 
genocide in 1988 was the culmination of decades of external involvement in the Middle East. 
External forces and dynamics during the Iraq-Iran war were key components on the onset of the 
genocide/politicide that occurred in 1988. 
 Direct assistance to the Iraqi Kurds in the 1970s allowed them to have the means to fight 
the central government. The agreement of 1975 between Iran and Iraq, however, left the Kurds 
without external support and consequently, the government in Iraq moved to attack the Kurds with 
renewed ruthlessness. Further contributing to the escalation of the conflict was the fact that Barzani 
did not recognize that both Iran and the United States were supporting the KDP because they 
wanted to see a weakened Iraq, and not because they actually wanted an independent Kurdistan 
(McDowall 1996, p. 331). This resulted in repeated attempts at revolt that motivated Iraq to strike 
back against the Kurds as a people. In addition, the disappearance of Barzani men and the first 
chemical attacks were issues brought to the United Nations, but the major concern was to contain 
Iran. Because there were no reprisals from any state against Iraq regarding Halabaja in particular, 
Hussein was emboldened to continue. This implicit approval, or indirect assistance, made Hussein 
believe that there were not going to be any outcry for the invasion of Kuwait (Nezan 1998). 
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Strategic indifference to the plight of the Kurds and indirect assistance to the government of Iraq 
by the United Nations’ inaction in the face of massive human rights violations during the Iraq-Iran 
war contributed to the severe measures taken by the government against the Kurds beginning in 
1987.  
One of the main conclusions of the chapter is that the fate of the Kurds was certainly linked 
to the fate of international relations, at least regional relations in the Middle East. Genocide 
research, and more specifically research on the prevention of genocide/politicide and other 
international crimes of the same nature, should take into account more fully the literature in 
International Relations. The conflicting nature of the Cold War, mixed with the political economy 
of oil (and other trade goods), were key factors in the support provided to the Kurds and to the 
Baath regime in Iraq. The Kurds were simply used for other purposes, as “Trojan Horses” in the 
words of McDowall (1996). In Iraq, the biggest issue of contention over areas that might form an 
independent Kurdistan were (and still are) the oil-rich areas such as the city of Kirkuk (see for 
example Raffat 2008; Stansfield & Anderson 2009). The fact that oil was also an interest of 
external powers and was not just an internal issue between Arabs and Kurds from Iraq made the 
future of Kurdistan dependent upon the involvement of external powers; external interests in that 
oil has shaped the dynamics between the Kurds and the Arabs in Iraq in important ways.   
The external powers involved throughout this conflict had interests that informed their 
decision to support the Kurds. The United Sates also began to support the Kurds in May 1972 in 
opposition to the Soviets and in opposition to the nationalization of the oil companies (McDowall 
1996, p. 331). The support was removed during the Iran-Iraq war, as the main objective was to 
prevent further growth in the power of fundamentalist Iran. The support from the United States 
only came back during the 1991 Gulf War, after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Israel also had self-interest 
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in helping the Kurds. As explained by Little: "The Israelis ...hoped that another rebellion in 
Kurdistan would keep the Iraqi armed forces tied down and prevent Salam Arif from re-deploying 
his troops to the west, where they might become part of a united Arab command directed against 
the Jewish state..." (2010, p. 71). Finally, Iran provided the Kurds with support to debilitate Iraq, 
with the notable exception of the period after 1975 and the Iran-Iraq war. One explanation is that 
Iran wanted to debilitate the Iraqi government to obtain access to Shatt al-Arab: "The Shah of Iran 
opposed all forms of Iraqi nationalism and was eager to regain full access to the Shatt al-Arab, the 
waterway that marked the ancient boundary between Persia and the Arab world. He regarded the 
KDP guerrillas as a key asset in his campaign to keep the military regime in Baghdad off balance" 
(Little 2010, p. 70). Iran was also worried about the close relationship between Baghdad and 
Moscow, especially after the 1972 agreement (Yildiz 2007, p. 22). “Increased aid was provided by 
the Shah, who had been dismayed by the accord (since the Kurds were a principal instrument for 
weakening Baghdad) and alarmed by Baghdad’s treaty with the Soviet Union” (McDowall 1996, 
p. 331). Later, their interest in helping the Kurds was to have them as allies in the Iran-Iraq war. 
Unfortunately for the Kurds, interests of these external states fluctuated and the Kurds were often 
left vulnerable to the Iraqi regime when the support was removed. 
Both genocides analyzed in this chapter, as well as events that occurred in between the 
genocides, were made possible by direct and indirect assistance from outside sources. However, 
the assistance varied in terms of who provided the assistance, to whom the assistance was given, 
and when. At different occasions, the Soviet Union, the United States, Iran and Israel provided 
assistance to the Kurds when they assessed the Kurds could weaken the Iraqi regime. But the help 
was not provided with the intention of actually helping the Kurds achieve autonomy. Furthermore, 
by providing and removing support at certain times, the external governments were contributing 
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to escalating a violent situation. The removal of support did not necessarily translate into a 
reduction in conflict, as evident in the aftermath of the Algiers Accord (and later in the aftermath 
of the invasion to Kuwait –although that is not included in the chapter). In the case of Iraq, removal 
of support left the Kurds vulnerable to more attacks from the government, as was the case after the 
Algiers Accord when Iran removed all support to the Kurds. While it is impossible to know if the 
Kurds would have been successful in their fight to obtain a separate state had they counted with 
continued support from Iran, the United States and Israel, it is true that once this support was 
removed the Kurdish population was in no position to halt a government offensive. No wonder 
why the Iraqi Kurds call themselves “‘orphans of the centuries’ and ‘the people who have no 
friends’” (Dawoody 2006, p. 483). 
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Chapter 5: Sri Lanka 
 
Barbara Harff’s model (see chapter 2 for detailed explanation) included the following events 
for Sri Lanka: An attempted revolution in 1971 and the genocide/politicide that occurred from 
September 1989 to January 1990: 
Year of 
Event 
Final model 
score 
Interpretation 
Classified 
Correctly? 
1971 0.018 NonGen/Pol Yes 
1989 0.0157 NonGen/Pol No 
 
The first episode in 1971 was an intra-ethnic conflict; a failed attempt at revolution. The 
intra-ethnic conflict, within the Sinhalese population, was mostly about caste, class, and political 
ideology: a group of lower caste, poor Sinhalese members of the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna; People’s Liberation Front), "disillusioned by exclusion on class grounds" (UN 2011, 
p.8) attempted, unsuccessfully, to overthrow the state on two separate occasions. The first one was 
in April 1971 but the insurrection was quickly defeated by government forces. A second attempt 
was made in 1987 and although better prepared and “close to achieving state power” (Moore 1993, 
p. 593), the JVP was defeated by 1990. During the last months of 1989, Barbara Harff (2003) 
identified a genocide/politicide and estimated 13,000 to 30,000 deaths (p. 60). During this time, 
Sri Lanka was facing two conflicts at the same time. While the JVP was fighting in the South, the 
LLTE was fighting in the North and East. The conflict between the LTTE (Thamil Eelam 
Viduthalai Puligal; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the Sinhalese government was 
mostly about ethnicity and separatism: the Tamil resistance, "disillusioned by exclusion on ethnic 
grounds” (UN 2011, p. 8), were also fighting for an independent state, Tamil Eelam. In contrast to 
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the JVP’s insurrections, this conflict was ongoing from 1983 to 2009. Estimates from this period 
(1983-2009) range from 70,000 (Shastri 2009, p. 76) to 80,000 (Feith 2010, p. 350) and up to 
84,000 (Hoglund & Orjuela 2011, p. 20; Lindberg, Orjuela, Wezeman & Åkerström 2011, p. 6). 
The first event, the attempted revolution in 1971 does not fit Harff’s classification of 
genocide/politicide and so it was included in the genocide model as a control case. The final model 
accurately predicted this event as a non-genocide/politicide. A score of 0.018 indicates that the 
probability of genocide/politicide occurring, given the domestic conditions was very low. On the 
contrary, the second event, the killings of 1989, was not accurately predicted by the final model.  
A score of 0.0157 is interpreted as non-genocide/politicide, giving a false negative result. Given 
that militant groups specifically and systematically targeted civilians and that the estimates of the 
number of deaths are at least 30,000 people, the model’s false negative error is significant. The 
objective of the chapter is thus to identify and analyze the external factors present in both events 
and their intersection with domestic variables. 
The following chart shows the indicators used in Harff’s statistical model for the instances 
included in the case of Sri Lanka: 
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Sri Lanka 1971 0 N/A 1 0 0 64.3 0 0 0.018 YES 
Genocide/Politicide classified incorrectly (were genocide but were classified as non-genocide) 
Sri Lanka 1983 1 1989 1 0 12 60.5 0 1 0.157 NO 
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The dissertation’s main objective is to assess the extent to which external factors impact 
the onset of genocide and politicide. Each of the case studies analyzes events that were both 
accurately and incorrectly predicted by Harff’s statistical model within the same state. This chapter 
answers the following main questions:  What are the external factors that were most significant in 
cases of gen-/politicide? In which ways did these interact with domestic variables? How did 
external factors affect the probability of genocide/politicide in each instance? In the case of the 
first event in 1971 it is expected that external factors either did not have an effect or reduced the 
probability of genocide/politicide while in the second event, in 1989, it is expected that the external 
increased the probability of genocide/politicide. 
 
Part 1 
 
This section presents an overview for both events. While it is not a comprehensive 
historical review, an explanation of key issues is provided. The interaction between domestic and 
external factors for each case is analyzed in part 2. 
 
Independence 
 
Sri Lanka1 is a heterogeneous state: in a “country of 21 million people … 74 percent are 
Sinhalese, speak Sinhala and are overwhelmingly Buddhist; 18 percent are Tamil, speak Tamil 
                                                          
1 The island has been known by different names to both insiders and outsiders. Before colonization it was known to 
Buddhist as Simhaladvipa and Dhammadipa; Muslims called it Serendib; Tamils Eelam and Sinhalese Lanka; the 
Portuguese called it Ceilao and the British Ceylon (Holt 2011, p. 1). In 1972 it became Sri Lanka (Wilson 1988, p. v) 
and in 1978 Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Evans & Grant 1992, p. 254). Although some events analyzed 
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and are mostly Hindu (comprised of Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils, 13 percent and 5 
percent respectively); 7 percent are Muslim, comprised of Moors and Malays who practice Islam 
and are largely Tamil-speaking; and 1 per cent belong to small ethnic communities including the 
Burghers and Veddahs, among others. Christians count for a small percentage of some 
communities” (UN 2011, para 25 p. 7). In addition, there are also intra-ethnic caste divisions2 
which further divide Lankans3.  Since its independence in 1948 Sri Lanka has been immersed in 
ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict. 
Sri Lanka was colonized by three western powers. First by the Portuguese (1505-1658) 
followed by the Dutch (1658-1796) and finally by the British (1796-1948). As explained by Stokke 
(1998), previous to the British rule, colonial plantation agriculture allowed the dominant classes 
of all ethnicities in Sri Lanka to accumulate wealth. Although the British had instituted a census 
that considered ethnic background, they did not recognize the caste system, which allowed social 
and economic mobilization, allowing lower castes to obtain education and jobs previously reserved 
for higher castes (Stokke 1998, p. 93; Gooneskere 2000 in Human Rights Watch 2001, p. 33). For 
example, lower caste Sinhala advanced economically due to maritime trade (Holt 2011, p. 52). 
The dominant classes from all ethnicities collaborated politically to maintain their position and in 
                                                          
in this chapter occurred when Sri Lanka was still known as Ceylon the chapter will use its modern name, Sri Lanka 
(unless directly quoting an author using “Ceylon”). 
2 Both Sinhalese and Tamil have caste systems, although they are different from each other. “The Sinhalese caste 
system is not linked to the Hindu varna” and has “a secular hierarchy” (Goonesekere 2001 in Human Rights Watch 
2001 p. 8). Both are divided into higher and lower castes with the lower castes being excluded from social and 
economic mobility. For the Sinhala, Rodiya and for Tamil: Pallas, Nalayas and Paraiyars. Lower-caste Sinhalese and 
Tamil have low literacy levels (Human Rights Watch 2001, p. 17).  However, caste discrimination has not remained 
within the confines of each ethnic group: in Sri Lanka, “Caste-based discrimination is sometimes applied to non-
Hindus—including Tamil Christian and Muslim converts, and members of other minority groups. These tensions are 
exacerbated by conflict-driven displacement, which can place groups of varying caste backgrounds in closer proximity 
to another” (Human Rights Watch 2001 p. 8).   
3 I am not sure what the appropriate term is. Peebles (2006) wrote that “Sri” is uniquely Sinhala and Buddhist. Most 
authors used the nomination of Sri Lankans. I am following Peebles and will be using Lankans, except when using a 
direct quote from another author. 
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1919 they united in the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) to seek independence (Stokke 1998, p. 
93; Peebles 2006).  
Independence was granted in 1948. Elections in September 1948 brought Don Stephen 
Senanayake and the UNP (United National Party) to power. Power has been dominated since then 
by a few Sinhalese, higher caste, English educated families4 (Stokke 1998, Peebles 2006). 
However, by the mid-1970s the political collaboration between Tamil and Sinhalese ended and 
violence soon ensued, first as riots and later in the form of insurrection and ethnic war. Although 
higher caste Sinhalese have had access to government, it is generally accepted by both academic 
and non-academic sources that in general, the Tamil benefited from colonization at the expense of 
the Sinhalese (for example Lindberg & Orjuela 2011; UN 2011; Frontline 2002; Wilson 1998). A 
series of policies to remedy the Sinhala situation were put in place (this was not the first time that 
the Sinhalese had tried to implement anti-Tamil policies. At least since 1930, the State Council 
had begun some anti-Tamil policies (Peebles 2006, p. 88-100). 
 
Policies 
 
The first policy implemented by the UNP was the declaration of the Citizenship Act of 
1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents Act of 1949, known collectively as Citizenship Acts 
of 1948-1949. These basically denied the Indian Tamil their citizenship and voting rights. An 
estimated 800,000 (UN 2011 p. 5 fn 5) Tamils from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu had been 
brought by the British in the 19th and 20th century to work on plantations in Sri Lanka5. Under 
                                                          
4 Stokke’s (1998) findings also show that much of the political rivalries were personal, with political parties having 
been monopolized by a small number of families. 
5 Tamils brought from India were lower-caste and were brought as “captive labor to work on plantations and as city 
cleaners” (Human Rights Watch 2001 p. 12).  These Indian Tamils, “also known as Hill Country Tamils, Up-Country 
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the new laws, Tamils who were brought by the English --or their descendants--“[could] only 
become citizens through registration. They [were] denied the right to citizenship by descent to 
which the rest of the Sri Lankan population [was] entitled” (Human Rights Watch 2001, p. 19). 
The Citizenship Acts were followed by the 1956 Official Language Act Number 33 or the Sinhala 
Only Act, implemented by Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike of the SLFP (Sri Lanka NIdahas 
Pakshaya or Sri Lanka Freedom Party)6. The Sinhala Only Act recognized Sinhala as the official 
language of Sri Lanka.  
The idea behind Sinhala Only was that because only those who knew English had access 
to resources, by making Sinhala the official language it was expected that more Sinhalese would 
benefit. However, despite high levels of education, unemployment was high early in 1970s after 
economic decline, and given how entrenched the country’s patronage system was, the rewards of 
the new policies were only benefiting “a specific groups of clients” (Stokke 1998, p. 98). “With 
no hope of displacing the English-educated elite, Sinhalese nationalists increasingly blamed 
Tamils for their distress” (Peebles 2006, p. 114) and began to prepare for a social revolution. 
 
Event 1: The failed revolution of 1971/Non-genocide. 
 
In April 5, 1971 the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People’s Liberation Front) 
attempted a socialist revolution against the administration of the UNP (Eksath Jathika Pakshaya 
or United National Party), under Sirimavo Ratwatte Bandaranaike. The JVP was a Sinhalese 
                                                          
Tamils or Plantation Tamils” (UN 2011 p. 7 fn 5) remained differentiated from the previous settlers from Tamil Nadu 
to Sri Lanka hundreds of years before colonization (Rudolph 2003, p. 227), known as “‘Ceylon/Sri Lankan Tamils’ 
or ‘Jaffna Tamils’” (Feith 2010, p. 347).   
6 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike had campaigned since 1951 for Sinhala Only. This was partly a response to colonization as 
the campaign was not only increasingly anti-Tamil, but also anti-Western and anti-Christian (Feith 2010, p. 348). 
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political party whose social base was Sinhalese from lower castes/classes; having been denied 
political participation, it decided to attack the government. The revolution failed because the 
government knew about their plans and because the JVP was not well prepared. This event is not 
considered genocide/politicide by Harff and was accurately predicted by the model. The JVP 
reemerged as a militant group in 1987 in the chaos of the ethnic conflict. 
 
The JVP 
 
The JVP was created in 1965 by Rohana Wijeweera7. The JVP was an ultra-leftist 
organization (Kearny & Jiggins 2011, p. 618), “comprised of mostly poor, [but] educated Sinhalese 
youth from rural areas" (UN 2011, N8, p. 8). Most of them Buddhists who spoke Sinhala and came 
from marginalized areas in the south (Holt 2011; Hill 2013). People from these communities found 
in the JVP a medium to express their discontent about the lack of economic and political 
opportunities (Hill 2013, p. 358-359).  
From 1965 to 1970 the JVP was mostly an underground movement but by 1970 the JVP 
had made contacts with revolutionary groups “in India, the Middle East and several Western 
countries” (Bullion 1995, p. 143). In 1970 the JVP supported the UF (United Front –a political 
coalition which included Marxist parties) led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike. At the same time, the 
JVP also began to publicize their goal of a socialist revolution8 (UCDP). When the UF emerged 
                                                          
7 Wijeweera had travelled to the Soviet Union from 1960 to 1963 to study and upon his return he joined the pro-Peking 
wing of the Sri Lankan Communist Party. He was expelled from the Communist Party and created the JVP (Bullion 
1995, p. 142). However, according to Peebles (2006) Wijeweera was expelled from the Lumumba University in 
Moscow and decided to go to North Korea (p. 120). 
8 The JVP’s revolutionary ideology was not really new though. Fernando (1973) writes that the Communist Party in 
Sri Lanka had been talking about revolution since the 1930s (p. 368) but the insurgencies in Malaysia (Bullion 1995, 
p. 143) and the Killings in Indonesia in the 1960s “persuaded many from the socialist-left that the capitalist classes 
would never relinquish their power and privileges peacefully” (Hill 2013, p. 358). 
 135 
 
victorious from the 1970 elections, the new government became concerned about “the JVP’s 
growing popularity and revolutionary ideology” (Hill 2013, p. 358-359). As a preventive tactic, 
the JVP was proscribed and Wijeweera, along with other JVP members, was incarcerated in March 
in 1971 (Wilson 1994, Moore 1993, UCPD).  
Notwithstanding a lack of external support (see part 2 below), the JVP9 attempted to 
overthrow Bandaranaike’s government on April 5th, 1971. Their strategy “was to amass arms, first 
from the police and then the military, to enable a ‘one day’ revolution buoyed by popular support” 
(Hill 2013, p. 360). But their plan failed: The anticipated support of 100,000 students (Bullion 
1995, p. 143) did not materialize and the government had been aware of JVP’s plans since March 
(UCDP, Kearny & Jiggins 2011, p. 620). Hence, the JVP only managed to capture “around 30 
police stations … which were quickly surrounded” (Hill 2013, p. 360).  The Sri Lankan armed 
forces controlled the situation quickly, using excessive force (Stokke 1998). The insurrection was 
over in less than two months.10 Estimates of the casualties are very varied: While Hill (2013) 
estimates that only 63 security forces and 1,200 insurgents were killed (p.359), others estimate a 
number between 1,500 and 5,000 (Fernando 1973, p. 368-369), 8,000 (Bullion 1995, p. 143) and 
up to 10,000 (UCDP).” Authors agree however that the entire JVP’s leadership was captured and 
incarcerated.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Bullion (1995) writes that the JVP leadership was divided about attacking; the attempt of revolution in 1971, 
according to this author, was not supported by Wijeweera, but by a JVP section led by Loku Athula (p. 143). 
10 There are different estimates for the length of the insurrection. Moore (1993) writes that it was over within three 
weeks; Hill (2013) writes eight weeks.  
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The aftermath of the JVP’s attempt of Revolution 
 
In an attempt to avoid a similar situation in the future, the Sri Lankan government 
implemented new policies to appeal to a broader Sinhalese. Ironically, by trying to make 
concessions to middle and lower class Sinhalese, the government inadvertently worsened the living 
conditions of the Tamil (which by now had already experienced discrimination and riots). 
Furthermore, the policies also had the undesired effect of bringing India into Sri Lankan affairs 
(more in part 2). 
A new constitution in 1972 incorporated Sinhala Only, and declared Sinhala and Buddhism 
as the language and the religion, respectively, of Sri Lanka. The new constitution changed the 
name of the state from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, which was not well received among Tamil since “Sri” 
was “uniquely Sinhala” (Peebles 2006, p. 127). In addition, the 1972 constitution did not contain 
protections for minority rights (Smith 2011, p. 450). Changes in the education system also affected 
the Tamils. For example, the change in the grade system (Stokke 1998, p. 100) and admission to 
universities from a merit-based to a quota-based system in 1973 reduced the number of Tamil 
students in universities:  Wilson (1988) found that: “The Tamil-dominant Northern Province in 
1969 obtained 27.5 per cent of the admissions to science-based courses on a merit system. On the 
quota basis, its share dropped to 7 percent in 1974” (p. 47). Other policies included land reform 
and nationalization of rubber and tea plantations (Stokke 1998; Bullion 1995); internal land 
colonization and “relocation of Sinhalese to Tamil areas” (Shastri 1990) as well as lack of public 
investment in Tamil areas (Stokke 1998; Stokke & Ryntveit 2010).  
All these policies combined had the effect of increasing the grievances of the Tamil 
population and the perception that Sinhalese majority was taking actions with the purpose of 
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damaging minorities. Sinhala Only in particular marked a “critical juncture [that] would lead to 
the pressing communal problem in the country in the future” (Bajpai 2013, p. 316). Protests and 
riots in 1956 and 1959 emerged against Sinhala Only. The change in language made jobs in 
government almost impossible for Tamils who did not know how to speak and write Sinhala: 
“‘From 1956 to 1970, the proportions of Tamils employed by the state fell from 60 to 10 percent 
in the professions, from 30 to 5 percent in the administrative services, from 50 to 5 percent in the 
clerical service, and from 40 to 1 percent in the armed forces’” (Rotberg 1999 in Smith 2011, p. 
450). By changing the employment opportunities in government and indirectly by augmenting the 
perception that the Sinhala were damaging the Tamil, the policies contributed directly to the 
escalation of violence.   
The changes after the JVP’s revolt also made for a more authoritarian state. A new 
Constitution in 1978 created a unitary state with a very powerful president. In addition, laws 
enacted in 1972 and 1982, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Indemnity Act created 
an “environment for human rights violations to occur”11 (UN 2011, p. 10).  
Tamil political parties had been trying to negotiate with the different Sinhalese 
administrations. The Federal Party (FP-- Ilangai Arasu Katchi or Lanka Tamil Government Party) 
first negotiated for federalism until it was replaced by the TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) 
in 1976, which began to ask for a separate state (Stokke 1998, Moore 1993; Peebles 2006). 
Different agreements were discussed but always rejected, such as the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam pact or BC pact12 in 1957. Part of the problem was that powerful Sinhalese-
                                                          
11 “The Prevention of Terrorism Act limited the ‘jurisdiction of the courts to check abuses of power and rights 
violations’ and provided, in turn, ‘extraordinary powers to the State’ in such matters. The Indemnity Act was 
‘applicable between August 1977 and 16 December 1988’ and it ‘barred legal proceedings against any minister, 
civilian or military official, or person acting under their direction in respect of any act, whether legal or illegal, 
undertaken in good faith to enforce the law or otherwise serve the public interest’” (UN 2011, p. 10).  
12 For description the BC pact and other agreements that were also broken see Bullion (1995), Wilson (1988), Shastri 
(1990), and Feith (2010). 
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Buddhist groups were behind the rejection of any concession toward the Tamil (Feith 2010, p. 
349). The old model of collaboration among dominant classes was replaced by nationalism. As 
years passed, both Sinhala and Tamil intensified their instrumentalization of nationalism, mainly 
ethnicity, language and religion. Opposition political parties “repeatedly made use of Sinhala 
nationalist propaganda to regain power, thereby undermining conflict resolution attempts by the 
party in power” (Lindberg & Orjuela 2011, p. 19). 
Political Buddhism or Sinhala-Buddhism refers to the politicization and 
instrumentalization of the beliefs that (1) the Sinhalese were the rightful inhabitants of Sri Lanka 
and all their problems emerged from the Hindu-Tamil brought from India (Holt 2011, p. 51) and 
(2) that because the Sinhalese had been in a bad situation during colonization, “they must now 
have it good” (Wilson 1988, p. 32). As the years passed, “Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism gained 
traction, asserting a privileged place for the Sinhalese as the protectors of Sri Lanka, as the sacred 
home of Buddhism" (UN 2011, p. 7-8). Political Buddhism was the driving force behind the 
policies implemented after independence, especially the Sinhala Only Act (UN 2011; Feith 2010). 
Helbardt, Hellman-Rajanayagam & Korf (2013) found that religion was “used to realize political 
objectives” which led “to the exclusion of the ‘Other’ and from there frequently to violence” (p. 
36).  
Tamil leaders also politicized and instrumentalized the idea of a “return” to their Hindu 
past to justify their ancestry, land claims and rejection of Sinhalese policies. By the late 1970s 
Tamil nationalism became more prevailing and calls for separation began to emerge:  “Tamil 
nationalists ... hold it as unquestionable that the Tamil-speaking people of Sri Lanka constitute a 
separate nation and that their traditional settlement pattern outlines the boundaries of the Tamil 
homeland, or Tamil Eelam" (Stokke & Ryntveit 2000, p. 287). While the Tamil claimed the North-
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East region (about 1/5 of the territory), Sinhala claimed the whole territory. What followed was 
that nationalistic claims made by both groups reinforced each other’s nationalist ideologies and 
the cycles of violence escalated. Political Buddhism radicalized the measures taken against the 
Tamil and hindered any efforts for reconciliation and negotiation. Ironically, these same Buddhist 
claims that denied any conciliation and power sharing with the Tamils contributed to the 
radicalization of the Tamils and intensified their intent to fight.  
 
Ethnic War 
 
Contrary to the JVP’s first insurrection which was quickly contained, the ethnic conflict 
lasted for more than 25 years, from 1983 to 2009 when government forces defeated the LTTE13.  
Ethnic riots in July 1983 marked the beginning of downward spiral in violence that would claim 
the lives of at least 70,000 people. Although violent riots had occurred before, the events of 1983 
escalated into a full-blown ethnic war between Tamil militias and the Sinhalese military and 
paramilitary. The ethnic war drew India into Sri Lanka; an Indian military intervention in 1987 
and the never ending violence with the Tamil, gave the JVP an opportunity to raise arms again. 
 
The 1983 riots or Black July 
 
On July 22, 1983 the LTTE (Thamil Eelam Viduthalai Puligal; the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam) ambushed an army convoy in the city of Jaffna killing thirteen Sinhalese soldiers. 
                                                          
13 Although the LTTE accepted defeat in Sri Lanka, there are foreign LTTE supporter: “Foreign cells … remain active, 
and are striving to form a transnational Tamil Government. Three broad groups control the remaining factions: a US 
group said to be headed by V. Rudrakumaran; a UK group, controlled by Aruththanthai Emmanuel of the WTF (World 
Tamil Forum) and a Norwegian group under Perinpanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyavan” (UCDP). 
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The attack was allegedly a response to the abduction and rape of three Tamil girls by the army the 
day before. When the dead soldiers were taken to Colombo for the funeral the next day, mass riots 
erupted against Tamil people and property (Holt 2011, p. 60; Sanmugathasan 1984, p. 63; Feith 
2010, p. 349; UN 2011, para 30, p. 8). It took the government between 24 hours (Holt 2011, p. 61) 
to a week (Sanmugathasan 1984) to control the riots in Colombo. Furthermore, violence spread to 
other towns and cities, including Trincomalee where violence “continued for more than a month” 
(Feith 2010, p. 350). There are no accurate records of the actual number of dead as a result of the 
riots. Most sources consulted write “thousands”; Feith (2000) estimated 3,000 were killed.  
Although there had been violent riots before Black July, several factors transformed 
sporadic violence into continuous violence: a clear ideological change within a sector of the Tamil 
population facilitated the creation and support of Tamil armed militias. In addition, policies such 
as Sinhala Only had not only increased the grievances of the Tamil population but also increased 
Tamil nationalism. Upon the failure of a political solution, combined with increasing government 
involvement in anti-Tamil riots, a new generation of Tamils, tired of waiting on the TULF’s 
negotiation tactics and with more nationalist ideologies began not only to call for an independent 
Tamil Eelam but also to arm themselves and increase their attacks14.  
 
The rise of militant groups 
 
After years of policies perceived detrimental toward the Tamil, failed political negotiations 
and government involvement in anti-Tamil riots, Tamil militarism radicalized in the late 1970s 
                                                          
14 Ironically, “The decades of brutal armed conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil militants …  
further increased the grievances of the Tamil population, as they were disproportionately affected by violence and 
ensuing underdevelopment” (Höglund & Orjuela 2011, p. 24). This increased the grievances which created a vicious 
cycle.  
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and early 1980s (Rudolph 2013, p. 231; Stokke 1998; Stokke & Ryntveit 2010, p. 293; Feith 2010, 
p. 348). After 1983, Tamil militants violently demanded the separation of Tamil Eelam. Although 
it was known that Sinhalese elites had been involved in riots in the past (Imtiyaz & Stavis 2008, 
p. 139) and that the government had actually “encouraged” and “sponsored” anti-Tamil violence 
in 1977 and 1981, the government’s involvement in the 1983 riots was larger than before (UN 
2011, para 30, p. 8). The government’s participation in the 1983 riots was evident because the 
mobs had voting lists with names and addresses of Tamils (Sanmugathasan 1984, p. 67; Feith 
2010, p. 349; UN 2011, para 30, p. 8) and these were “provided to them by people linked to the 
government, including government ministers” (Feith 2010, p. 349). In addition, the UN reported 
that “Sinhalese mobs were transported in Government buses“(UN 2011, para 30, p. 8).  Attacks 
were systematic against Tamils as no Sinhalese were attacked during the riots (Sanmugathasan 
1984).  
The transformation of the nature of the conflict in Sri Lanka from sporadic riots to a full-
blown ethnic war was not only the result of domestic dynamics but also of external forces. Of these 
external factors the most significant one was the double role of India: One was a diplomatic attempt 
to mediate the conflict. Another one was to provide material support to Tamil militants, both 
indirectly and directly; by doing this, “India altered the power balance between the dissidents and 
the government” (Holt 2011, p. 64). (See part 2). 
 
The creation and rise of the LTTE 
 
In 1972, Velupillai Prabhakaran created the Tamil New Tigers militia (TNT), which 
changed its name to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 1976 (BBC 2008; 
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UCDP). 15 Since the early 1970s they began to collect arms and began training (Moore 1993, p. 
606) and at least since May 1982 they began training covertly in Tamil Nadu in India (Bullion 
1995, p. 51). Although there were other Tamil militant groups, the LTTE eventually became “the 
most disciplined and most nationalist of the Tamil militant groups” (UN 2011, para 31, p. 8)16.  
The LTTE had attacked before 1983, but after Black July, violence escalated. LTTE attacks 
were not only against the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) but also against civilians of all ethnicities 
(including Tamil and Muslim), and not only Sinhalese. According to data gathered by the UCPD, 
“The bulk of victims were killed in the disputed and ethnically mixed areas of the East, Northeast 
and North-Central provinces. Particularly violent areas have been Trincomalee, Batticaloa and 
Amparai” (UCPD). The LTTE quickly became radical and were considered a terrorist 
organization17: 
 
The LTTE pioneered modern suicide bombing … [and] were responsible for 
the deaths of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1991) and Sri Lankan 
President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1993) as well as numerous Sri Lankan 
ministers and members of parliament, and moderate Tamil political leaders. 
It also carried out suicide attacks, often with large numbers of civilian 
                                                          
15Although not the only Tamil militant group, they very quickly became the most powerful one.  As early as 1987 the 
LTTE had dominated all other groups (Kodikara 1987). LTTE was the dominant group by May 1986 (Peebles 2006, 
p. 154). 
Other groups fighting were the “Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, the People’s Liberation Organization for Tamil 
Eelam or The Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary Liberation Front” (Cochrane, Baser and Swain 2009, p. 686) The Tamil 
are not necessarily united in all fronts (as evident by the different Tamil militant groups that erupted after the 1970s). 
Although four militant groups created an alliance in 1985 (including the LTTE, EPRLF (Eelam People's Revolutionary 
Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and EROS), the Eelam National Liberation Front, 
by mid-1986 the LTTE began fighting against them (UCDP). 
16 The “success” of the LTTE is impressive, considering that they began as a small group of 50 active members 
(UCDP). The LTTE was very well organized with different units for different activities. For instance the Black Tigers 
was the unit for suicide bombers and the Sea Tigers were the LTTE naval force. 
17 India declared the LTTE terrorist in 1992 and the United States in 1997 (Wezeman 2011, p. 47, 49). 
 143 
 
casualties, on economic and religious targets. The LTTE pursued 
exclusionary politics, expelling Muslims from their homes in the north in 
1990 and massacring Singhalese and Muslims living in villages bordering 
areas it controlled... The LTTE was also known for its forced recruitment and 
use of child soldiers, including boys and girls. Its tactics led to the 
organization's proscription in numerous countries, including Canada, the 
European Union, India, the United Kingdom and the United States; its 
proscription intensified after 11 September 2001 (UN 2011, para 32, p. 9). 
 
 The LTTE “has carried out more suicide bombings than Hamas, Islamic Jihad and al-
Qaeda combined” and have killed an estimated 8,000 people who the LTTE considered traitors 
(Frontline 2002).18 
 
India and Peace conferences 
 
Upon the escalating violence in Sri Lanka and the thousands of refugees who fled to Tamil 
Nadu after the riots of 1983, India began to mediate between the Tamil militant groups and the 
Sinhalese government in a series of peace conferences (the All-Party Conference in 1984 and the 
Thimpu Talks in 1985). But all attempts were unsuccessful because neither side was willing to 
make compromises. At the same time that India was officially mediating the conflict, India was 
also covertly providing support to the Tamil militias. 
                                                          
18 The LTTE activities were not contained in Sri Lanka. The LTTE has been “involved in various transnational 
criminal activities, smuggling of persons and drugs, human trafficking, extortion from Tamil families living abroad, 
and numerous forms of fraud” (Cochrane, Baser and Swain 2009, p. 690). 
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Sri Lanka attacked Jaffna 
 
When the Sri Lankan Army attacked the Jaffna peninsula (populated mostly by Hindu-
Tamil from India) in February 1987, the government of Tamil Nadu was calling for more support 
to the Tamil militias and pressing India for military intervention19. Right after the attacks and 
blockade to Jaffna, India dropped food over Jaffna with the intent to show Colombo that India was 
not going to tolerate such attacks against Tamil population (Oullet 2011, p. 475). The government 
of Tamil Nadu also mobilized. More importantly, on July 29 1987, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi and Sri Lanka’s President J.R. Jayerwardene signed the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement 
(ISPA).  
The agreement stipulated that Tamil areas in the north and east would operate as one 
administrative unit, but Sri Lanka was to remain united (Holt 2011, p. 65), Tamil militias were to 
surrender their weapons and the Sri Lanka military was to withdraw from Tamil areas (Oullet 
2011, p. 475), remove all embargoes to Jaffna and not resume military operations (Bullion 1995, 
p. 60). India “agreed to close the training camps on its territory, and arranged combined maritime 
patrols with the Sri Lankan Navy to prevent smuggling between the island and the Tamil Nadu” 
(Oullet 2011, p. 475). The implementation of the agreement was to be facilitated by the Indian 
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 For instance, By 1987 TESO (Tamil Eelam Supporters' Organization) was created in Tamil Nadu and they "openly 
advocated the cause of 'Tamil Eelam' and agitated for armed Indian intervention in Sri Lanka" (Bullion 1995, p. 95). 
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IPKF in SRI LANKA 
 
 The first 6,000 Indian troops landed in Jaffna to help implement ISPA twenty-four hours 
after signing the agreement (Rudolph 2003, p. 231). A month later the numbers had increased to 
10,000 (Bullion 1995, p. 122). By July 1988 the number of Indian troops increased to 50,000 and 
to “nearly 80,000 … by the summer of 1989“ (Rudolph 2003, p. 232). The IPKF was not successful 
in their task: First, the IPKF was ill-prepared (Bullion 1995, p. 123) especially for “helping 
civilians and disarming the LTTE” (Oullet 2011, p. 479). Second, the IPKF was internally divided 
with some units even siding with Tamil militants (Oullet 2011).  Third, the IPKF was confronted 
by the LTTE. While the other Tamil militias complied with the agreement, the LTTE withdrew 
from the accord and began fighting the IPKF (Lindberg & Orjuela 2011, p. 20).  At the same time, 
the LTTE engaged in confrontation with other Tamil militias: “the LTTE and the other Tamil 
guerilla groups worked with and against each other at different points of time during this period. 
The various combinations and permutations of these groups added to the confusion that already 
existed about who was doing what, to whom and why” (Senaratne 1997, p. 146).  
 
Event 2: JVP’s second revolution 
 
The agreement between India and Sri Lanka was signed under secrecy and “under the 
veiled threat of further involvement [from India] if it was not accepted” (Holt 2011, p. 65). The 
Sinhalese population in general was not content about an accord that gave India access to Sri Lanka 
(Bullion 1995). However, by 1987 the JVP had already regrouped and were threatening the 
government again, and so “fear of JVP insurrection in the south, as much as Tamil insurgency in 
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the north and east, served as a key motivation behind the signing of the 1987 Accord” (Bullion 
1995, p. 144). The fact that the Indian troops were not able to reduce the violence in the North and 
East gave the JVP the justification for their second insurrection. 
 
1982 Presidential election 
 
The JVP resurged as a political party in 1977 when they obtained amnesty (Moore 1993, 
p. 634).  By then, Wijeweera had replaced “almost the entire leadership” and “had also become 
almost the sole representative of Sri Lanka’s historically relatively strong Marxist tradition” 
(UCDP). Wijeweera contended as a presidential candidate for the JVP during the 1982 elections 
and obtained 4% of the votes and the JVP was “expected to secure at least two parliamentary seats” 
(Hill 2013, p. 359) in the general election in 1983. But President J.R. Jayawardene and the UNP 
won a referendum to postpone the parliamentary elections, which left the JVP without access to 
the government. Furthremore, the JVP and other leftist parties were blamed for the July 1983 
riots20 (Hill 2013, Bullion 1995; Sanmugathasan 1984).The riots provided the government with 
the opportunity to ban the leftist political parties and to reflect responsibility off the government 
(Sanmugathasan 1984, p. 71-73). 
The JVP took the opportunity in 1987 when mass protests erupted across Sri Lanka against 
the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. Because people feared an Indian invasion, the JVP obtained popular 
support in their fight against a government that had allowed a foreign power into Sri Lanka (Hill 
                                                          
20 Hill’s list also include: the “Moscow-wing of the Communist Party, the Nawa Sama Samaja Pakshaya (NSSP)” 
(2013, p. 359). Bullion’s list include: the LSSP (Lanka Sama Samaja Party), the CP (Communist Party), and the TULF 
(Tamil United Liberation Front) (1995, p. 144). It is debatable whether the JVP was involved. Hill (2013) found no 
evidence of JVP’s involvement (p. 359), while the UCPD writes that the JVP was banned “with some justice”, 
suggesting there may have been some involvement. 
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2013; Holt 2011; Rudolph 2003; Bullion 1995; Senaratne 1997). While the JVP’s objective was 
still the same as before, a socialist revolution, this time their ideology was “cloaked in a more 
Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist rhetoric than in the early 1970s” (UCPD), increasingly anti-Indian 
and anti-Tamil (Moore 1993, p. 599) 
The JVP did not count on external material support. This time, however, the JVP had 
supporters within the Sri Lankan armed forces “which took little aggressive action against the JVP 
in 1987 and 1988” (Hill 2013, p. 359-360), both because the JVP had infiltrated the SLA and the 
police (UCDP), but also because some members of the armed forces sympathized with the JVP 
objectives. Their strategy was “to make the task of governing so difficult and so costly in terms of 
loss of public support and confidence that eventually government would cease to function" (Moore 
1993, p. 634).  Their tactics ranged from mass rallies and strikes to bombings and political 
assassinations. Violence had escalated by early 1989 and there were fears that the JVP could 
actually succeed (UCDP, Hill 2011, Moore 1993). 
However, JVP’s luck changed early in August 1989 when the JVP turned on the armed 
forces and demanded them to “stop defending the government” (Hill 2013, p. 360) and “leave their 
posts” (Moore 1993, p. 639) or risk the lives of their families. While they had assessed that this 
would provide a swift victory, the JVP’s threat had the opposite effect of what they intended. The 
armed forces together with paramilitary groups, replied by killing anyone suspected of belonging 
to the JVP21 (Moore 1993, p. 639; Hill 2013, p. 360). This was occurring at the same time that the 
LTTE was gaining territory in the North and the East. It is estimated that between 20,000 and 
60,000 people died. According to data by the UCDP, most of the casualties from 1989-1990 were 
civilians (not armed combatants) at the hands of the Sri Lankan armed forces, the JVP and the 
                                                          
21 “Supporters of the opposition, civil rights workers, lawyers, and journalists were targeted as well as JVP members” 
(Peebles 2006, p. 159). 
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LTTE as well. While the SLA was able to defeat the JVP22, capturing Wijeweera and other JVP 
leaders, the LTTE gained territory after the IPKF left; they took control of the Jaffna peninsula 
and began a de facto state under the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers. Violence continued until 
2009 when President Mahinda Rajapakse declared victory. However, in the last few months of 
2009 alone it is estimated that between 7,500 (Lindberg & Orjuela 2011, p. 16) and 40,000 people 
died, mostly civilians, killed by both the government and the LTTE (Amnesty International 2013). 
 
Part 2 
 
Like the other case-studies presented in the dissertation, this chapter also uses a modified 
version of Stoett’s (2011) classification of external involvement to evaluate different ways in 
which external factors interacted with the internal factors. The main question for the section on the 
effects of colonialism is how experiences of colonialism and the process of independence created 
two different conflicts in Sri Lanka. This section explains that domestic variables significant in 
Harff’s model, such as political exclusion, were a response from the new elites to colonial 
experiences. Second, direct assistance from abroad is assessed mainly in the form of arms transfers 
(using SIPRI’s database) to both the Sri Lankan government and militant groups (the LTTE and 
the JVP specifically). It is found that arms transfers increased throughout the time as the conflict 
escalated. Indirect assistance is examined mainly in the relationship between India and Sri Lanka, 
focusing on the impact of Indian policy toward Sri Lanka and its effects on the conflict. The focus 
is on the arrival of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) that occupied northern parts of Sri Lanka 
                                                          
22 The JVP reemerged as a political party in 1999 and was one of the key actors that made difficult any attempt to 
negotiate with the LTTE. 
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from 1987 to 1990 as a key factor that contributed directly and indirectly to the escalation of 
violence and the genocide in 1989. 
 
Effects of Colonialism 
 
 There are two key effects from the English colonization23 that affected the events after 
independence in Sri Lanka: (1) the idea that the Tamil population had a privileged position during 
British colonization; (2) the fact that high caste, English speaking elites dominated politics. These 
two issues had the effect of increasing nationalism, both for Tamil and Sinhalese which got in the 
way of negotiations and sparked violence. 
Once independence was achieved, even though there were democratic institutions in place, 
political power remained in the hands of a few Sinhalese, English educated, and high caste 
families. While the Tamil did have some political representation in Parliament, with the FP and 
later the TULF, by the late 1960s and early 1970s the grievances of the Tamil population had 
increased. At the same time, lower caste/class Sinhalese had also been disenfranchised from 
political, social and economic advancement. The Sinhalese blamed the economic situation on the 
Tamil, especially the Hindu-Tamil who had been brought by the English. It was the general 
assertion that the Tamil had benefited at the expense of the Sinhalese during colonization and so 
the measures taken by the government after independence were expected to benefit the middle and 
lower sectors of the Sinhalese population. However, high unemployment and general unhappiness 
                                                          
23 A deeper analysis would analyze the different colonial experiences under the Portuguese the Dutch and the British. 
In fact, Strathern (2004) argues that “the boundaries around (a) the Sinhalese state, (b) ethnic identity, and (c) religious 
identity were drawn… [during the Portuguese colonization]” (p. 192). 
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with the UNP government, combined with the proscription of the JVP led to the first attempt of 
revolution. All these domestic issues explain why the first JVP’s insurrection occurred. 
All the policies, such as Sinhala Only and the Citizenship Acts, negotiations and failed 
agreements were exacerbated by nationalistic and religious claims. Both Tamil and Sinhalese 
increasingly relied on nationalist sentiments to advance and justify their claims, intensifying cycles 
of violence. Nationalist ideologies intensified after the first event in 1971, the JVP’s attempt at 
revolution, which directly contributed to the radicalization of the Tamil. While it is evident that 
both Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms were a post-colonial project, with specific political objectives 
(Stokke 1998; Stokke & Ryntveit 2000), identity formation in Sri Lanka was a reaction to 
colonization. Language and religion had already become the focus point of resistance during 
colonization (Helbardt, Hellman-Rajanayagam & Korff 2013) and these became radicalized, 
idealized and politicized after independence.  
However, it is also likely that the outcome could have been different if the Sri Lankan 
government had opted for pluralistic (Holt 2011, p. 25) or inclusive (Wilson 1998, p. v) policies. 
Similarly, violence could have been avoided if both Tamil and Sinhalese leaders would have found 
a middle ground for their demands. But the spark for the JVP revolution was lack of political 
participation. Although Sri Lanka had some elements of democracy24 (elections, multi-party 
system) (UN 2011 para 26, p. 7), schisms in political participation and access to government 
aggravated differences within the Sinhalese community and political violence ensued. The effects 
of colonialism may help explain the historical setting and grievances of the actors involved, but it 
does not explain why civilians were not targeted during the 1971 armed confrontation (the non-
genocide) but they were targeted in 1989.  
                                                          
24 The “democracy” qualification of Sri Lanka could be debated. For current evaluations of Sri Lankan democracy, 
see DeVotta (2011) and Stepan (2015). 
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The second event, the genocide in 1989, took place during the second JVP insurrection and 
the fight between the LTTE and the IPKF. The opportunity for the JVP to start a new insurgency 
was provided by the lack of support to the UNP government for allowing the IPKF into Sri Lanka. 
In this case, the politics of independence and the effects of colonization affected indirectly the 
instrumentalization of nationalism by both Tamil and Sinhalese elites in order to amass support 
for their respective purposes.   
 
Direct assistance 
 
The first JVP insurrection was the result of lack of political participation. However, the 
second one was a response to India’s intervention, at least the IPKF provided the support the JVP 
needed. One of the main differences between the two events is that by 1989 there were more 
weapons in Sri Lanka. 
This section evaluates the material contributions or direct assistance from abroad to the 
government of Sri Lanka, as well as to the JVP and the LTTE. This category emphasizes the means 
that were available to the leaders. Using SIPRI’s database, an analysis is made on the arms transfers 
to Sri Lanka in both events. Other types of direct assistance are also taken into account: military 
training, intelligence, and other types of assistance.  In accord with Lindberg, Orjuela, Wezeman 
& Åkerström (2011), this section argues that the arms race between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
Army contributed to the escalation of the violence. Because the conflict could not be contained by 
Sri Lanka, India intervened. This intervention gave the JVP the perfect opportunity to attempt a 
second revolution. 
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Direct assistance to the Sri Lankan government 
 
According to SIPRI’s database25, the Sri Lankan government received conventional 
weapons consistently throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s from both Western and non-Western 
states. The graph below (G5.1) made with data from SIPRI’s database, shows the percentage of 
arms transfers made to Sri Lanka from 1950 to 2013. The columns are sized per the percentages 
at the left axis of the graph and mark the volume of arms transfers per year as a percentage of the 
total received during the period studied. The percentages at the right axis reference the line that 
crosses diagonally and are the cumulative percentages from 1950 to 2013 (thus, the line starts at 
nearly zero and finishes at 100%).  
 
                                                          
25 SIPRI’s statistical data measures “the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons using a 
common unit, the trend-indicator value (TIV). The TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of 
weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer 
[…] This data is intended to provide a common unit to allow the measurement if trends in the flow of arms to particular 
countries and regions over time […] SIPRI TIV figures do not represent sales prices for arms transfers ... They are 
best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers over periods of time, global percentages 
for suppliers and recipients, and percentages for the volume of transfers to or from particular states” (SIPRI). See 
chapter 2 for further explanation. SIPRI’s data reports the country from which the arms were delivered, but it may not 
reflect the country that actually made the transfer. 
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G5.1. Note: The information for the graph was taken from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
 
 Although the graph shows that there have been years when arms transfers decrease 
significantly compared with the previous years, it is also evident that there was an increase in the 
transfer of conventional weapons to the government of Sri Lanka. There is a peak in arms transfers 
in 1970 and 1971, with 80 TIV; although this only represents 3.6% of the total, it is a significant 
increase from the previous year. It is also noticeable in the graph that beginning in 1984 and 
peaking in 2000 there was a significant increase in arms received by Sri Lanka; this coincides with 
the period through the war with the LTTE. From 1984 to 2000, the government received 1,394 
TIV, representing 62.4% of the total. Interestingly, in the previous year and after the genocide in 
1988 there was a decrease in the arms transfers. From 1988 to 1990 there were only 2% of the 
total, adding up to 44 TIV. However, in 1991, the year the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, arms 
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transfers to Sri Lanka increased again: 7.8% of all arms transfers from 1950 to 2013 were received 
in 1991 for a total of 171 TIV.  
Graph (G5.2) below shows the states that supplied the most volume of conventional arms 
(TIV) to Sri Lanka from 1950 to 2013. Previous to the JVP’s first insurrection, the government of 
Sri Lanka had only received weapons from the United Kingdom, Israel and the United States, 
although in total the volume received until 1970 was 84 TIV. Sources consulted reported the 
following support after the JVP’s first insurrection: at least 13 helicopters from the United States, 
the United Kingdom and India; 5 MIG-17 fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union (Fernando 1973, 
p. 369); and 5 patrol boats from China (Manor & Segal 1985, p. 1183). India and the Soviet Union 
also provided technical assistance sending crews and technicians and China provided “a long- term 
interest-free loan of Rupees 150 million in convertible foreign exchange” (Fernando 1973, p. 369). 
In this period, however, SIPRI’s data shows only transfers from the United States (3 TIV), the 
Soviet Union (10 TIV) and the United Kingdom (13 TIV). In the following year, 1972 only China 
(45 TIV) and the United States (2 TIV) transferred weapons to Sri Lanka.  
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G5.2 Note: The information for the graph was taken from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
 
On the contrary, the JVP did not receive external support. There are reports that the JVP 
was looking for material support for their cause since the late 1960s, but that only North Korea 
provided “some support” (Moore 1993, p. 143); this has not been corroborated by other authors. 
It could be possible considering that the leader of the JVP studied in North Korea (Peebles 2006). 
Regardless, whatever they provided was definitely not significant. And, Kearny & Jiggins (2011) 
argue that “No evidence has appeared of arms or training supplied from abroad” (p. 619). SIPRI’s 
database confirms this as they have no data on transfers of weapons made to JVP.  
There is also no evidence to suggest that the JVP received external support during their 
second insurrection in 1987 (at least not from states and not legally). There is some indication that 
the JVP may have received “limited amounts of cash from Iraq” (Chandraprema, Sri Lanka: The 
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Years of Terror, in Moore 1993, p. 599), although this is not corroborated by other authors and 
SIPRI has no record either. 
Although the transfers made to the Sri Lankan are not much compared to other states (see 
chapter 6, analysis and conclusion), because the JVP had no access to external sources, the Sri 
Lankan army quickly dominated the situation. Furthermore, it is evident SIPRI’s database that Sri 
Lanka had only received sporadic weapons previous to 1984. Beginning 1984, the transfer 
remained constant (although with less transfers in some years than others, but the transfers did not 
stop). Bullion (1995) reports that the United Kingdom provided “$30 million worth of arms (p.83).  
Graph G5.2 above show that from 1984 to 1989 (the year of the genocide), there was a 
semi-constant supply of conventional weapons. In the few years previous to the riots of Black July 
in 1983, there were no transfers at all and so compared to the volume of transfers from previous 
years, there is a clear peak in 1984, despite Indira’s Doctrine. In fact, there is mixed evidence on 
the response from abroad to Indira’s Doctrine. According to Rao (1988) both the United States 
and the United Kingdom refused to help Sri Lanka and authors agree that the lack of significant 
assistance reflected the recognition and acceptance that India was the regional hegemon (Bullion 
1995; Moore 1993). In 1984, SIPRI reports that Sri Lanka received weapons from the United 
States, Canada, and Singapore (9, 3, and 41 TIV, respectively). In 1985, the United States increased 
the transfers to 39 TIV. Although this is not much, it is more than what the United States had been 
providing in the previous years. 
Two states provided direct assistance to both the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil 
militias: India and Israel. “Israel ha[d] been a faithful supplier to Sri Lanka, even though in 1989 
Sri Lanka suspended diplomatic relations with Israel after pressure from Sri Lankan Muslims” 
(Wezeman 2011, p. 48). Bullion (1995) reported that Israel’s secret agency Mossad was providing 
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support and weapons to the Sri Lankan army in 1984, while “simultaneously arming and training 
Tamil militants on Israeli soil” (Bullion 1995, p. 81). SIPRI’s database reports that there were arms 
transfers from Israel to Sri Lanka in 1987 and 1988 (16 TIV each year). It was not until 1995 that 
Israel resumed transfers of arms. In fact,  Throughout the period included in SIPRI’s data (1950-
2013) China and Israel were the states from which Sri Lanka received the most volume of 
conventional weapons (675 and 520 TIV total, respectively). 
  The LTTE was able to overpower all other Tamil militant groups, the IPKF and the Sri 
Lankan army because, as sources consulted report, they had access to external support. The LTTE 
received support from both state and non-state actors: The LTTE received on and off support from 
the Indian government, from the government of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, for a brief period 
of time from the Sri Lankan government itself and, most important of all for the LTTE, from the 
Tamil diaspora. 
The government of India provided the Tamil guerillas with safe havens (UCDP) and 
training camps (Oullet 2011). India’s own external secret service (RAW—Research and Analysis 
Wing) was involved in training of Tamil militants26 (Bullion 1995; Feith 2010; Oullet 2011; 
Peebles 2006).  At the same time, the local government of Tamil Nadu was also providing direct 
assistance to the LTTE. “India’s military support – although at a relatively small-scale – for a few 
years after 1983 was crucial for the development of the conflict into a full-scale civil war. Without 
Indian backing and arms, the Tamil militant groups would not have been able to grow forceful 
enough to wage such a war” (Lindberg & Orjuela 2011, p. 36). Most of the weapons obtained by 
the LTTE, however, were illegally obtained (Lindberg, Orjuela, Wezeman & Åkerström 2011, 
                                                          
26 The role of RAW may have extended beyond providing training and support to Tamil armed groups: "In May 1985, 
a massacre occurred at Anuradhapura ... in which Tamil militants killed 150 people. Evidence has since emerged that 
the LTTE carried out this massacre in tandem with Indian officers from RAW” (Bullion 1995, p. 55). 
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p.10), smuggled from India, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, and other places (Wezeman 2011, p. 
53). 
When India reduced the support provided to Tamil militias in 1985 during peace 
negotiations (Rao 1988), after ISPA and after 1991 after Gandhi’s assassination (UCDP), the 
LTTE was not heavily weakened; the LTTE had another source of support: The Tamil diaspora27 
that had left Sri Lanka in 1983.  
Cochrane, Baser and Swain (2009) found that “By the mid-1990s, … 80 to 90 percent of 
the LTTE’s military budget came from overseas sources, including the LTTE’s own business and 
investments in addition to the Diaspora’s wider financial contribution” (p. 690). By some 
estimates, the LTTE generated up to US$300 million annually, including legal and illegal activities 
(Pant 2009). Moreover, the links among the LTTE and terrorists organizations, including al-Qaeda 
(Pant 2009)28 were made possible by the diaspora (Cochrane, Baser and Swain 2009, 691).  
During the IPKF intervention, the LTTE received support from the government of Sri 
Lanka in its fight against the IPKF and supplied them with arms (Lindberg & Orjuela 2011, p. 20; 
Stokke & Kirstian, 2000, p. 285; Oullet 2011, p. 477). This was done with the objective of 
removing the source of support for the JVP’s insurrection. Ironically, India began arming the 
EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front) to fight against the LTTE (Oullet 2011, 
p. 479).  
                                                          
27 Wezeman (2011) estimates that the diaspora represents 25% of all Sri Lankan Tamils (p. 52). The Diaspora is not 
a unitary entity of course. A deeper study on the role of the diaspora would focus its attention to the different 
organizations created by Tamils from abroad. Similarly, not all exiled Tamils were providing funds for the LTTE or 
other Tamil groups. A more precise study of the Diaspora would emphasize which particular organizations of Tamils 
contributed directly and under which circumstances for aid. The Tamil were not the only ones attempting to raise 
money (or being extorted) for the LTTE cause. There were also Sinhala associations in favor of a united Sri Lanka in 
the United States, Canada and Australia (Kodikara 1987, p. 642).  
28 Although others deny that there was a connection between the LTTE and Al Qaeda (Wezeman 2011, p. 50). 
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The first event, the non-genocide/politicide of 1971, was rapidly contained by the Sri 
Lankan armed forces. As shown in the analysis above, this is explained by looking at the difference 
in arms transfers between the JVP and the government. In short, the JVP did not have external 
support in any occasion and the government did. On the contrary, even when the LTTE lost the 
support from India, they found that the support from the diaspora was their lifeline. This, in 
combination with their tactics, kept the LTTE able to fight (although not included in the chapter, 
evidence also shows that when the diaspora removed the support to the LTTE in the late 1990s 
(Pant 2009) the LTTE was debilitated and that is when the government defeated them). The second 
event, the genocide in 1989, occurred when the JVP attempted a second revolution, justified by 
the IPKF intervention in India.  
 
Indifference and selective intervention/Indirect assistance 
 
One explanation for the second event, the genocide/politicide in 1989, is the fact that the 
international community was not paying attention to the events in Sri Lanka during the 1980’s 
despite several attempts by Tamils who fled Sri Lanka after the riots (Shastri 2009; Lindberg & 
Orjuela 2011; Kodikara 1987) and by Tamils from Tamil Nadu in India. After the riots in July 
1983, people in Tamil Nadu mobilized and brought the issue to the United Nations. The political 
party DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) collected one million signatures and submitted them 
in protest to the UN Secretary General (Kodikara 1987, p. 639). Also, the publicity that people 
from Tamil Nadu spread about the riots in 1983 was listened to by some non-governmental 
associations: The International Commission of Jurists came out with an adverse report on Sri 
Lanka, submitted to the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights in Geneva” (p. 639). Norway lead 
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a resolution requesting further investigation into the July riots. “Norway, was supported by Egypt, 
Belgium, Greece, France, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
It was opposed by Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan, Syria, USSR, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Bangladesh. Four 
countries -Argentina, India, Ghana and Zambia -abstained, and four others - Nigeria, Morocco, 
Rumania and Panama – were not present at the time of voting.” (p. 640). However, the issue was 
taken to the UN Commission on Human Rights and after meeting in February and March 1984, “a 
consensus resolution was adopted to the effect that ‘further consideration of the Sri Lanka situation 
is not necessary’. This reversal of attitude was clearly the product of intensive lobbying by Sri 
Lanka among the membership of the Human Rights Commission … but it also reflected the 
changed attitude of the international community generally to Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem” 
(Kodikara 1987, p. 640). After this, the little attention that the world was paying to Sri Lanka, 
disappeared, facilitating the events of 1989. 
India’s double role in Sri Lanka, mediating and supporting Tamil militias even as the IPKF 
landed in Sri Lanka, earned the distrust of the Sinhalese population. Ironically, by attempting to 
pacify Sri Lanka, India had inadvertently provided the JVP with the justification for their second 
insurrection.  
 India had negotiated agreements such as the Nehru-Kotelawala Pact of 1954 and the 
Sirimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964 with Sri Lanka in favor of the Hindu-Tamil, but these pacts were 
not successful.  The Sirimavo-Shastri Pact, for instance, stipulated Indian Tamils would have the 
option of obtaining citizenship in Sri Lanka or returning to India. However, by the time the Pact 
expired in 1979, there were still 150,000 Tamils who remained stateless (Wilson 1995, p. 45-47). 
Similarly, as explained in part 1 above, the peace negotiations of 1984 and 1986 also failed. Among 
the reasons for this failure are: (1) the general distrust of Indian intentions; (2) Tamil extremists 
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were not willing to accept anything less than independence (Rao 1988, p. 422); (3) the plan for 
devolution included Trincomalee and the Sinhalese did not want to lose this port (Holt 2011, p. 
65); (4) Another reason is that even though Tamil militant organizations were present, “the groups 
were not represented by their leaders” (Bullion 1995, p. 56);  (5) In addition, the Tamil 
organizations did not present a united front, “and India was forced to spend as much time trying 
to narrow the differences between the two moderated and four radical Tamil groups present as 
between the Tamils and Colombo" (Rudolph 2003, p. 230). Furthermore, some conferences took 
place at the same time that massacres of Tamil were occurring and some militant groups left the 
talks (Bullion 1995, p. 57).  One of the reasons why the peace negotiations and ceasefire never 
worked was that both the LTTE and the government seized opportunities to rearm which 
undermined any attempts of peace (Lindberg, Orjuela, Wezeman & Åkerström 2011). “In all the 
different peace processes throughout the history of the war in Sri Lanka, the parties have been able 
to use periods of ceasefire to rearm” (Lindberg & Orjuela 2011, p. 36). 
When it was time to sign ISPA, Sri Lanka had reluctantly accepted India’s mediating role 
(Bullion 1995) during the peace conferences in 1984 and 1986. When the peace agreement was 
signed in 1987, Sri Lanka also did it reluctantly, but authors agree that Sri Lanka had no choice 
(Rao 1988): Sri Lanka lacked significant external support to control the LTTE and its economic 
conditions were deteriorating. 
Not surprisingly, India’s double approach to Sri Lanka had the unexpected consequence of 
increasing distrust of India’s diplomatic approach and objectives toward Sri Lanka as well as 
augmenting the fears of an Indian occupation. Consequently, even when Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi “tighten[ed] India’s control over the guerrilla training camps in Tamil Nadu … it 
occurred too late to prevent Sinhalese militants from concluding that, in Sri Lanka's communal 
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conflict, India was pro-Tamil" (Rudolph 2003, p. 234). The direct effect of the Indian occupation 
was the escalation of conflict, not only because the IPKF was fighting the LTTE and Tamil 
guerrillas were fighting each other, but also because it provided the justification for the JVP’s 
second insurrection. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Given India’s proximity to Sri Lanka, and that Tamils from India were living in Sri Lanka, 
India’s involvement in the conflict is not surprising. India’s involvement was very complex, 
ranging from diplomatic mediation to military intervention, as well as from supporting the Tamil 
militias to supporting the Sri Lankan government to maintain Sri Lanka whole. This apparent 
contradiction in India’s foreign policy toward Sri Lanka, which Bullion (1995) described as 
"confused and schizoid" (p. 8), attempted to manage external and domestic demands at the same 
time. Domestically, India’s internal pressure to protect the rights and lives of the Tamil population 
in Sri Lanka increased after the 1983 riots when thousands of refugees fled to the Indian state of 
Tamil Nadu. India attempted to balance the grievances of Tamil Nadu while being careful not to 
give so much so that minorities’ conflicts in India could be controlled. Indeed, India’s policy 
throughout this time was one of a united Sri Lanka29 (Bullion 1995, 44; Holt 2011, p. 66; Pant 
2009; Rao 1988; Kodikara 1987). Certainly, India’s own separatist insurgencies in regions such as 
Kashmir explains why it did not support an independent Tamil Eelam. 
                                                          
29 Other states also favored a united Sri Lanka, including the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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The Indian state of Tamil Nadu had its own reasons for providing support to the LTTE and 
other Tamil militant organizations in Sri Lanka. Previous to the 1983 riots, the policies 
implemented by the Sinhalese government against the Tamil had also impacted the people of Tamil 
Nadu (Kodikara 1987): (1) Tamil Nadu had to deal with Tamils from Sri Lanka who had been 
repatriated after the Citizenship Acts of 1947; (2) Sri Lanka’s Immigration and Emigration Act of 
1949 ended free travel between Sri Lanka and India, “which restricted employment opportunities 
in Sri Lanka for the people of Tamilnadu”; and (3) at the same time that the government was 
implementing Sinhala Only in Sri Lanka, people in Tamil Nadu had a similar struggle over 
language (p. 638).  
But keeping the balance was difficult for India: "It could not favor the Tamils in their 
conflict with the Sinhalese without antagonizing the Sinhalese and straining its relations with 
Colombo. It could not be too severe in repressing the Tigers without appearing to favor the 
Sinhalese and antagonizing the Tamil majority in southern India. It could not openly favor the 
moderates in Sri Lanka's Tamil camp without polarizing the more extremist Tamil organizations 
that it would be unable to mediate the intra-Tamil conflict" (Rudolph 2003, p. 231). India’s 
difficult position contributed to increasing the fears of an Indian intervention, which were used by 
the JVP to rally support.  
India’s actions are also explained by politics in the region. Because India could not achieve 
great power status due to internal constraints as well as the presence of the United States in the 
region, India followed a policy of nonalignment during the Cold War, in an attempt to “exclude 
the Cold War –and therefore the superpowers – from the subcontinent” (Nayar 2003, p. 217). After 
the United States “tilted” in favor of Pakistan30 in 1971, India was drawn closer to the Soviet 
                                                          
30 India and Pakistan had been in conflict before. In 1965 Pakistan attempted to seize Kashmir. In 1971 India supported 
the creation of Bangladesh.  
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Union31 (Nayar 2003, p. 217) and was thus concerned about the possibility of the United States 
getting access to a military base in Triconmalee (Bullion 1995; Kodikara 1987; Rao 1988). 
Obtaining Triconmalee, in India’s assessment “would antagonize … [India’s] key ally, the Soviet 
Union … threatening its [Soviet Union’s] geopolitical interests in the strategically important 
Indian Ocean" (Bullion 1995, p. 43). However, both the United States and Sri Lanka denied that 
possibility (Kodikara 1987; Manor & Segal 1985; Fernando 1973). After the riots in July 1983, 
India confirmed that Sri Lanka was looking for assistance from abroad (Rao 1988). In fact, United 
States government officials visited Sri Lanka beginning in August 198332. Although it did not have 
“official articulation” (Kodikara 1987, p. 645), India declared Indira’s Doctrine which basically 
stated that “India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless 
requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by an outside power; if external assistance is 
needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help” (Rao 1988, p. 
422).  
Despite Indira’s Doctrine, Sanchez Nieto (2008) reports that the United States sold 
weapons to the government for (1) “the creation of a Voice of America radio station in the island”; 
(2) “for allowing US Navy ships to dock in Colombo”; (3) for giving “limited diplomatic 
recognition to the Israeli state” (Sanchez Nieto 2008 p. 585). In 1984 the United Kingdom said no 
to Sri Lanka, but by 1986 “turned a blind eye to the activities of the Channel Islands Company 
KMS (Keeny Meeny Services), a group of ex-SAS (Special Air Services) personnel, recruited by 
                                                          
31 In 1971 India signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty and the Soviets provided “70 per cent of India’s imported 
weapons and spare parts, and was its second largest trading partner and major source of oil” (Bullion 1994, p. 73). 
32 “Beginning with Caspar Weinberger … in August 1983 … General Vernon Walters, US Ambassador-at-large, 
Senator Addabo, Chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee, and the US Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for South Asia, Howard Schaeffer. Following upon these visits, the United States announced a US $73 million 
economic assistance package for Sri Lanka, and President invitation to visit the United States in June 1984” (Kodikara 
1987, p. 645-646). 
 165 
 
Sri Lanka to train their newly-formed [a paramilitary organization] STF (Special Task Force)" 
(Bullion 1995, p. 83).  
This chapter analyzes why there was a non-genocide in 1971 and a genocide in 1989 and 
why Harff’s model was not able to predict the second event. The explanation centers on the study 
of regional politics and their impact in the conflicts. In particular, India’s attempt to balance its 
power in the Indian Ocean as well as to placate its own Tamil population led India to have a 
contradictory, two-sided approach to Sri Lanka (mediation and military support) which affected 
violence dynamics. As summarized by Bullion (1995), “the Tamil groups themselves became 
complicit agents in the Indian 'hegemonic' strategy, only to be dropped when this was deemed 
politically expedient" (Bullion 1995, p. 3). 
In the case of the non-genocide in 1971, the violence was a response to lack of political 
participation. But violence in 1971 was not a genocide/politicide: violence did not spread to 
civilians and it was not a targeted and systematic plan by the government to kill a certain sector of 
the population (Kearny & Jiggins 2011, p. 621). The direct support in the form of arms can be 
viewed as contributing to the escalation of the conflict and thus to the second event, the genocide 
of 1989, via an arms race (Lindberg, Orjuela, Wezeman & Åkerström 2011): “During 26 years of 
war, the arms race between the two prevented either of the parties from winning over the other, 
while escalating the human and economic costs of the war” (Lindberg, Orjuela, Wezeman & 
Åkerström 2011, p. 7). The arms race between the LTTE and the government drew India into Sri 
Lanka, which became the JVP’s call of war for their second attempt at revolution. India’s attempt 
to bring peace paradoxically provided the JVP with the justification for a second attempt of 
revolution in 1987.   
Although the internal conditions that gave rise to both events were the practically same 
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(Hill 2013; Kearny & Jiggins 2011), including unemployment and expulsion from political 
participation, the main difference between the two events is India’s larger role in Sri Lanka and 
the increase in violence after the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement was signed. It is impossible to know 
for certain if the JVP would have risen to arms if the IPKF had not intervened. It is true that they 
had tried to fight the government in the past and it is also true that they had internal grievances. 
Certainly, the JVP’s reasons to fight were evident by 1983 when they were excluded from political 
arena and blamed for the 1983 riots. However, the IPKF provided the justification for the 
insurrection and provided the JVP with the perfect opportunity to amass arms and support.  
Widespread opposition to the Indian intervention fueled JVP’s sentiments not only against 
India and Tamil, but also against the government of Jayarwadene for having allowed the Indians 
into Sri Lanka. The IPKF intervention was the precipitant factor the JVP needed to rally and to 
keep support for their fight. It provided the JVP with the opportunity to attack.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Genocide is not a new crime. For centuries, genocides of different scales have been 
committed all over the world. In 1948 the world community pledged to not let it happen again with 
the United Nations Genocide Convention. Yet, the systematic targeting for killing of a particular 
group of people (whether political or ethnic groups) remains a common experience. It is implicit 
that the ultimate goal in understanding events like genocide and politicide is to prevent them. While 
a majority of studies and analysis place most of their focus on internal conditions, it is the basic 
premise of this dissertation that in order to understand why genocide and politicide occur it is 
important to assess both its internal and its external causes as well as their interactions. Using case-
study methodology, this work analyzed three cases: Iraq, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Each case has 
at least two events classified by Harff as genocide/politicide or non-genocide/politicide, with one 
accurately predicted and others not accurately predicted by Harff’s (2003) statistical model. The 
dissertation used a modified version of Stoett’s (2004) classification of state involvement to assess 
the role of external variables at the onset of these crimes: effects of colonialism at state creation, 
direct assistance, and indirect support. The main research question centered on the effect of 
external variables on the probability of geno-/politicide: (1) what external factors have the most 
impact on the onset and progression of genocide and politicide?; and, (2) how do these factors 
interact with domestic variables to generate the conditions that give rise to such events?  
Methodologically, the dissertation expanded the scope of previous analysis. By using case-
studies, the role of the external variables was highlighted so that their role could be assessed as the 
main objective of study. Additionally, case-studies made it possible to observe the interaction 
between the external and the internal and how those dynamics worked at the onset of genocide and 
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politicide. Furthermore, whereas Harff’s scores of the internal variables provided a snapshot of the 
internal variables, on average five years, before an event took place, the case-studies allowed to 
expand the time-frame of study making it possible to observe how interactions and dynamics took 
shape and evolved over time. This allowed the study to observe the separate events in the same 
state as a continuum, thus making it possible to assess how external variables had an effect in the 
years previous to and during the onset of the event; the wider timeframe allowed to see in which 
ways external variables in the past influenced, constituted and created the events in the future and 
which ones had a larger impact. 
The interactions and dynamics between the internal and the external was assessed using 
Bellamy’s (2011) categorization of reasons, means, and opportunity. Although Bellamy wrote that 
the opportunity can be affected by external actors, the cases in the dissertation show that external 
actors (mainly states but also the United Nations and even non-state actors) can also affect the 
reasons to commit the atrocities as well as provide or deny the means for committing such 
atrocities. All reasons, means and opportunity can occur simultaneously, such as in the case of the 
invasion of East Timor where the Indonesian government/military had reason to invade and to 
attack because most East Timorese wanted to remain independent of Indonesia, and where they 
also had the means and created opportunity for themselves by assessing the responses to the 
invasion from the United States, Portugal, and Australia beforehand. By branding Fretilin as 
communists, they also continued to place themselves in the same camp as the West in the cold 
war, making it easier to justify their claim. This was also the case for Iraq in 1988, with a 
combination of reasons, means and opportunity at the same time. For the most part, in the cases 
presented in this dissertation the reasons may have been brewing since before independence, while 
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means and opportunities usually have a more recent effect. Opportunities to commit the crimes are 
embedded in the international context, usually via indirect support.  
The case studies revealed that the external factors can have both direct and indirect effects 
which can increase or decrease the probability of genocide/politicide. Overall, direct assistance 
and indirect support had the most impact at the onset, providing both means and opportunities to 
commit the crimes, and in some cases, even the reasons for engaging in genocide or politicide. 
While the effects of colonization are the main root cause of conflict; these effects had already been 
embedded in the domestic conditions. This does not mean that these effects were not present at the 
onset. In fact, in some cases, such as Sri Lanka, the past was instrumentalized to achieve certain 
goals. What it means is that there were other actions occurring after independence and before the 
onset of genocide that had a more immediate effect on the probability of genocide/politicide. 
 
Effects of colonialism 
 
This study found that the effects of independence had influenced the onset of conflict, but 
that effect varied across the cases and for the most part the effect was indirect. In both Iraq and 
East Timor calls for independence began before state creation but the effect toward genocide was 
stronger in the case of East Timor where the process of independence was underway when it was 
hijacked by Indonesia. In this case, the fact that the majority of the East Timorese wanted 
independence provided the Indonesian government with the reason to attack; Indonesia needed to 
annex East Timor before their independence was recognized internationally. Of course by this time 
Indonesia had already received both direct and indirect support from the West. On the contrary, 
the effects of colonialism at state creation were not as strong by themselves in the other cases, 
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where the onset of genocide was preceded by a mix of direct and indirect support.  
In Iraq, while calls for autonomy or independence for the Kurds began even before 
independence, both genocidal events did not occur until years later, meaning that in the time 
between independence and the first and second genocides there were other events that affected the 
probability of genocide.  Certainly, Kurdistan could have been created at the end of World War I 
or in 1930, when Iraq was established, but this did not occur. This double denial of their 
independent state or at least some autonomy gave the Iraqi Kurds reasons for rebelling against the 
government. But internal and external events in the 1970s and in the 1980s contributed to generate 
the genocidal policies toward the Kurds. It was the direct and indirect assistance provided to the 
Iraqi regime as well as to the Kurdish militias that provided reasons, opportunity and means to 
trigger genocide.  
In the other cases, Indonesia in 1965 and Sri Lanka in 1971 and in 1989, the victim groups 
were not attacked because they wanted a state of their own, although the reasons for the attacks 
were embedded in the political systems created after independence in which different political 
groups were seeking access to government. In the case of Indonesia in 1965, the Killings, was 
about stopping the communists from controlling political power. In the case of Sri Lanka, it was 
the JVP, a communist party attempting to seize political power. In these two instances, the effects 
of colonialism at state creation were indirect.  
In all the cases studied, one common key element is that no powerful state and no major 
power in the region wanted to see an independent Kurdistan, Tamil Eelam or East Timor, either at 
the moment of independence or afterwards. During the period studied, only in the case of East 
Timor did the prospects change in 1999 [in the case of Iraq, the Kurds were able to obtain 
autonomy in 2006, during the United States’ invasion to Iraq]. In all three cases, however, the 
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search for independence by the different groups increased with time, providing further reasons for 
both militant groups and government forces to attack each other, and for government forces to 
extend their attack onto the civilian population. 
 
Direct assistance 
  
 In general, direct assistance from abroad provided the governments of Indonesia, Iraq and 
Sri Lanka with the means to produce genocide/politicide. But direct assistance was sometimes also 
extended to the militant groups, and not only from external states, but from NGOs as well. There 
are three basic types of external direct assistance on the cases included in the dissertation. First, 
cases in which only the government received external direct support: Indonesia and Sri Lanka (for 
the conflict with the JVP in 1971 and in 1987-1989). Second, cases in which both militant groups 
and the government received direct support from abroad: Iraq and Sri Lanka (for the conflict with 
the LTTE). A third type can be considered a subsection of the second one, in which both the 
government and militant groups received external support but the external powers shifted support 
from one group to the other, such as in the conflict within Iraq (this change in directionality is 
further discussed in a section below). 
In the events in Indonesia and in East Timor, the Indonesia military received direct support 
from the West, obtaining the means to engage in the atrocities continuously until the end of the 
1990s. Indonesia was already receiving direct support during the massacre of communists in 1965, 
continued receiving it throughout the invasion of East Timor, and was still receiving arms and 
other forms of direct assistance even in the late 1990s, when the political climate had started to 
change and some states, like the United States, had prohibited the sale of weapons to Indonesia. It 
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is likely that this lost support helped decrease the conditions for escalation in 1997.  
Regarding The Killings in particular, only the Indonesian military received external direct 
support; there is no evidence that the communists received support. In fact, the communists had 
been targeted without a war going on (although there had been a coup prior to the Killings, the 
coup was not widespread violence, it was contained). This is different from all other cases; the 
most relevant comparison is the violence against the JVP in Sri Lanka in 1971, also without an 
ongoing war, but this event did not progress into genocide. The first JVP attempt of revolution 
ended quickly, in less than a month, without civilian casualties (a non-genocide/politicide), 
probably because the JVP did not have any type of support (internal or external). Thus, there was 
no compelling reason to expand the conflict.  
In the case of Sri Lanka, although the volume of conventional arms received by the 
government of Sri Lanka was small compared to Iraq and Indonesia, when considering population, 
it is comparable to the aid provided to Indonesia123, thus the means provided were still significant. 
Additional instability was generated due to the direct support provided to the LTTE, first from 
India and then from the diaspora. This contributed to the complexity of the conflict and led to the 
second JVP insurrection and consequently the eventual targeting of the JVP by the regime. During 
their second attempt, while the JVP still did not have external direct support, they were able to 
amass a substantial amount of internal support, including support from members of the military, 
which meant they had access to weapons. Once that support ended, the JVP was defeated, but the 
increased threat and the widespread instability due to the conflict with the Tamil likely made this 
conflict escalate. 
In the case of Iraq and the Kurds, it is evident that both the Iraqi government and Iraqi 
                                                          
123 From 1960 to 1995 (the periods covered throughout the three main cases), Iraq received 44,156 TIV; Indonesia, 
9,678 TIV and Sri Lanka, 773 TIV (www.SIPRI.org). 
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militant groups were able to get access to direct support from abroad. During the 1965-1975 period 
the Iraqi military obtained weapons and training from the Soviet Union. The closer the relationship 
between Iraq and the Soviet Union, the more the United States paid attention to the Kurds. But the 
United States was not the only one interested in providing the Kurds with the means (weapons, 
equipment, logistical support, etc.); Israel and Iran also had tangible interests in debilitating the 
Iraqi regime. All them provided or removed that support depending on their immediate national 
security goals. For instance, when Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Accord, all support provided to 
the Kurds disappeared and the Kurds were crushed. During the war with Iran, the Kurds received 
some support again from Iran --for which they paid severely during the Anfal campaign-- while at 
the same time, the Iraqi government was receiving material support not only from the Soviet 
Union, but also from the United States and other Western states as well as other states, mainly in 
the Arab world. The support the Kurds were receiving from Iran was not enough to overcome the 
imbalance.  
 In general, when a militant group was not able to obtain direct support from abroad, they 
were quickly defeated. In the case of Iraq, both the PUK and the KDP initiated insurgencies against 
the government with support from abroad, but were defeated when the support ended. In the case 
of Sri Lanka, the JVP did not obtain support from abroad on any occasion. They were quickly 
defeated during their first attempt, contributing to the non-occurrence of genocide/politicide. 
However, during their second attempt at revolution, they had internal support from the Sinhalese 
population and even from members of the Sinhalese military, which allowed them to fight longer. 
However, as soon as this support ended, the JVP was defeated. In the case of Indonesia, the victims 
groups did not have much access to external support either. In the politicide in 1965, the 
communists were massacred without much difficulty or condemnation. In the case of East Timor, 
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the East Timorese had access to some weapons left by the Portuguese, but this was not significant.  
In all cases studied, there is a conflict and violence perpetrated by the regime in power, but 
it is important to understand under which conditions the regime retaliated not only against the 
militant groups, but also against the general population that sympathized with these groups with 
the objective of preventing further uprisings. The events studied indicate that when militant groups 
receive significant support, even if temporarily, the regime is more likely to retaliate against the 
general population when the opportunity arises, perhaps due to them being perceived as more of a 
threat. On the other hand, when little or no external support was given, retaliation was more likely 
to be limited to those participating in the revolt. In this case, the participation of external states by 
supporting militants may provide the motivation to committing crimes.  
 
Indirect support 
 
One of the most important findings in the dissertation is that indirect support or lack thereof 
(which in this study included political support and strategic indifference) had a very strong effect 
on the onset of genocide/politicide, both in terms of increasing and decreasing its probability. But 
it also can reduce or increase the effect of the other two external variables analyzed in the cases, 
the effects of state creation and direct support, as well as effect on the internal variables originally 
considered in Harff’s model. This is because indirect support can provide the right international 
setting, creating opportunities for enabling or restraining leaders from engaging in 
genocide/politicide. Indirect assistance can take two basic forms: (1) external actors provide 
indirect assistance to the governments by suppressing information from the militant groups, the 
media and/or other states; (2) external actors provide indirect support to the governments by giving 
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de facto or tacit approval for the crimes or by letting on that they will not interfere in their affairs 
(either in private meetings or by stopping action in the United Nations against that particular state).  
 In the case of Iraq, indirect assistance was provided to Saddam Hussein by not letting 
Barzani know that Iran and Iraq were making a deal in 1975. The KDP was unaware that they were 
likely to lose Iran’s support and attacked as planned. Indirect assistance was also given to the Iraqi 
government by denying that Iraq was using chemical weapons against its own population as early 
as 1983. This certainly made it more likely for Iraq to continue the use of these weapons, 
culminating with Anfal. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia, indirect assistance to the government 
is evident when the United Nations kept the issue of East Timor on the agenda, but nothing was 
really done about it. Indonesia was able to operate under the assumption that there would not be 
consequences from the international community. Regarding Sri Lanka, no evidence of indirect 
assistance was found in the sources consulted for the first event. For the second event, there is a 
manifestation of strategic indifference; there was not much attention being given to Sri Lanka from 
abroad, even after the events of 1983 were brought to the United Nations. Other than India, there 
were no other states who had a strategic interest in Sri Lanka and therefore the ethnic war did not 
attract much attention (especially at a time that the superpowers were more concerned about events 
in Pakistan).  This may have helped the decision of the government to retaliate against the JVP 
and its sympathizers. 
Perhaps the most important aspect observed regarding indirect support is that proof or 
likelihood of strategic indifference provided the perpetrators with assurance that they could 
commit the crimes without involvement of outside powers. Indeed, this further confirms that repeat 
offenders are more likely to engage in genocide (Horowitz 2002; Harff 2003; Fein 1993; Thaler 
2012). Iraq is definitely an extreme case of this situation, in which the material and political support 
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from external powers (including both the United States and the Soviet Union) led Saddam Hussein 
to assess correctly that an extensive genocidal campaign such as Anfal and the use of chemical 
weapons would go unpunished. Only after the interests of the West in the region were affected did 
this support end. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, endangering oil supplies, the West began to 
take a positive approach toward the Iraqi Kurds and turned against Saddam Hussein. Similarly, a 
positive reaction from the West to the targeting of communists in Indonesia signaled to Suharto 
that Indonesia had their support (or at the very least that the West would not intervene). That 
Suharto consulted Australia and the United States before the invasion in 1975 further proves that 
perpetrators assess external responses before committing the crimes. But as the case of East Timor 
clearly shows, indirect support can affect a conflict to also favor the victims. When the 
international political and economic climate changed in the 1990s, the indirect support to the 
government of Indonesia became indirect support toward the East Timorese population. While in 
the case of Iraq the change in support to the regime came from economic/security concerns in the 
region, in the case of Indonesia and East Timor the change came from the continuous and 
increasing pressure from activists, journalists and NGOs. These changes closed the opportunity 
for the governments to keep committing the crimes. 
 Indirect assistant did not play as large a role in Sri Lanka as in Iraq and Indonesia. 
Although the IPKF intervened militarily in Sri Lanka --which was India’s response to the attacks 
on Jaffna-- the invasion only sparked more violence from all sides and neither the government nor 
the militant groups in Sri Lanka were deterred. But this case helps to illustrate another important 
issue regarding indirect assistance, which refers to how factions within conflicts instrumentalize 
the actions of foreign states and non-state actors to justify, initiate, convince or gain support for 
their own fights and provide reason for conflict escalation. This was clear in the case of Sri Lanka 
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and the JVP. Indian mediation and later intervention in Sri Lanka was perceived by some members 
of the Sinhalese community, and particularly to those sympathetic to the plights of the JVP, as 
sufficient reason to fight the Sri Lankan government. Although the second JVP attempt at 
revolution was not just a reaction to the Tamil-Sihalese conflict and to the Indian intervention, 
these were the reasons used by the JVP to fight and to gather sympathizers for their revolt. 
 
Changes in directionality of direct and indirect assistance 
 
A recurring theme of the cases analyzed is the complexity of the situation, in which several 
militias are present and where various external states are involved, usually with some states 
supporting the militias and others the government, and even situations in which the same states 
provided support to both the government and the militant groups at some point during the conflict. 
External states had very specific reasons for providing/removing the assistance to either the 
government or to the militant groups, or both. Thus, when their interests changed, the assistance 
could be removed completely or given to the opposite group. This resulted in changes of 
directionality of the direct and indirect assistance to both the government and the militant groups 
as the conflict progressed. 
When supporting the perpetrators, external actors gave them implicit approval and 
protection; when supporting the rebellion but without strong action against the perpetrators, it can 
result in strengthening the perpetrator's resolve, triggering genocide. This was the case in Iraq in 
1963-1975 and in the Anfal campaign in 1988, with external actors supporting both sides and 
inciting violence. For the first event in particular, a case with low political upheaval quickly 
escalated due to external interests supporting different factions. This dynamics could not have been 
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detected by Harff’s quantitative model because it considered the internal variables in the previous 
three to five years before the genocide began.  
The change in directionality of support can also explain why the cases progressed further 
into genocide or politicide or why they did not. It is clear from the case of Indonesia that the change 
from support to non-support was a major factor in Indonesia’s decision to let East Timor go. While 
the United States had supported Suharto militarily during the cold war, the overt support began to 
change at the beginning of the 1990s. When political support decreased in the mid-1990s, the 
probability for Indonesia to commit genocide or politicide lessened. Although the United Nations 
had never recognized the annexation of East Timor as a legitimate act, this did not had any impact 
on Indonesia’s occupation of the island. It was not until states like the United States and Australia 
began to advocate for East Timor’s independence the mid-1990’s that the prospect changed. This 
was partly due to the change in the international political environment, with the end of the Cold 
War and the beginning of humanitarian interventions. But it was also a response to non-
governmental organizations that began to pressure local governments. The fact that the Indonesian 
military and paramilitary groups began to destroy East Timor after the vote, show that they were 
following the same tactics as they did in 1975 but were stopped in 1999.   
Similarly, the government of Iraq also experienced the change in the directionality of the 
support received from abroad, both direct and indirect. Unlike Indonesia, however, the change in 
the directionality of support benefited the central government of Iraq for the events studied (this 
quickly changed when Iraq decided to attack Kuwait). While during the early 1970s the United 
States was supporting the Kurds against the government of Iraq, after the Iranian revolution, the 
United States (among other states) began to support the Iraqi government. For the Iraqi government 
this meant increasing support from different states. Meanwhile, the Kurds began collaborating with 
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Iran again on and off during the mid-1980s, which the Iraqi regime used as their reason and 
opportunity to brand the KDP and PUK as traitors and attacked them in 1987 and 1988. Because 
Iraq had been receiving direct support throughout the war with Iran, the regime had the resources 
to do so. For the Kurds, this change in directionality of support was devastating. Their loss of 
support from the United States and the increased support of Iraq provided the means and 
opportunity for the crimes.  
Furthermore, it is not only the governments perpetrating the crimes that take into account 
the external environment. Leaders of the different militias also have expectations about the support 
they may receive from abroad and act accordingly. For instance, the KDP decided to continue the 
attack in 1975 expecting that the support was going to continue, only to be blindsided by the 
Algiers Accord. Similarly, expecting support from abroad the Fretilin government in East Timor 
declared independence, but did not know that Portugal, the United States and Australia had already 
provided tacit approval for the invasion. 
 
Non-state actors  
 
In addition, it was also found that external non-state actors can influence the directionality 
of the assistance provided by external powers. Moreover, assistance provided by non-state actors 
can change in directionality as well. In the case of East Timor, non-state actors decreased the 
probability of genocide/politicide. In the case of Sri Lanka, the diaspora initially increased the 
probability of genocide/politicide by providing direct and indirect support to the LTTE. However, 
in the late 1990s the diaspora turned against the LTTE for increasing their atrocities against 
civilians and recruiting of child soldiers.  
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 Non-state actors made a significant difference for East Timor, especially after 1997; the 
East Timorese networks had expanded during the 1990s and appealed to different governments 
abroad to support East Timor. This was not the case for the Kurds. Although the Iraqi Kurds had 
some links with the Kurds in other states, especially in Iran, the networks were not as significant 
and could not be relied on when support from states was denied. In fact, the Kurds had been used 
by different governments to fight against each other and against other states. 
 
Back to R2P 
 
Overall, the research in the dissertation shows that external variables not only influence 
leader’s decision-making but they also have a constitutive effect on the states where the crimes 
were committed. The cases in the dissertation show that onset and conduct of genocide does not 
result from a static set of variables, but a dynamic interaction between internal and external 
variables. 
The main objective of R2P is to prevent and/or stop cases of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. The main drawbacks of the R2P documents is that they 
do not consider the role that the external environment can have in the crimes covered by R2P and 
how the international context affects actions for prevention and/or intervention. For instance, both 
R2P documents, Mobilizing the Will to Intervene and Preventing Genocide, provide reasons for 
their governments (Canada and the United States, respectively) to intervene in a crisis (for 
instance, the cost of non-intervention: refugees, spillover effects, etc.). But they do not take into 
account the bigger picture of geo-politics and why a state does not intervene in a given crisis or 
the many ways in which a state is involved in a crisis. For Mobilizing the Will to Intervene, the 
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problem is that external governments are worried about votes in their own countries, which leads 
them not to act. In the case of the document Preventing Genocide, they argue that genocide 
prevention is not a national priority and claim that the United States needs to make it a priority and 
improve its own capacity to intervene.  
I argue there is more to be done; understanding the role of external actors at the onset of 
genocide can lead to the identification of tangible actions that states can take to prevent genocide 
from taking place. If these policies can be implemented by documents similar to Mobilizing the 
Will to Intervene and Preventing Genocide, perhaps an improvement may be realized. It is not 
simple. As this dissertation reveals, these conflicts are long, complex, and have root causes in the 
distant past. How can conflicts that have no real beginning be prevented? How can something that 
is ongoing be prevented? Furthermore, the external involvement abroad reflects broader dynamics 
of international security and political issues. For instance, the Cold War literature explains how 
the Soviet Union and the United States both used their resources in third party countries to try to 
tip the balance in their favor. It is important to consider this in genocide studies. This study also 
shows that it was not only governments, but also militant groups who were being drawn into the 
dynamics of the Cold War and who also attempted to play Cold War fears in their favor, as seen 
with the Iraqi Kurds. It is also evident that the external factors that were at play throughout these 
years were centered on the dynamics of the Cold War (Iraq and Indonesia’s first event) and 
regional balance of power (Iraq, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka). Assessed through this perspective, the 
fate of the Kurds in particular (but to some degree the fate of the victims in the other cases) is not 
dissimilar to other ethnic groups around the world, as Little (2010) explained: "In a classic Cold 
War story that would be repeated from the central highlands of Vietnam to the rugged savannas of 
Angola, U.S. policymakers exploited ancient ethnic and tribal fault lines inside Kurdistan to 
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achieve short-term geopolitical advantage. U.S. officials displayed neither diplomatic commitment 
nor sentimental attachment to the Kurds, whom they viewed as little more than spoilers in a 40-
year struggle to keep the Soviet Union and its Arab clients like Iraq off balance" (p. 64). The same 
is accurate for Indonesia and Sri Lanka. 
Overall, the study found that external factors can have a very strong influence on the onset 
of genocide, and it is very likely that external factors by themselves could be the leading cause of 
a genocidal event. Internal factors are necessary but sometimes not sufficient. It was found that 
external factors may be catalytic, but do not have to be deterministic. What is clear is that even 
domestic problems are not entirely domestic. There are always external forces reinforcing, 
creating, decreasing or aggravating whatever is happening within a state.  
While some research indicates that external states can restrain others from engaging in 
genocide (Harff & Gurr 1988), others point that external states, including democratic regimes, 
“have been patrons and accomplices of genocidal regimes elsewhere.” (Fein 1993, p. 79) This 
dissertation found evidence supporting both positions. In general, by providing direct assistance, 
via material contributions (weapons, intelligence, etc.), as well as indirect support, external states 
have increased the probability of genocide and politicide by providing the means and the 
opportunities for governments to commit these crimes against their own population. At the same 
time, however, the cases show that by removing indirect support, as was the case in Indonesia in 
the mid-1990s, the probability of genocide and politicide is reduced. In this case, the removal of 
that indirect support, despite the fact that the military continued to receive the means, removed the 
opportunity to continue with a genocidal situation in East Timor. Indirect does not mean that it is 
not powerful; it simply reflects that no tangible assistance is given. However, indirect support can 
be even more important. Most material assistance such as transfer of weapons pales when 
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compared from a guarantee for a superpower to prevent any sort of outside intervention against a 
regime. Ultimately, it is important to pay close attention to the changes in directionality of external 
assistance, both from states and non-state actors, because these changes can be the pivot to de-
escalate or escalate a conflict.  
The current approach on preventing these crimes has not proved very effective. The roots 
of most of these conflicts are internal or come from a relatively distant past, but this study shows 
that the international environment has great influence on the outcome of the events. New policies 
should include such factors, both in providing the conditions for the crimes to occur and in 
allowing or preventing any intervention to stop them. The question is how to handle states’ 
interests and the interaction between world powers to prevent genocidal situations and whether 
external states can integrate the needs and interests of civilians in other states with their own. It is 
not simple and perhaps not likely, but it is not impossible. In the words of Martti Ahtisaari, 
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008: “Wars and conflicts are not inevitable. They are caused 
by human beings. There are always interests that are furthered by war. Therefore those who have 
power and influence can also stop them. Peace is a question of will.”   
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